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Ambiguous truth - A true story  
(as far as I can remember it)
In the summer of 1966 I was 23 years old and had chucked a promising career teaching 
in economics to co-manage an experimental pop group with no record deal, only limited 
technical ability, but bags of ideas, most of them generated by the singer, guitarist 
and main songwriter, an even younger guy who everyone called Syd.1 His band was 
transitioning from being The Pink Floyd Sound to just Pink Floyd,2 though most of their 
fans informally carried on abbreviating to “the Floyd” or just “Floyd”.3 I was on my way to 
visit Syd at his room in Peter and Suzy’s flat in Earlham St4 when I heard a track from the 
American band Love.5 There was a section that stuck in my brain, it was an earworm and 
I could not get it out of my head. When I saw Syd; I asked him if he had heard the new 
Love album6 – he hadn’t. As I explained that I had heard this great riff, I was very charged 
up by this earworm, and mouthed it to him: “dah dah dah dah-dah dahdi-dah DAH”, or 
something like that.7 Now, I am definitely not personally musical, and I certainly cannot 
sing or hum in tune. Despite that, as I hummed the riff, Syd picked up his guitar and played 
it back to me. I recognised it as what I had been trying to hum and then; he continued 
to work on the riff, and then after a while I left, with Syd obsessively reproducing and 
reworking my somewhat, atonal humming on his guitar. Shortly afterwards Syd played the 
[re-worked] riff to the rest of the band who adapted it as an instrumental which became 
known as ‘Interstellar Overdrive’.8 It was the perfect title for a psychedelic tune from the 
leading ‘underground band’ of the time. As it developed, it became a long, improvised 
instrumental track for the whole band, and it helped define their ‘sound’. It became almost 
their signature song, and was filmed a couple of times, notably by Peter Whitehead.9 It 
was played live at the UFO10 Club and it became the closing song in the band’s live shows, 
and for all the other gigs in that early period. In many ways it defined the band’s unique 
character as a visual, multi-media substantially instrumental and improvisational group. 
When signing, or dealing with initial contracts in early Floyd days, our ignorance was 
massive, both of the music business, copyright and contracts. Initially we talked with our 
agent, Bryan Morrison, who had some experience. Bryan advised us on a record deal 
and suggested we should go with the biggest company and get the largest cheque we 
could. This turned out to be EMI who offered us a large advance,11 and access to Abbey 
1 Syd’s real name was Roger Barrett. There was of course another Roger in the Floyd: Roger Waters. Identifying 
the contributions of the membership of the original Pink Floyd becomes more than a little ambiguous,.
2 Pink Floyd went through a range of names in the early days.
3 Today we call that fan input co-creation or “prosuming”.
4 Peter and Susan Wynne-Wilson? 
5 Love were an American rock band from Los Angeles highly rated by 1960’s music fans in the UK
6 The album was ‘Love’ by ‘Love’, the bands first studio album for Elektra Records released 1966. Source: 
Strong, Martin C. (2000). The Great Rock Discography (5th ed.). Edinburgh: Mojo Books. pp. 585–586
7 The LOVE recording was a cover of a Burt Bacharach song which also had words and melodies, of which to 
this day I have no recollection, at all. What I had heard and remembered was merely a riff within that track.
8 “Interstellar Overdrive” was one of the very first psychedelic instrumental improvisations recorded by a rock 
band.It was seen as Pink Floyd’s first foray into space rock Source: Manning, Toby (2006). The Rough 
Guide to Pink Floyd (1st ed.). London: Rough Guides. p. 180.
9 Film Director Peter Whitehead used Interstellar Overdrive as the theme for the seminal 1960’s zeitgeist 
movie “Tonite lets make love in London” – A 16 min version of the song was recorded and filmed by 
Whitehead in 1967 at John Wood’s Sound Techniques in Chelsea.
10 The UFO Club was founded by John Hopkins (usually known as “Hoppy”) and Joe Boyd in an Irish dancehall 
called the “Blarney Club” in the basement of 31 Tottenham Court Road, under the Gala Berkeley Cinema. 
11 EMI advance.
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Road.12 EMI were in great economic shape in full Beatles mode, at the time, and they 
provided Norman Smith13 as a producer, who had previously been an engineer on the 
Beatles sessions. When negotiating the contract, we were advised by a very nice lawyer 
who had no experience of the music industry. None of us had any idea about what really 
mattered in a record deal, and what might be the implications. When we asked those we 
negotiated with about something we didn’t understand we were regularly told it was a 
‘standard industry’ clause. The same advice applied to the publishing deal. We did not 
really understand the life of copyright, the implications of assignment or so many other 
things such as royalty rates, life of contract, assignment of rights, which we were told were 
‘standard industry practice’ and we knew no better. 
Later, in 1970 I produced a record14 with Roy Harper15, for EMI’s Harvest records label.16 
I was still very new to the game and we were recording his version of a traditional British 
folk song called ‘The Girl from the North Country’.17 Roy just assumed it was ‘a traditional 
folk song’. However, we were informed by the label that the song was being claimed by 
Bob Dylan’s publisher as one of his. As an industry novice, I had no desire to take on Dylan 
and his people,18 so I just took EMI’s word for it. It was only later that I realised that it was 
indeed a traditional British folk song, which was clearly Public Domain19, and that Dylan 
had previously been in England20 where he had probably heard it in a British folk club. 
Dylan’s publishers however, just claimed it via the standard industrial structures and as 
there was no dispute raised, the system sent the publishing money off to Dylan’s people 
12 EMI Recording Studios Abbey Road - 3 Abbey Road, St John’s Wood, City of Westminster, London - 
13 Producer Norman Smith was the engineer on all of the EMI studio recordings by the Beatles until the autumn 
of 1965, when EMI promoted him from engineer to producer. He began working with Pink Floyd in 1967.
14 Flat Baroque and Berserk was the first of Roy Harper’s recordings to enter the charts, reaching number 20 
in the UK album chart in January 1970. 
15 “One of Britain’s most complex and eloquent lyricists and genuinely original songwriters... much admired 
by his peers” - McCormick, Neil (12 November 2013). “Roy Harper: ‘I’m inspired to carry on’”. The Daily 
Telegraph. London. Retrieved 15 November 2013.
16 Harvest Records is a British record label belonging to Capitol Music Group, originally created by EMI, active 
from 1969.
17 Girl from the North Country is a song written by Bob Dylan. It was recorded at Columbia Recording Studios 
in New York City in April 1963, and released the following month as the second track on Dylan’s second 
studio album, The Freewheelin’ Bob Dylan. Dylan re-recorded the song as a duet with Johnny Cash in 
February 1969. – Source: Bjorner, Olof (November 21, 2015). “5th Nashville Skyline session, 18 February 
1969”. bjorner.com. Retrieved October 31, 2016. Harpers version was released as ‘North’ on the album 
Valentine (1973).
18 Bob Dylan’s manager Albert Grossman was known as a hard negotiator, he persuaded Dylan to transfer the 
publishing rights of his songs from Duchess Music, whom he had signed a contract with in January 1962, 
to Witmark Music, a division of Warner’s music publishing operation. Dylan signed a contract with Witmark 
on July 13, 1962. Unknown to Dylan, Grossman had also negotiated a deal with Witmark. This gave 
Grossman fifty percent of Witmark’s share of the publishing income generated by any songwriter Grossman 
had brought to the company. This “secret deal” resulted in a bitter legal battle between Dylan and 
Grossman in the 1980s. – Source: Sounes, Howard (2001). Down The Highway: The Life Of Bob Dylan. 
Grove Press, Heylin, Clinton (2009). Revolution in the Air: The Songs of Bob Dylan, Volume One: 1957–73
19 The public domain consists of all the creative works to which no exclusive intellectual property rights 
apply. Those rights may have expired, been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. – Source: 
Boyle, James (2008). The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind. CSPD. p. 38., Graber, 
Christoph B.; Nenova, Mira B. (2008). Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions in a Digital 
Environment. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 173., 
20 While in London in 1962, Dylan met several figures in the local folk scene, including English folksinger Martin 
Carthy. “I ran into some people in England who really knew those [traditional English] songs,” Dylan recalled 
in 1984. “Martin Carthy, another guy named [Bob] Davenport. Martin Carthy’s incredible. I learned a lot of 
stuff from Martin.” Carthy exposed Dylan to a repertoire of traditional English ballads, including Carthy’s own 
arrangement of “Scarborough Fair,” which Dylan drew upon for aspects of the melody and lyrics of “Girl 
from the North Country,” including the line from the refrain “Remember me to one who lives there, she once 
was a true love of mine.”
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establishing a precedent for payment of royalties. I doubt if anyone gave it a moment’s 
thought, certainly no one asked me or Roy about it, and no-one queried the attribution. 
Roy being signed to EMI, also meant we were given the free run of Abbey Road during 
a time when it was a ground-breaking environment. Assistant engineers who became 
engineers and then producers came up with technical innovations, techniques and 
inventions that shaped the sound of the recordings that were produced there, and which 
were widely imitated21. It was in this context that Roy somehow persuaded his friend 
Jimmy Page to come and collaborate with him on the making of Stormcock22. Along with 
Phil McDonald, Peter Bown and John Leckie23 the album was produced with only four 
songs on it. The tracks recorded with Jimmy Page were extraordinary. They worked with 
the studio team to derive complicated repeat echo systems, which were set up all round 
the studio environment, yet all the music was played on acoustic guitars, and nearly all 
live. Jimmy was uncredited at the time as he had to work under an alias on the recording24. 
Stormcock, never a big hit, raised important and interesting questions about attribution, 
such as: How is accurate information about the recording collected and categorised? Who 
should get credited for their creative contribution? What data should be listed, and for 
what reason? 
These stories are intended as an invitation to consider how contractual obligation, employment 
conditions, the fear of litigation and concerns about relative market value and economic return, 
impact the gathering of data and subsequent attribution during the practice of creativity. 
In short, I would argue that there are often essential elements of uncertainty and/or 
ambiguity in trying to assert authoritatively who is/are the writer(s) of a song, who was in 
the band and also, who had creative input. In this respect, deciding who should be paid 
and how much, becomes a very difficult question. This question becomes increasingly 
complicated with the passage of time, and also within the dynamic of a creative 
collective, encountering and engaging each other within a studio environment and/or 
other workspaces. When trying to think about information associated with a recording, 
one has to come to terms with the fact that data detests ambiguity, while on the other 
hand creativity is full of ambiguity. Tiredness, excessive use of drink or drugs, and the 
passage of all combine to make accuracy in recalling and identifying the accurate, ‘true’ 
information, of any event, and particularly a creative event, very challenging. 
21 Abbey Road engineers such as Geoff Emerick and Peter Bown are legends in the industry and invented 
techniques which are now in standard use throughout the industry such as Direct Insertion for electric 
instruments, the choice and placement of microphones and the creative design and use of effects and 
signal processing.
22 Stormcock is the fifth album by English folk/rock singer-songwriter and guitarist Roy Harper. It was first 
released in 1971 by Harvest Records and is widely considered his best record. Savage, Jon (26 January 
2011). “Jon Savage on song: Roy Harper serves up Hors D’Oeuvres”. Theguardian.com. Retrieved 7 
December 2018 - At the time, the album was not particularly well promoted by Harper’s record label. 
Harper later stated: They hated Stormcock. No singles. No way of promoting it on the radio. They said 
there wasn’t any money to market it. Stormcock dribbled out. Nonetheless, Stormcock would remain a 
favourite album of critics and Harper’s fans. In October 2013 NME placed Stormcock at 377 in their list of 
“The 500 Greatest Albums Of All Time - Petridis, Alexis (13 October 2011). “Roy Harper: ‘I fought like hell to 
stay alive’”. Theguardian.com. Retrieved 7 December 2018, NME: The 500 Greatest Albums Of All Time : 
October 2013”. Rocklistmusic.co.uk. Retrieved 7 December 2018.
23 John Leckie (born 23 October 1949) is a record producer and recording engineer. His production credits 
include Magazine’s Real Life (1978), XTC’s White Music (1978) and Dukes of Stratosphear’s 25 O’Clock 
(1985), the Stone Roses’ The Stone Roses (1989), Radiohead’s The Bends (1995), Muse’s Origin of 
Symmetry (2001) and The Levellers’ We the Collective (2018).
24 Jimmy Page was originally credited as S. Flavius Mercurius for contractual reasons.
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There is a lot to be said for accepting that we cannot truly know the truth, but we must 
rely on the most probable and plausible suggestion. Not only is data on the creativity 
inherently uncertain, it is primarily dependent upon the memories of people after the event, 
(and in some cases long after the event). After a period of time, data disappears into the 
hands of people with little, if any, connection with the actual original event. If we consider 
a copyright life of 50 years from the first release of a record, or 70 years after the death 
of the last major writer (in the case of songwriters), the nature and possible extent of the 
problem starts to become appreciable. As time goes by creators and their estates too, 
lose touch with their instinctive understanding of the collective input of their collaborators. 
Consequently, I feel, that there is a case for setting aside a proportion of revenue from 
any recording to be withheld as a fund to compensate for the inevitable accidents and 
inadvertent mistakes that accompany and frustrate attempts to capture and categorise 
unambiguously creativity. 
The implications of these sort of ‘accidents’ were brought home to me when I was 
managing Billy Bragg25, and we went in to see his royalty collection society to look at his 
account, as a matter of curiosity. When we inquired into the system, we were surprised to 
find that Billy was under suspension. As we investigated, we found that what the system 
had identified as the same title, had two separate entries with different ISRC identifier 
codes. This had sent the system into automatic action, concluding that this must be 
Billy’s fault (somehow), and he was put on suspension, (i.e. they stopped paying him). 
The matter remained unresolved until we happened to decide to look up the database. 
In contrast, some years before, when I was looking after Billy‘s early career, working with 
him on his first album ‘Life’s a Riot’,26 we were talking through his repertoire, and there 
was a stand out song called ‘A New England’.27 It came out that the first two lines of this 
song Billy had borrowed from Paul Simon.28 By then I knew a bit more about publishing 
and I remembered the Bob Dylan experience with Roy Harper, so I talked to Billy about the 
problems of authorship. I suggested to Billy that he should write personally to Paul Simon 
and tell him about his use of those two lines, and how he was a fan, and he should ask 
permission to use them. Paul was very gracious and OK’d the use personally to Billy and 
these became the opening lines of Billy’s most successful song. What this story illustrates 
is not only the rather fortuitous nature of so much of the music industry, but also how 
human relationships can often underpin good business. Paul Simon’s publisher may not 
have given permission for the use of the two lines.
25 Billy Bragg’s music blends elements of folk music, punk rock and protest songs, with lyrics that mostly 
span political or romantic themes. His music is heavily centred on bringing about change and involving 
the younger generation in activist causes. Source: Jackiewicz, Edward; Craine, James (2012). “Scales of 
Resistance: Billy Bragg and the Creation of Activist Spaces”. In Johansson, Ola; Bell, Thomas L. Sound, 
Society and the Geography of Popular Music. Farnham, England: Ashgate, Kenny, Michael (2014). The 
Politics of English Nationhood. Oxford University Press.
26 Life’s a Riot with Spy vs Spy is Billy Bragg’s first album, released in 1983. All songs on the original album 
consisted of Bragg singing to his electric guitar accompaniment. The original album played at 45 rpm rather 
than the more usual 33.3 rpm, contained only seven songs and lasted for only 15 minutes and 57 seconds. 
However, rather than being classified as an EP, it qualified for the UK albums chart and reached number 30 
in January 1984. Source: British Hit Singles & Albums (19th ed.). 2006
27 A New England” was released in 1983. It became a hit single when covered by Kirsty MacColl the next year, 
and remains a signature song. The opening lines of the song (“I was 21 years when I wrote this song/I’m 
22 now, but I won’t be for long”) are identical to the opening lines of Paul Simon’s song “Leaves that Are 
Green”, which appears on Simon and Garfunkel’s 1966 album Sounds of Silence. 
28 Paul Simon’s musical career has spanned seven decades, with his fame and commercial success beginning 
as half of the duo Simon & Garfunkel - (originally known as Tom & Jerry), formed in 1956 with Art Garfunkel. 
Simon was responsible for writing nearly all of the pair’s songs, including three that reached number one on 
the U.S. singles charts: Source - Bronson, Fred (2003). The Billboard Book of Number 1 Hits. Billboard Books.
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The fundamental problem, as I see it, is a conflict between the legislative rights and 
benefits that appear to be granted to the creator, and the market conditions that enable  
those rights to become alienated from the creators. Copyright legislation, with its historic 
ethical and religious/moral underpinning has an uneasy relationship with contract law 
which is built upon economic principles. Regulatory or legislative gaps (some of which 
are widened by technological innovation) are often explored and exploited to further these 
economic principles. In my view, contract law should be secondary to the normative legal 
structures that society has developed to balance competing interests in the interests of 
‘fairness’ and to stimulate and encourage creativity.
It’s worth reflecting that one of the most re-used recordings in the history of popular 
music, is a 20 second drum solo, from a 1970s James Brown record called ‘Funky 
Drummer’. Clyde Stubblefield’s drum break was sampled and used on countless Hip-
hop and Electronic Dance tracks, which have grossed millions of dollars in revenue. 
Although Stubblefield was credited as a drummer on the original record, as an employed 
session musician he did not benefit from any royalties in respect of his performance. 
Nevertheless, despite being the most sampled drummer in history, Stubblefield received 
nothing from any of the content which exploited his improvised performance or its capture 
on a phonographic recording.29 He died aged 73 after years of protracted health problems 
and was eulogised throughout the music industry for his unique talent and massive 
contribution. A benefactor30 paid his outstanding $93,000 health bill.31
“All the drum patterns I played with Brown were my own; he never told me how to play 
or what to play, I just played my own patterns, and the hip-hoppers and whatever, the 
people that used the material probably paid him, maybe. But we got nothing. I got none 
of it. It was all my drum product…People use my drum patterns on a lot of these songs. 
They never gave me credit, never paid me. It didn’t bug me or disturb me, but I think it’s 
disrespectful not to pay people for what they use.” (clyde Stubblefield 2015).
My own personal experiences, combined with that of many experienced artist managers 
who have also spoken to even more experienced managers and lawyers, has led to 
my involvement in recent development and growth of ‘label services’ deals between 
artists and labels /distributors. The deal that Billy Bragg (with my advice as his manager) 
developed with Cooking Vinyl32 was particular in this regard. In this agreement, the 
recordings belonged to Billy, and Cooking Vinyl provided services, particularly marketing, 
promotional, financial and distribution, both nationally and internationally. Importantly, 
the deal required both parties to agree on strategy, tactics and expenditure. This type of 
deal demanded responsible and co-operative behaviour on both sides. In short it was 
a partnership where the artist had control of their business and career, but recognised 
that this happened in collaboration with the distributor/investor. Billy made a creative 
investment and cooking vinyl provided business development services.
29 Sisario B. (2011). “Living Legend Tries to Make a Living”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on 
April 6, 2011. 
30 According to Kreps (see below) Prince was the the benefactor who paid the health bill
31 Kreps D. (2017), Clyde Stubblefield, James Brown’s ‘Funky Drummer,’ Dead at 73 - Most sampled 
drummer in hip-hop history dies from kidney failure, Rolling Stone (Feb 18th 2017)
32 Cooking Vinyl is a UK independent record company, based in Acton, London. Founded in 1986 by former 
manager and booking agent Martin Goldschmidt and business partner Pete Lawrence. The company 
focusses on artist service based deals where the artist retains ownership of their copyrights - Label profiles: 
Four independents under the spotlight”. The Independent. 2006-05-23. Retrieved 2018-11-06, Hot Seat: 
Martin Goldschmidt – Founder, Cooking Vinyl”. The Music Network. 2013-12-06. Retrieved 2014-04-07
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There is no doubt that this type of relationship depends on both parties taking 
administration, documentation and reporting processes seriously, and relies upon a 
practical data and communication framework that promotes, builds and underpins trust. 
This is expressed in the form of transparent reporting. However some difficult questions 
are raised with regards to structures which have to deal with an increasingly high volume 
of micro-transactions, such as, when is it no longer economically viable to administer 
payments? Can an avalanche of data and micro reporting really be called transparent? 
In my experience, creators cannot find out how and under what terms their content has 
been used, or the terms and conditions under which others were working, in virtually 
identical situations. This is exacerbated by the use of Non Disclosure Agreements (NDAs)
and Most Favoured Nation Clauses (MFNs) which can have exclusionary effects on rivals, 
new entrants and those pioneering ‘different’ business models.33 
Around 2010, I read about a proposal from the EU for some changes in copyright 
administration34, which related to then current issues around digital content. Given, that 
changes in legal structures take at least ten years to work through the international legal 
forests35, and a further five for implementation, it was better not to be constrained by 
current structures, but rather to think ahead in order to anticipate systems that may need 
to be in place to enable the creative content of 2025 to get through to the public and for 
the creators to have a chance of getting paid properly.
It became clear through discussions that data was the key to the digital future, but that 
this was also about a lot more than just allocating and distributing information and micro 
payments all around the world36. (Attribution is a wide concept with a value that is not 
always directly linked to the payment process.) Technology can change not only the way 
that content is accessed and produced, but also the structure of the businesses, and the 
law, which inevitably needs to adjust to reflect the business changes and their societal 
impact. Music 2025 is probably not looking far enough ahead, but the pace of change 
across the industry is increasingly fast, so it is imperative that we start reflecting on these 
questions now.
33 Salop S., Scott Morton F., Developing an Administrable MFN Enforcement Policy, Antitrust, Vol. 27, No. 2, 
Spring 2013. © 2013 by the American Bar Association
34 The European Union’s (EU) first attempt to unify copyrights in light of digital technologies was adopted in 
2001 as the Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC – In 2010 The EU brought in the Audiovisual & Media Services 
Directive - In 2012, the European Commission (EC) announced that they would be reviewing the 2001 
Directive and having stakeholder discussions in light of several issues raised with failed copyright proposals 
from those in the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services position.
35 Lenz Vs Universal Music Corp. - is a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
affirming the ruling in 2008 of the US District Court for the Northern District of California, holding that 
copyright holders must consider fair use in good faith before issuing a takedown notice for content posted 
on the Internet. Stephanie Lenz posted on YouTube a home video of her child dancing to Prince’s song 
“Let’s Go Crazy”. Universal Music Corporation (Universal) sent YouTube a takedown notice pursuant to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) claiming that Lenz’s video violated their copyright in the “Let’s Go 
Crazy” song. Lenz claimed fair use of the copyrighted material and sued Universal for misrepresentation 
of a DMCA claim. In a decision rejecting a motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claim, the district court 
held that Universal must consider fair use when filing a takedown notice, but noted that to prevail a plaintiff 
would need to show bad faith by a rights holder – [Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (2015), 
(9th Cir. 2015), Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008)]
36 Attribution versus payment.
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Given the ambiguities attached to information concerning who actually performed 
on a recording, or wrote a song37, attribution data needs to be able to be contested, 
queried and disputed. Data management, in my opinion, require that a trusted, regulated 
organisation oversee any policies, procedures and operations. System confidence, in my 
view, is inextricably linked to this exercise of governance. The future will be uncertain in 
many respects, and the socio-economic structures around creative content need to be 
flexible enough to be able to structure systems of investment that facilitate consumption/
use, as well as creator remuneration and reward. We should expect that accessing and 
stimulating creativity will be as important in 2025 as it is now, perhaps even more so.
I am immensely grateful for the opportunity to engage with my colleagues and peers 
across the music industry about these important topics, and I would like to thank everyone 
who has been involved in this project for their generous contributions. This research 
would not have happened without the ongoing help and support of David Humphries at 
UK IPO and the support of both John Mottram at PRS for Music and Matt Phipps Taylor 
at PPL who gave expert advice throughout the project, bringing a considerable wealth 
of experience and industry insight. Finally, I would especially like to praise the excellent 
work of the Music 2025 research team working out of Ulster University under Professor 
Frank Lyons, who diligently and bravely undertook the considerable and challenging task 
of investigating the issues of data and attribution across the music industry, and through 
tenacity, patience and hard work, have expertly and conscientiously produced this Music 
2025 report. Many thanks to all. ...
Peter Jenner - January 2019
37 Soha M., MacDowell Z. (2016) Monetizing a Meme: YouTube, Content ID, and the Harlem Shake, Social 
Media + Society January-March 2016: 1 –12 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.
co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/2056305115623801 sms.sagepub.com – “This article 
analyses  YouTube’s methods for monetizing UGC through their copyright Content ID system, explored 
through the colossal assemblage of creative energy that constituted the 2013 “Harlem Shake” meme.  At 
its peak, the Harlem  Shake  meme  was  immensely  popular  and  generative (with nearly 4,000  YouTube 
uploads per day). It only took about 40 days to reach 1 billion views on  YouTube, half the time that it 
took for “Gangnam Style.” At the same time, the rights owners of the song that served as the musical 
accompaniment to all these amateur videos quickly realized the profit potential of the phenomenon and 
profited handsomely through the architectures of control provided by YouTube.” Choreography - 
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1. Executive summary
1.1 Context
The Intellectual Property framework is a crucial underpinning factor in the success of the 
UK’s creative industries. It provides rights owners and holders with the tools to promote 
and distribute creative content to the public and to receive remuneration and attribution 
in return. 
However, the advent of streaming and online distribution has posed a significant challenge 
for the management of repertoire and content attribution. This is due to unprecedented 
volumes of data being generated, divergent velocities across the data flow, exponential 
increases in the variety of data sources, a lack of confidence in the veracity of the 
information and difficulties with access. Additionally, inherited frameworks, which 
remain the backbone of the system, and which evolved to ensure that rights holders are 
effectively, efficiently and transparently remunerated, have increasingly been threatened 
by a range of competing, proprietary data protocols, introduced through disruptive 
innovation. Across the ecosystem as a whole, a divergence of standards has compounded 
problems. This multi-layered fragmentation of metadata and a preference for proprietary 
walled data silos, have inevitably undermined cross-system interoperability. These issues, 
and in particular their effects on the music industry, were pointed out in the Bazalgette 
Independent Review of the Creative Industries:
‘[W]hilst there has never been so much choice at all levels of the value chain, the growth 
in new streaming services and platforms, each with their own methods of managing data, 
means that there is a potential for error and conflict and a growing threat to an artist’s 
ability to gain attribution and remuneration for their works. In order to develop the right 
environment for the market to create new and sustainable business models, we need data 
to be robust, reliable, transparent and accessible. In many parts of the Creative Industries, 
in particular the Music industry, this is not currently the case.’38 
Data can be defined as a collection of facts such as numbers, words, measurements, 
observations that has been translated into a form that computers can process. It can also 
simply be information. In the music industry, this data, specifically clean data, is central to 
the function of any remuneration/reward system that is built upon content attribution.
The application of computers to solving complex business problems is well established 
however there is a move towards using mainstream artificial intelligence (AI)/machine 
learning (ML) techniques which is a big departure from previous practice as most business 
problems were solved by processing data with logic, not learning from the data itself via 
algorithms. Netflix recommendations are built on data, LinkedIn has 300 billion events in 
which data is used every 24 hours, Uber tracks data from rides and drivers to match them 
up and select the best journey. Machine Learning is the process of building a scientific 
model after discovering knowledge from a data set. It is the complex computation process 
38 HM Government, 2018. Independent Review of the Creative Industries https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/independent-review-of-the-creative-industries
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of automatic pattern recognition and intelligent decision making based on training sample 
data. Machine learning can therefore make use cases like this possible as it can make 
predictions based on patterns and the other factors it has been trained with, which can 
prove significant in the music industry for solving gaps in data when amalgamating various 
repositories of music data.
There are limitations however and these are for the most part due to computing power and 
the actual sophistication of the AI-driven algorithms. A computer can only solve problems 
it is programmed to solve and does not have any generalized analytical ability. For many 
that ultimately limits AI/ML. Specifically, the limitation which needs to be overcome is the 
degree to which data should be balanced such that ordinary machine-learning methods 
work well. The greatest advances at least in the near future will be due to Deep Learning 
(DL). Deep learning is already achieving excellent results in fields such as computer vision, 
automatic speech recognition, natural language processing and audio recognition where 
they have been shown to produce state-of-the-art results on various tasks. In the shorter 
term in the music industry, it could be applied in areas such as processing large volumes 
of merged music metadata and cleaning misappropriated data.
Despite industry practices that automatically match data and expose errors, inaccurate 
data from old catalogues, often resulting from a paper to digital transition, can require 
time-consuming manual reconciliation. The opacity and complexity of music data flow has 
created a perception in some parts of the creative community that unattributed income 
generated from digital music platforms is unfairly distributed to labels and publishers 
in proportion to their market share. This perception has created a lack of trust in some 
parts of the industry and could inadvertently dis-incentivise generating and maintaining 
accurate datasets. With the rise of digitisation and increasing demand for efficient and 
transparent music data transactions, music industry stakeholders have made efforts to 
resolve these problems, including attempts to develop a centralised registry (e.g. Global 
Repertoire Database), initiatives which promote the implementation of metadata standards 
and messaging protocols and legal interventions. As discussed in more detail in the main 
report, these efforts have had limited impact, creating a need for fresh approaches to 
address these continuing issues. 
Music 2025 has sought to address these challenges by adopting a holistic view and 
aims to provide a comprehensive and in-depth exploration of the issues. Inspired by 
‘Social Shaping of Technology’ [SST], which emphasises the contingency, complexity and 
intricacy of relationships involved in the innovation process, the team sought to explore 
relationships amongst heterogeneous forces and give voice to the blurred interaction 
between the many stakeholders in the music industry who have different interests and 
perspectives. Drawing upon the qualitative data analysis of interviews with over 50 music 
industry stakeholders, the Music 2025 team brought together a broad range of expertise 
from across the entire value chain, all of whom agreed that improvements in data capture, 
accessibility and management are key to future success. 
Across the ecosystem, divergence of standards in existing datasets has led to matching 
problems and a multi-layered fragmentation of data which affects use by different 
entities. Despite various attempts to resolve the problems, there remain disparate levels 
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of information access across the industry that hinders efforts to resolve the fundamental 
problems of data integrity. Yet, the interviews evidenced a strong and growing consensus 
that a transparent and efficient data infrastructure is key to building a more sustainable 
music industry, with potential benefits more widely across the digital creative sector. The 
importance of resolving these issues was recognised in the UK Government’s Creative 
Industries Sector Deal, 2018:
‘(The Creative Sector Deal) seeks to safeguard copyright and address the transfer of 
value from the creative industries… We will continue to address the transfer of value from 
the creative industries and progress work on closing the value gap at the European and 
domestic levels’.39
Commissioned by the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and supported by a Project 
Board including the two national UK music collection societies, PRS for Music and PPL, 
the prime objective of this research is to highlight infrastructure issues that appear to 
hamper the fair and timely distribution of revenue from digital music platforms. This has 
been problematic for the music industry because of disconnections between the ways 
in which music can be created, disseminated and remunerated. A current paradox for 
digital music is how it ignores national borders, yet the existing licensing system is still 
built around disparate territory-specific national copyright norms leading to a multitude 
of divergent licensing schemes and regulations. Crucially, this research provided the 
opportunity for all stakeholders in the music industry to come together to look at how 
efficiencies can be made, how the data is managed, the veracity of that data and how it 
flows; these are all essential components of an effective IP framework.
39 Industry Strategy - Creative industries sector deal http://www.thecreativeindustries.co.uk/media/462717/
creative-industries-sector-deal-print.pdf
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1.2 Key findings 
It is important to emphasise that the key findings presented here are those of the core 
research team, however they were informed by the various perspectives provided in 
interviews with industry stakeholders; we have outlined in this report what industry told us.
1.2.1 Urgency for change 
The interviews evidenced a growing consensus that a transparent and efficient data 
management system is vital to realise the full potential of the digital music economy. They 
revealed that the industry is urgently seeking to unlock the full potential across the value 
chain and that this requires better data. The three main drivers for change discussed were: 
1. exponential growth in data volume; 
2. potential existential threats to incumbents and inherited systems;
3. economic imperatives which recognise that improved data quality benefits industry.
1.2.2 Issues with International Standard Recording Code (ISRC) and 
International Standard Musical Work Code (ISWC) identifiers
In music data management, two important standards were developed to identify digital 
music content: ISRC for sound recordings and ISWC for underlying works. Whilst these 
were developed to promote standardisation and interoperability, our findings conclude that 
there are significant issues in linking ISRC and ISWC identifier systems, including:
• insufficient understanding of the proper use of ISRC which is often compounded by 
inconsistent application of the guidelines of this standard, frequently leading to misuse 
and duplication;
• the inherent complex and dynamic nature of music publishing data, which is less 
readily available at the point of first release of a new recording. Several stakeholders, 
who find reconciling ISRC and ISWC a significant issue, have created their own 
internal linking solutions which have required substantial capital investment and 
manual processing.
Alternative solutions to these issues are emerging, including CMO-driven linking initiatives, 
a provisional ISWC initiative, International Standard Name Identifier (ISNI) adoption 
and recently announced changes in ISWC processes40 which aim to speed up authors’ 
societies’ assignment of an ISWC code for use by digital service providers and publishers. 
CMOs’ initiatives have in the past struggled with the lack of consistent application and 
technical disruption in the use of identifiers.41 The long-standing issue of ISRC/ISWC 
linking is still an important focus of activity and cause for complaint across the industry.
40 Paine, A., Feb 2019, CISAC to upgrade global music identifier system, Music Week http://www.musicweek.
com/publishing/read/cisac-to-upgrade-global-music-identifier-system/075189 
41 We understand from one interviewee however that in late 2018 the, US trade body, Recording Industry 
Association in America (RIAA) recommended its adoption
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1.2.3 Data infrastructure
We heard evidence that data structures and practices developed for the analogue 
world are no longer appropriate to meet the demands of the digital streaming business 
environment. For example:
• some legacy datasets created in the analogue era with less emphasis on data integrity 
are incomplete;
• existing business practices including Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) are 
obstacles to data transparency, and impair the ability to effectively and efficiently audit 
information across systems;
• some existing infrastructures still rely on paper-based transactions; reconciling the 
legacy data often requires significant financial and human resource involving time-
consuming manual processes; 
• opacity in the data flow together with inaccurate data creates a perception that a 
significant amount of income remains un-attributable;
• unattributed income distributed on a market share basis may reward poor reporting 
and inevitably impacts weaker or insufficiently informed stakeholders;
• many weaker, less informed stakeholders are often unregistered and remain unaware 
of their entitlement to potential remuneration.
Whilst acknowledging the UK CMOs’ relative high standards of operation that are 
perceived as pillars of trust and confidence by a range of competing interests, there remain 
concerns about bureaucratic and archaic governance structures when looking at the CMO 
system as a whole. For example:
• on the publishing side, systemic complexity, increasing fragmentation of datasets and 
the relatively slow process of ‘interested party’ disambiguation are issues affecting the 
velocity of data; 
• stringent processes, designed to ensure data privacy and security, have become part 
of the systemic friction involved in data processing;
• on the phonographic rights side, although CMOs collaborate to consolidate data 
processing (e.g. PPL back office services, SCAPR VRDB), they are not involved in 
monitoring data or collections on interactive streaming services, which makes it harder 
to implement a single collective solution to data issues;
• in the absence of a centralised ISRC reconciliation, frequent un-reconciled multiple 
versions increase complications when linking with other identifiers. A CMO’s decision 
to lock down their data may, in time, make the CMO’s role less relevant as they could 
be bypassed. 
Music 2025 - The Music Data Dilemma   |  13
Duplication of work across the industry leads to: 
• many organisations with their own systems operating in isolation; 
• proliferation of databases across the licensing systems, most designed to meet 
internal and local needs and obligations; 
• replication of effort, lack of efficiency and high cost.
1.2.4 The importance of data
The interviews indicated that a number of issues arise from a general lack of awareness of 
the importance of data. For example:
• historically, getting the (meta)data correct at a point close to content creation was 
rarely deemed a priority and there is a sense this can be significantly improved; 
• the lack of a unified systematic infrastructure to embrace all of the different 
component parts of the value chain has compounded the data problem; 
• the emergence of a DIY culture and increasingly diverse ways of creating, producing 
and distributing music have made it difficult to maintain rigorous data management 
standards;
• there is insufficient awareness and understanding of the incentives for good practice 
nor of the impact of bad practice; 
• even with the education programs available across the industry, their limited remit and 
lack of homogeneity reduce their impact.
1.2.5 Politics and asymmetrical power relations
We heard from many stakeholders that:
• the failure of the GRD project showed that vested interests and asymmetrical 
negotiating power can impede efforts to improve data efficiency and integrity;
• what the entire recorded and music publishing industry needs is less to do with 
technological solutions and is more about improved industry-wide collaboration;
• politics driven by self- interest has hampered industry-wide collaboration and 
engendered a lack of trust.
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1.2.6 Fragmentation and insufficient collaboration
We also heard from stakeholders that:
• the rapid growth in the volume and variety of data, discrepancies in the alignment 
and velocity of data flow and the increasing pace and sophistication of technological 
change have all exacerbated complexity in the management of data; 
• the existing complex data management landscape depends on an interoperable and 
interconnected framework to function across the whole ecosystem; 
• where there is a lack of collaboration, this has led to increasing fragmentation of 
datasets, along with increasing administration costs for data management and a 
duplication of data solutions built by individual organisations.
1.2.7 Appropriateness of governance
Many stakeholders argued that:
• the market-led approach has created hierarchy and friction, which are not suited to 
realise the full potential of the value in digital music; 
• whilst continued support for the standardisation led by DDEX (Digital Data Exchange)42 is 
essential, this alone is not enough to solve the complex challenges of data management; 
• there is a need for a mechanism to ensure all stakeholders work together better - without 
this many companies are looking for individual solutions to meet their own needs.
1.2.8 Creators’ earnings on streaming platforms
We heard that a number of issues impact on creators’ income from streaming platforms. 
For example: 
• content creators themselves are not fully aware of the importance of (meta)data and 
data management;
• inaccurate data resulting from inefficiencies and opacity can lead to non-attribution 
with a common perception in parts of the creative community that a considerable part 
of the income generated from digital music platforms is unfairly distributed to labels 
and publishers in proportion to their market share;
• there are divergent views on the current application of the ‘making available’ and 
‘communication to the public’ rights in respect of interactive streaming, with some 
organisations representing artists advocating change and others such as IFPI 
favouring the current interpretation;
42 a“consortium of leading media companies, music licensing organisations, digital service providers and 
technical intermediaries, focused on the creation of digital supply chain standards
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• reassessment of the legal definition of streaming seems desirable to ensure artists 
are reassured about the model. This is particularly relevant given the emergence of 
automated search and discovery systems and the impact that streaming is having 
on the next generation of music consumers who are increasingly turning away from 
traditional broadcast media.
1.3 Key recommendations 
Following empirical analysis of the semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, a number 
of key recommendations for the industry to consider for future management of music data 
were developed, focusing on education, interoperability, governance and collaboration. 
These recommendations are detailed below:
1.3.1 Education
The lack of understanding about the importance of data is widespread across the industry 
from data entry specialists to creators. 
Here we recommend that industry, academia and education providers should collaborate 
to develop, promote and deliver educational opportunities with accredited levels of 
proficiency around data management and that there should be:
(1) Accredited education programmes for data entry specialists
To ensure those who deal with industry identifiers have sufficient knowledge, we propose 
the development and delivery of education programmes with accredited levels of 
proficiency around data management for data entry specialists. 
(2) Enhanced education programmes for creators
Specifically, to address the skills gap in the creative sector in respect of practical data 
management and digital rights, we propose the development of an industry-wide 
education programme specially designed for creators to increase their awareness of the 
importance of data. 
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1.3.2 Interoperability
Increased interoperability has been identified as a potential solution for improving data 
management and is inextricably linked to the standardisation of processes and to the will 
and ability of organisations to adhere to agreed practice while accommodating innovation.
Although standardisation promoted by DDEX is having a positive impact across a range of 
industry stakeholders, for increased interoperability a number of important issues still need 
to be addressed. 
To this end we have a series of related recommendations:
1) Identifier use for uploaded content - no entity without identity 
Upon upload to a digital platform, the content and contributor need to be represented 
by an authority regulated identifier. This is fundamental to the technical operation 
of an interoperable system and underpins automated processes of disambiguation 
empowering efficiency, reducing cost and enabling enriched experience through search 
and discovery. This unavoidably places a responsibility upon DSPs to become ‘active’ 
conduits of content, ensuring that legislative/regulatory frameworks and agreed systems of 
governance are adhered to.
It is recommended that all content uploaded to a commercial digital platform be identified 
and attributed using internationally recognised, publicly accessible, linked identifiers.
2) Links between identifiers
Although it is generally acknowledged that identifier linkage is critical to interoperability, 
commonly used identifiers, such as ISRC and ISWC have been constituted, developed and 
deployed as distinct, unrelated systems.
Proper linking of ISRC and ISWC is essential to ensure all parties involved in the value 
networks are properly remunerated. When matched with the associated metadata, the 
linked ISRC and ISWC becomes a valuable resource for rights compensation. Whilst 
diverse initiatives have attempted to tackle this problem, no comprehensive solution is 
readily available. 
From this, it is recommended that mandatory procedures of ISRC assignment upon upload 
to a DSP should also include an ISWC assignment; i.e. no ISRC should be allocated 
without a linked ISWC.
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3) Inter-connecting databases
Data silos are a pragmatic reality of the landscape when it comes to digital content.43 The 
construction of a global database with defined rules of operation, to which all participants 
adhere, involves considerable commitment and resources and raises questions about 
ownership, access, cost and security which have failed to produce consensus. On a 
practical level, storage, access, ownership and structuring of a system which accommodates 
multiple data sources, needs a clear designation of responsibilities and obligations. 
It is recommended that research into standardised processes and interoperable data 
gateway systems be prioritised for support and investment. The development of a registry 
focused upon the wider attribution of content contributors is also recommended as a 
subject of further research. 
4) Standardisation
In building interoperability, stakeholders have been urged previously to consider four key 
infrastructure requirements to implement control mechanisms for the management of 
digital content: 
• unique persistent identification; 
• global resolution for identifiers; 
• information management standards;
• Trusted Certification Authority services.44 
It is acknowledged that DDEX have already established a forum for technical discussions on 
standardisation and the implementation of these requirements. The practical implementation 
of small-scale targeted standardisation structures across the ecosystem using an accepted 
‘lingua-franca’ and an agreed terminology around messaging could form the foundation 
of a flexible system that takes into account diverse operations. DDEX’s role in setting data 
definitions, data exchange formats and choreographies (i.e. ‘protocols’), and profiles for 
mandatory data sets for various types of transactions is important in this regard. 
It is therefore recommended that funding for research be directed towards academic, 
governmental and industry partnerships appropriate for the management of data as a 
proprietary asset, acknowledging the status of data as a public good. 
43 Ohlhorst, F.J., 2012. Big Data Analytics: Turning Big Data into Big Money., Hoboken: Wiley.
44 Hill, K., 1999. A perspective: the role of identifiers in managing and protecting intellectual property in the 
digital age. Proceedings of the IEEE, 87(7), pp.1228–1238.
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1.3.3 Governance 
Many stakeholders stressed that serious inefficiencies have resulted from a lack of system-
wide data governance.
It is therefore recommended that a networked system of data governance, which takes into 
account requirements across the ecosystem, be the subject of adequately funded research 
and development; this should promote harmonisation of process, set infrastructure 
standards and implement rules of practice that facilitate collaboration amongst all parties in 
the value chain. It is further recommended that a working group be established as a priority 
to look at the issue of data governance across the industry as a priority. 
Further research is required in this area, to determine the sort of system which may 
be appropriate in various territories. This should include perspectives from other 
industries, such as banking, telecommunications and internet domain names, who have 
encountered similar challenges dealing with digitisation and transformation as a result of 
technological change.
1.3.4 Collaboration
Many interviewees recognised that collaboration and improved communication are keys 
to efficient data management which could reduce administration costs and increase 
productivity across an interconnected system.
To inform any potential or future governance framework, it is recommended that bespoke 
fora are established to facilitate multi-layered collaboration and communication which 
engage a greater number and a wider range of stakeholders on a more frequent and 
regular basis than at present. 
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2. Research aims and design
2.1 Background
Digital technology has opened up unprecedented opportunities to manage data. In an 
ideal world, the automated process of registering and allowing access to worldwide 
musical works would help overcome the hurdles of geographical distance and reduce the 
costs involved in bargaining and negotiation. A one-stop database providing access to the 
metadata for diverse world catalogues would enhance the efficiency in rights clearance, 
help pre-empt illegal use and reduce administration costs. The ability to monitor digital 
music uses on a global scale could also improve the remuneration of all involved in the 
creative process. 
However, the world the music industry currently operates in is far from ideal. The meteoric 
growth of data volume created via content streaming platforms poses a serious challenge 
to the existing management of music data. The issue is particularly contentious within 
the music industry, as there is a perceived disconnect between the way music is created 
and disseminated, and the current copyright regimes that underpin payment structures. 
Research has told us that a myriad of different licensing schemes and regulations render 
it difficult and expensive for prospective licensees to access music repertoire.45 The 
divergence of standards in existing datasets has led to the multi-layered fragmentation of 
data. There have been numerous attempts to resolve these problems, ranging from legal 
interventions to development and investment in technical innovation. However, conflicting 
motivations are endemic to the landscape of influence, power and information amongst the 
diverse stakeholders that make up the music industry, and these have frustrated attempts 
to forge a meaningful solution in this highly complex and political area. 
This Music 2025 research sought to bridge the gap between utopian ideals and moribund 
reality. The impetus for this research has come from the music industry’s own recognition 
that transparent and efficient data management is a key component of a sustainable and 
successful digital music economy, with the potential to impact the wider digital creative 
content sector. Having been among the first industrial sectors to be significantly disrupted 
by digitisation,46 the music industry has had to innovate and face up to new socio-
economic realities.47 Having been heavily criticised for its failure to evolve, it also could 
prove to be the phoenix of new paradigms.
45 Hargreaves, I., 2011. Digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth: an independent 
report. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf
46 Klein, B., Meier, L.M. and Powers, D., 2017. Selling out: Musicians, autonomy, and compromise in the 
digital age. Popular Music and Society, 40(2), pp.222-238.; Witt, S., 2015. How music got free: The end of 
an industry, the turn of the century, and the patient zero of piracy. Penguin.
47 Hesmondhalgh, D. and Meier, L.M., 2018. What the digitalisation of music tells us about capitalism, 
culture and the power of the information technology sector. Information, Communication & Society, 21(11), 
pp.1555-1570.; Kretschmer, M. and Erickson, K., 2018. How much do we know about notice-and-
takedown? New study tracks YouTube removals. Kluewer Copyright Blog. http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.
com/2018/06/12/much-know-notice-takedown-new-study-tracks-youtube-removals/
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The research was commissioned by the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and 
supported by a Project Board including the two key UK music collection societies, PRS for 
Music and PPL. It examines the complex data issues involved in digital music content, in 
order to improve efficiency and transparency and, as a result, remuneration and attribution 
for all those involved. The significance of this study is recognised in the UK Government’s 
Industrial Strategy as part of the Creative Industries Sector Deal, launched in February 
2018 by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and 
the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). This highlighted the 
explosion of digital music data and commented that any delay in resolving issues of data 
management could further exacerbate the problem. 
Music 2025 brought together a broad range of stakeholders from across the music 
industry and collected industry experts’ lived-in, vigorous and most up-to-date views on 
this complex and often contentious issue. Our interdisciplinary team, with specialisms 
cutting across law, social science, technical architecture and music industry practice, 
developed a holistic approach, aiming to provide a comprehensive and in-depth 
exploration of the issues. We sought to capture the complex relationships amongst 
heterogeneous forces and give voice to the blurred interaction amongst stakeholders who 
often have different interests and perspectives. 
As the first comprehensive documentation of these issues, Music 2025 will make a 
valuable contribution to the discourse, making the invisible visible and challenging the 
prevailing linear understanding of the subject. 
2.2 Aims and objectives 
The overarching objective of this research project was to accurately map, for the first time, 
current systems of music data management. More specifically, the team aimed to engage 
with as wide a range of music industry stakeholders as possible to examine the operation 
of existing systems in terms of complexity, contingency and ambiguity, in a way that 
reflected diversity of opinions across the value chain. Through analysis of qualitative data 
gathered from stakeholder responses in semi-structured interviews, we have identified key 
issues in current data management systems and processes and have offered pragmatic 
recommendations which we feel will facilitate realisation of the full potential of the digital 
music economy.
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2.3 Theoretical approach
The underlying multidisciplinary approach embraced expertise from the creative 
industries, technology, social science, law, economics and management science. A key 
influence was ‘The Social Shaping of Technology’,48which sets the context for moving 
beyond ‘technological determinants’ by providing a comprehensive view of the context 
for technological development, enabling an understanding of uncertainty, contingency 
and complexity, as well as the negotiation of heterogeneous actors with different, often 
conflicting views. The key conceptual framework that guided the research was designed 
as a ‘socio-technical constellation of the digital recording industry’49 which proposed that 
data, copyright, technology, and industry actors be investigated in two strands, which 
were termed ‘archaeology’ and ‘architecture’. Overarching concepts were drawn from 
liminality,50 later adapted as ‘Tarzan Economics’.51 The law element relied on a range 
of sources but most significantly on Peter Baldwin’s 2014 book ‘The Copyright Wars’52 
and Dennis Collopy’s 2008 paper ‘Barriers to Harmony’53. The technological architecture 
research concept was also informed by the 2007 publication, ‘A Visual Musical Structural 
Analysis System for Browsing Music Interactively’ by Frank Lyons, Kevin Curran and Elaine 
Smyth. Research by Kevin Curran and Paul O’Hagan into dynamic registration for studio 
performers also contributed to the overall approach. 
2.3.1 Social shaping of technology
The music industry has been extensively studied by legal scholars whose interest is 
mainly focused on the impact of the law on the market. Comprising a variety of actors, 
this industry has evolved around diverse factors related to technological, social, political 
and institutional settings. Innovations in music data management have been part of a 
complex and contested process that has been influenced by negotiated interactions 
amongst parties who exercise power and resistance and often have divergent motivations 
and vested interests. A comprehensive understanding of the issues around music data 
management, therefore, requires a more sophisticated approach than the prevailing linear 
approach that focuses primarily on the impact of the market.
48 MacKenzie, D.A., and J. Wajcman. 1985. The Social Shaping of Technology: How the Refrigerator Got 
Its Hum. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.; Williams, R. and Edge, D., 1996. The social shaping of 
technology. Research policy, 25(6), pp.865-899.
49 Sun, H., 2019. Digital Revolution Tamed in the Recording Industry. In Digital Revolution Tamed (pp. 257-
286). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
50 A concept developed by anthropologists Arnold van Gennep and later Victor Turner that describes a 
transitional period or phase between one ‘rite’ and the new ‘rite’. Participants are said to ‘stand at the 
threshold’ between the old and the new.
51 Griffin. J., 2010 ‘Tarzan Economics’: If Music Is Free, How Do Artists Get Paid? Wharton Knowledge. 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/tarzan-economics-if-music-is-free-how-do-artists-get-paid/
and quoted by Silver, J.M., 2014. Digital Medieval: The first twenty years of music on the web and the next 
twenty. Xstorical Publications Media.
52 Baldwin, P., 2014. The copyright wars: three centuries of trans-atlantic battle. Princeton University Press.
53 Collopy, D., 2008. Barriers to Harmony: Divergent approaches to copyright law and collective copyright 
management.” in: Music and Intellectual Property. BNA
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‘The Social Shaping of Technology (SST)’54 sets the context for moving beyond the linear 
understanding of technological impacts. It was further developed to take ‘a broad church’ 
perspective to integrate other areas of research including economics, politics, history 
and cultural studies.55 It is an approach suited to exploring complexity, uncertainty and 
contingencies that result from the wide array of actors, factors and networks.
2.3.2 Socio-technical constellation of music data management 
Capturing this dynamic innovation process involved the development of a conceptual 
framework of ‘socio-technical constellation of music data management’. This concept 
emphasises the multiplicity of heterogeneous connections amongst all those involved in 
networks.56 This broader perspective allowed the observation of not just those players in 
close proximity but also those looser and dispersed constellations of the interactions on 
the fringes of the network.57 The framework enabled the identification of four major factors 
that have influenced innovation in music data management: data, copyright, technology 
and industry actors. 
Figure 1. Socio-technical constellation of music data management
54 MacKenzie, D.A., and J. Wajcman. 1985
55 Williams, R. and Edge, D., 1996
56 Williams, R., Stewart, J. and Slack, R., 2005. Social learning in technological innovation: Experimenting with 
information and communication technologies. Edward Elgar Publishing.
57 Sun, H., 2019
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For an analysis of the interactions amongst the industry actors, we drew upon a 
framework of ‘Digital Music Value Networks’,58 which provides a useful tool to capture 
the complexity of the interactions amongst diverse forces and their interactions in the 
four major networks of creativity, reproduction, promotion/distribution, and consumption. 
These factors were investigated through the two strands of the underpinning approach: 
archaeology and architecture.
Figure 2. Digital Music Data Value Networks
58 Sun, H., 2019. Developed from networks of musical economy in Leyshon, A., 2003. Scary monsters? 
Software formats, peer-to-peer networks, and the spectre of the gift. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 21(5), pp.533-558.
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2.4 Research design 
2.4.1 Qualitative research: interviews and data analysis
Interviews 
1) Semi-structured interviews
The research drew upon an in-depth qualitative data analysis of over 50 interviews 
with a wide range of stakeholders from the music industry. The interviews, conducted 
between May and October 2018, were semi-structured, covering key questions relating 
to challenges and opportunities around data management: the measures taken to resolve 
the issues; how the interviewee foresaw the future and what was needed to improve data 
transparency and efficiency.
2) Interview questions
The research adopted loosely structured interviews to ensure flexibility in exploring questions 
the researcher regarded most appropriate and to provide opportunities to seek clarification. 
The approach allowed interviewees freedom to discuss points they perceived to be more 
important or relevant. In conjunction with the specific guidelines for the interviews that were 
core to the research design, questions were later customised for each interviewee. 
Table 1. Guide to interview questions
Categories Questions
Introduction / Personal 
Background
Introduction to the interview and the research purpose
Tell me your background and responsibilities at your company
Company Profile and 
Experiences
A brief history of your company
How did it start and how has it evolved?
Experiences in relation to digital music data transaction
What opportunities and challenges have you experienced in relation 
to digital music data transaction?
What do you think are the biggest building blocks in digital music 
data transactions?
What did the company take into account in addressing the 
problems?
How have artists and managers been involved in the discussions?
What data do you share and how comparable is it with other 
similar companies? [do you take this into account when setting up 
systems?]
Would you be willing to share your data with the research team on a 
confidential basis?
Future What do you think would be the best scenario and what do you think 
needs to be done to achieve it?
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Data analysis
1) Qualitative data analysis
For qualitative data analysis, we employed an ‘interactive model’ where the entire process 
of data analysis, from collection, reduction, display and conclusion drawing and verifying, 
was reiterated.59 By using the qualitative data analysis tool, NVivo, we coded transcribed 
interviews organised under key categories by similar and contrasting themes and patterns. 
The key categories include architecture, artists, change, CMOs, education, future, 
inefficiency, innovations, ISRC-ISWC, law, practices and previous attempts. The coding 
scheme was modified to take on board the full range of views on key themes. The analysis 
was further developed with the review of relevant literature. Quotes were extracted to 
highlight and represent the views aligned to the key categories. Informed by this analytical 
process, we structured the key findings as detailed in section 3.3. 
2) Multiple viewpoints and triangulation
An imperative in our research was to capture the multiple ‘viewpoints’ that arose as 
a heuristic process in extended time and dispersed locations in a broad context.60 
The triangulation of these diverse viewpoints allowed us to provide a rich and deep 
understanding of the multitude of issues negotiated amongst a wide array of players in 
multiple locations across many networks.
3. Existing literature and key findings
3.1 Archaeology of music data - the industry context 
The data challenges facing the recorded music and music publishing industries are 
the outcome of the progression and development of the two related but independent 
industries from their initially dispersed, disparate national roots in the 19th Century to the 
highly consolidated, competitive and globalised industries of the 21st Century. The current 
liminal phase for the content industries can be seen as the outcome of the transition from 
20th Century ‘analogue’ norms to the emerging hegemony of digital culture. It is also 
about the changing dynamics and relationships between music publishers, record labels, 
recording artists, songwriters and composers along with the influence of copyright law, 
contractual norms and collective licensing practices.
59 Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M., 1984. Drawing valid meaning from qualitative data: Toward a shared 
craft. Educational researcher, 13(5), pp.20-30.
60 Pollock, N., and Williams, R. 2009. Software and Organisations: The Biography of the Enterprise-Wide 
System—Or How SAP Conquered the World, London: Routledge.; Hyysalo, S. 2010. Health Technology 
Development and Use: From Practice-Bound Imagination to Evolving Impacts, London: Routledge.; 
Williams, R. and Pollock, N., 2012. Research commentary—moving beyond the single site implementation 
study: how (and why) we should study the biography of packaged enterprise solutions. Information Systems 
Research, 23(1), pp.1-22.
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3.1.1 Copyright law
The music industry according to Patrik Wikstrom61 is a copyright industry and this is 
evident in the way copyright law underpins the entire music industry from national and 
EU copyright statutes as well as various international treaties all of which underpin the 
international collection society structure, the agreements between creators and owners 
and the complex agreements between rights owners and users. Unfortunately, as Peter 
Baldwin62 describes, there have been conflicts over the past three centuries between 
the Anglo-American ‘copyright’ and the mainland European ‘authors rights’ systems. UK 
copyright law’s modern roots lay in the monopoly rights widely employed in the Tudor 
and Stuart era and then expanded by the 1662 Licensing Act. Even after the passage 
of the 1709 Statute of Anne it was not until the 19th Century that copyright became 
internationalised,63 notably following the passage of The Berne Convention. 
The early 20th Century saw the first legislative attempts to deal with the emerging new 
reproduction technologies (broadcasting, sound recordings, motion pictures), which led 
to the expansion of copyright term and the establishment of three key rights that provided 
the legislative basis for the modern music publishing and sound recording business. Aside 
from the 1976 US Copyright Act which finally brought the USA into line with international 
norms, a key development took place in the 1980s with two major court decisions64 that 
affected the legal relationship between the creative content and technology industries 
in relation to non-commercial uses of recording devices. The later part of the century 
saw three further important developments, the first being the extension of the term of 
copyright for musical works to life plus 70 years in Europe and then in the USA in 1995/6, 
although sound recordings remained at the time at 50 years from publication. The second 
innovation was the 1996 EU Directive on rental, lending and neighbouring rights which 
provided featured artists and session performers with a legal right to receive ‘equitable 
remuneration’ across the EU. The third significant development, following the two 1996 
WIPO treaties, was the passage of the 1998 US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
that by 2012 had become the default copyright law for online uses of music.65 By the turn 
of the millennium the DMCA norms were introduced internationally which, in the EU, took 
the form of the 2001 European Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC). This Directive 
was in turn adopted by the various EU national legislatures with the UK passing legislation 
in 2003. 
61 Wikstrom P (2009) The Music Industry: Music in the Cloud. Polity Press (page 12)
62 Baldwin, P. 2014. p.14-52
63 Seville, C., 2006. The internationalisation of copyright law: books, buccaneers and the black flag in the 
nineteenth century (Vol. 8). Cambridge University Press.
64 Universal Studios v Sony Betamax (1984) and CBS Songs v Amstrad (1988)
65 Levin, R., 2011. Free Ride How Digital Parasites Are Destroying the Culture Business, and How the Culture 
Business Can Fight Back. New York: Anchor Books. p.15-16
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3.1.2 The music publishing industry
The music publishers, as the pre-eminent gatekeepers of music in the 19th Century, 
were challenged in the early 20th Century by the emergence of the phonogram, film and 
broadcasting industries. Changes in copyright law (e.g. 1909 in the US and 1911 in the UK) 
enabled the publishers to move from a single source of income (printing) to several income 
streams from record sales, broadcasting, film fees and live performances, whilst embracing 
collective licensing to handle some of the new technologies, notably broadcasting.66 The 
20th Century music publishing industry involved tens of thousands of publishers and 
self-publishers but became dominated by the publishing affiliates of the major worldwide 
record distributors.67 By 2002 the global music publishing industry68 had grown to $6 
billion69 and by 2014 its estimated value was near $11.34 billion. However, the allocation of 
publisher revenues70 shifted to a greater reliance on performing right revenues and other 
income such as synchronisation. 
Over the past 30 years the impact of the pervasive transition from analogue to digital media, 
the boom in micro-computing and mobile technologies as well as the advent of the Internet 
profoundly impacted the music publishing sector, as evidenced by the fact that none of 
1987’s thirteen substantial UK publishers existed in the same form in 2012. Currently, 
the only international publishing companies are BMG Rights Management, Imagem (now 
Concorde), Downtown/Song Trust, Kobalt, Peer Music, Warner /Chappell, Universal Music 
Publishing Group and Sony/ATV, with the three leading companies (Sony/ATV, Universal and 
Warner/Chappell) having double rather than single-figure global market shares.
The current main challenge to the hegemony of the major publishers comes from BMG 
Rights Management and Kobalt. The latter’s model of a global rights administration service 
rather than traditional rights ownership, emphasises service and transparency and reflects 
on-going disintermediation within the music publishing accounting chain, by eliminating 
the ‘local’ sub-publisher element through direct royalty collection from overseas CMOs. 
Such disintermediation may not stop at this, given Kobalt’s willingness to also move into 
the collective licensing space by buying AMRA. In this highly competitive market most 
other ‘significant’ music publishers use a single Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for EU 
digital licensing, with the potential for expansion to global digital licensing vehicles, that 
could have ramifications for the existing national CMO system. 
66 PRS and ASCAP were created in 1914 The French had already established their performing rights society, 
SACEM, in 1851 and Germany’s GEMA was created initially as AFMA in 1903. 
67 Read, M., 2000. Major to Minor: The Rise and Fall of the Songwriter. Sanctuary Publishing.
68 Hardy, P., 2013. Music Publishing and how it works. Omnibus Press
69 National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) report 2002
70 Phil Hardy (2013) Music Publishing and how it works. Omnibus Press
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3.1.3 The recording industry
Beginning with Edison’s invention of phonograph in 1877, followed by Emile Berliner’s 
Gramophone in the following decade, from the 1920s, despite initial tensions in the 
USA between the recording and broadcasting industries, the record industry became 
symbiotically linked to the radio industry.71 New technological developments included 
magnetic tape and multi-track technology and these along with adoption of vinyl as 
a cheaper and more durable alternative, led to the Long Play (LP) format.72 Even with 
the emergence of an increasingly internationalised recording industry in the 1960s, and 
1970s it was the unprecedented commercial success of Michael Jackson’s 1983 Thriller 
video and its parent album that marked the beginning of the superstar economy.73 The 
introduction of the Compact Disc (CD) in 1982 brought an unexpected economic boom to 
the recording industry, bringing new life to labels’ back catalogues.
From the 1960s through to the 21st century, the recording industry experienced significant 
consolidation mainly involving the acquisition by larger companies of smaller labels. By 
1999, the recorded music industry was controlled by the so-called ‘Big Five’ - Warner, EMI, 
Sony, BMG and Universal - whose oligopoly accounted for 70-80% of the global music 
sales74 through vertically integrated economies of scale.75
The CD sales boom led to digital disruption after the arrival of Napster,76 as mass-scale 
distribution of free music disrupted the conventional economics of the recording business 
and led to the industry’s, at times, fraught fight against piracy. Its efforts to replicate 
the CD-driven revenue peaks77 were largely unsuccessful, until 2008’s Spotify freemium 
streaming model finally brought a halt to the tidal wave of pirated music and the prospect 
of renewed growth.
3.1.4 Collective licensing and market analysis 
Different IP regimes (Common and Civil code) have spawned different management 
regimes and structures in CMOs78 that create variations of control and ownership in how 
copyright and authors’ rights are managed that are significant for the music licensing 
system,79 as is clearly evident in Page and Safir’s findings below. The wide spectrum of 
control available within the global CMO system runs from the light-touch agency model 
to full ‘rights owning’ collection societies pre-eminent in mainland Europe. This means 
there is disparity in the powers and rights available to CMOs and a gulf between the North 
71 Negus, K., 1992. Producing pop: Culture and conflict in the popular music industry. London: Arnold Publishing.
72 Coleman, M. 2004. Playback: From the Victrola to MP3, 100 Years of Music, Machines, and Money. New 
York: Da Capo Press.
73 Garofalo, R. 1999. From Music Publishing to MP3: Music and Industry in the Twentieth Century. American 
Music: A Quarterly Journal Devoted to All Aspects of American Music and Music in America 17 (3): 
318–353.
74 Burnett, R. 1996. The Global Jukebox: The International Music Industry. London: Routledge.
75 Bakker, G. 2012. Adopting the Rights-Based Model: Music Multinationals and Local Music Industries Since 
1945. Popular Music History, 6 (3): 307–343.
76 Witt, S., 2015. How music got free: The end of an industry, the turn of the century, and the patient zero of 
piracy. Penguin.
77 Sun, H., 2019
78 Collopy, D., 2008.
79 Gervais, D., 2012. The Changing Role of Copyright Collectives (p. 6) in Gervais, D.J. ed., Collective 
management of copyright and related rights (pp. 264-265). Kluwer Law International.
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American, UK, Australia (Common law) and the European and Latin American (Civil Code) 
collective licensing models, which affects digital licensing models. Most countries operate 
a single quasi-monopoly CMO, but the USA market is distinct in allowing four PROs80 to 
operate in the market. There is a further distinct difference between the US and EU PROs 
in the rights granted to them by their writer members.81  
CMOs’ roles encompass licensing works on behalf their members, monitoring usages, 
collecting and distributing revenues from the works. CMOs mitigate high transaction 
costs by administering higher volumes of transactions82 through blanket licenses, acting 
as a central point of administration, offering cost-efficient access to a wide variety of 
catalogues for licensees and collecting and distributing royalties from the monitored 
uses of the works for creators which are generally too expensive to be done individually. 
Prior to digitisation, CMOs operated solely within national territories, administering 
domestic repertoire along with foreign repertoire, the latter via reciprocal agreements 
with foreign collecting societies, applying local copyright laws and setting national tariffs. 
Then interim PRS CEO Jeremy Fabinyi stated at the 2010 annual Midem conference, 
“Collective licensing works best on a local basis, but the trans-national nature of digital 
music distribution and use has caused disruption.” 
In the EU, pan-European mechanical licensing in the 1980s and 1990s produced the first 
challenges, principally from the Anglo-American rights holders to the EU CMO structure. 
Even so, it was thought essential to maintain the established inter-CMO structure for 
digital licensing, but this structure was then challenged by the European Commission 
(EC) who objected to the first inter-society, Santiago, agreement on competition grounds. 
The EC’s desire to end the typical CMO bilateral agreements and the use of MFN83 
provisions led to the 2005 Recommendation that enabled rights holders to remove their 
rights from most local European CMOs. Whilst intended to improve the efficiency of 
the burgeoning digital single market, it had the contrary effect leading to even greater 
fragmentation and uncertainty because of the formation of SPVs for the major corporate 
and independent international publishers. This led to the current digital licensing hub 
system to resolve those uncertainties and the creation of ICE (PRS, STIM, GEMA) and 
Armonia (SACEM, SGAE, SIAE). The outcome of these changes, some argue, is that 
increased competition has led to more bureaucracy and inefficient administration.84 
Others claim clearing multiple rights across multiple territories with different legal 
regulations could undermine CMOs’ governance framework.85 Particular concerns have 
been raised over the increased repertoire fragmentation resulting from competition.86
80 ASCAP, SESAC, BMI and GMR 
81 Kohn, A. and Kohn, B., 2002. Kohn on music licensing. Bob Kohn.
82 Besen, S.M., Kirby, S.N. and Salop, S.C., 1992. An economic analysis of copyright collectives. Virginia 
Law Review, pp.383-411.; Towse, R. and Handke, C., 2007, July. Regulating copyright collecting societies: 
current policy in Europe. In Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI) annual congress, 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin/Centre for British Studies. p. 12-13.
83 Most favoured nations – a common bargaining tool in negotiations. Designed to secure equal treatment 
with another 3rd party on terms agreed 
84 Day, B.R., 2011. In defense of copyright: Creativity, record labels, and the future of music. Seton Hall 
Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, 21(1).; Conley, N., 2007. The Future of Licensing Music Online: 
The Role of Collective Rights Organizations and the Effect of Territoriality. J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. 
L., 25, p.409.
85 Ghafele, R. & Gibert, B., 2011. Counting the Costs of Collective Rights Management of Music Copyright in 
Europe. IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc.
86 Gervais, D. and Maurushat, A., 2003. Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Management: Proposals to 
Defrag Copyright Management. Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, 2(1).
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Will Page and David Safir’s 2017 SERCI87 conference paper88 addresses the state of the 
market post the EC’s 2005 intervention in describing the current maze of rights involved in 
digital music licensing in the EU. They describe “distorted, diverted, delayed and diluted” 
revenues for creators as well as asymmetry between the creators and DSPs caused by 
the complex web of intermediaries whose transaction costs impact the efficient licensing 
and payment for the use of musical works in the digital sphere. The authors claim the 
pathway for licensing of the master recording rights is easy to see when compared to the 
“snakes and ladders” of the authors’ rights licensing system. The main cause of the maze 
of rights is the requirement to “do the splits” between mechanical and performing rights 
and involves various approaches across the different CMOs with their divergent policies 
and processes across licensing and collection, documentation of works and recordings 
(insufficient authenticated metadata), reporting and invoicing (sharing accountability and 
responsibility),89 allocation and distribution (what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is mine 
too).90 They also argue the expectation of lower transaction costs in e-commerce has 
not been realised in the music publishing sector as the headline administration costs 
have increased from 7% (for licensing a CD) to 14% for licensing a stream. Using a 2016 
CISAC chart of the 29 different EU CMOs91 they examined how the CMO distribution rules 
split revenue from the four key types of digital exploitation identifying as many as 11,513 
possible splits by country, right and format across the EU. They conclude that “Digital 
exploitation (is) characterized by non-exclusive assignment, multi-territorial licensing, 
inadequate metadata, increased disintermediation” and argue that “in this confusing 
environment, a new approach is both essential and urgent”. 
Unlike other IP rights, copyright law allows for almost limitless divisibility of ownership, 
which contributes significantly to increasing complexity in the licensing of music,92 due to 
fragmentation as well as “the lack of cohesion, standardization and, to a certain extent, 
effective organisation of both copyright law and collective management per se”.93 This 
fragmentation of copyright takes place on many different levels: covering rights stemming 
from national laws, that recognise several economic rights (reproduction, communication 
to the public, adaptation, rental etc); within market structures; within licensing practices; 
within a repertory of works; within different markets (including language and territory); and 
through interoperable rights clearance systems. 
The complexity of the rights involved in the online communication of a sound recording 
of a performance of a protected musical work is magnified by the different rights holders 
involved (songwriters, publishers, performers and producers) operating in each territory of 
reception and of emission. Efforts to resolve this complexity included the 2001 Santiago 
Agreement which aimed to allow a single collective to grant a worldwide license on 
87 Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues
88 Page, W. and Safir, D. 2017. The Causes and Consequences of allocating revenue between Mechanical 
and Performing Rights. The Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues. http://serci.org/congress_
documents/2017/Page%20and%20Safir2.pdf
89 They highlight the ‘opaque’ process and ‘tortuous, prolonged and even impenetrable’ route from license fees 
to royalties in those countries where CMO’s distribute and account mechanical royalties through the publishers
90 This refers to the minimum use rule, sampling rather than census analysis of distributions and the effect of 
the divergent allocation of revenues to mechanical and performing rights
91 CIS16-1059, 2016-11-03 European rights splits 2016 (November update)
92 Gervais, D.2012
93 Ibid. .12
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behalf of the other participants especially in relation to communication to the public.94 It is 
evident the EC’s decision to oppose this solution aimed at improving licensing had certain 
unintended consequences that have further increased fragmentation.
Fragmentation is also a consequence of recent mergers and acquisitions, which have been 
a feature of the recorded and music publishing industries across the 20th Century; the 
1980s and early 1990s saw another consolidation wave spurred on by the enormous profits 
from the CD boom, that led to the turn of the millennium oligopoly of major labels. The early 
21st Century saw further consolidation across both recorded labels and music publishing, 
creating the modern triopoly of Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment and 
Warner Music Group However, certain recent corporate acquisitions required disposals 
of some of the acquired company’s assets to competitors, an EC competition inspired 
divestment programme that led to further fragmentation of repertoire which may explain 
some data integrity and veracity issues within the labels and the music publishers.
3.1.5 Cultural economics 
The relationship between creators and the main cultural intermediaries, record labels and 
music publishers has long been conflicted95 because the contracts96 were usually skewed 
in favour of the intermediary, apart from a select number of ‘superstars’ with superior 
bargaining power and leverage.97 This imbalance appears to be the root problem for 
creator remuneration98 and is evident in recent debates on streaming royalties. A common 
perception is that, even as digital music revenues are on the increase, distributions to 
artists are not perceived as fair.99 The widespread use of NDAs is also linked to a lack of 
transparency that hampers efforts to improve remuneration.100 
Some also claim there are issues in how the making available right relates to streaming, 
given neither the traditional broadcasting right, nor the making available right properly 
define streaming, thus creating a ‘legal limbo’.101 Streaming requires a different 
interpretation of the reproduction right, long integral to the copyright system.102 Even 
94 Ibid. p.13-14
95 Peacock, A.T. and Weir, R., 1975. The composer in the market place. Faber. p.42
96 Caves, R.E., 2000. Creative industries: Contracts between art and commerce. Harvard University Press.
97 Towse, R., 2001. Creativity, incentive, and reward an economic analysis of copyright and culture in the 
information age, Cheltenham, U.K.; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar. Kretschmer, M., 2005. Artists’ 
earnings and copyright: A review of British and German music industry data in the context of digital 
technologies. First Monday, 10(1).
98 Cummings, A.S., 2010. From monopoly to intellectual property: Music piracy and the remaking of American 
copyright, 1909–1971. The Journal of American  History, 97(3), pp.659-681.
99 Tschmuck, P., 2015. Music Streaming Revisited—The Problem of Income Distribution. Music Business 
Research. https://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2015/07/18/music-streaming-revisited-the-
problem-of-income-distribution/
100 Hirschhorn, J., 2015. Less money, mo’music & lots of problems: A look at the music biz. Linkedin Pulse.; 
Rethink Music., 2015. Fair music: Transparency and payment flows in the music industry. Berklee Institute of 
Creative Entrepreneurship. p.5.; Lalonde, P.É., 2014. Study concerning fair compensation for music creators 
in the digital age. CIAM, International Council of Creators of Music. Nashville, USA, 22(10), pp.2014-23.; 
Cooke, C., 2015. Dissecting the digital dollar part one. In The Music Managers Forum, London.
101 Borghi, M., 2011. Chasing copyright infringement in the streaming landscape. International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 42(3).; McGugan, F., 2015. Making Available, Communication 
to the Public & User Interactivity. https://www.musictank.co.uk/resources/reports/making-available-
communicationto-the-public-user-interactivity accessed, 24, pp.04-16. The making available right is 
exercised differently in different regions, creating deep disparity of rules under cross-border situations. 
102 Miller, E. and Feigenbaum, J., 2001, November. Taking the copy out of copyright. In ACM Workshop on 
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though access clearly involves a transient reproduction element, it is arguable whether 
reproduction should be the key legal determinant of a stream. The other key element is 
communication to the public, which in turn involves two distinct rights; the ‘broadcasting’ 
right and the ‘making available’ right. These are subject to different legal frameworks with 
different protections for rights holders, which lead to divergent treatment across the music 
publishing and sound recording sectors. 
The making available right enables authors as well as performers and producers to have 
the exclusive right to make the work available to the public, whereas the broadcasting right 
allows performers just a right to equitable remuneration. In relation to the broadcast of sound 
recordings, in the UK it is only the owner of the copyright in the sound recording that can 
exercise their rights. In this framework, performers are entitled to equitable remuneration for 
the public performance or broadcasting of recordings of their performances. 
On the making available right, all users need consent directly from the performers but in 
practice, most performers assign their exclusive rights to the record labels through their 
recording contracts, leaving just a few featured performers able to negotiate the making 
available right royalty rates. This means most legacy performers are unable to receive 
significant financial benefits from streaming as their record labels currently pay the same 
10-20% rate they used to apply to physical record sales,103 rather than the 50% rate the 
performers would expect to receive for a broadcast royalty.
3.1.6 Data management initiatives 
Music data has always been time-consuming and expensive to obtain, verify and manage, 
which meant the distribution of revenue often required collecting societies’ ‘discretion’.104 
The two sides of the industry developed industry identifiers to improve the exchange of 
accurate data; an International Standard Work Code (ISWC) for the underlying musical 
works and an International Standard Recording Code (ISRC) for sound recordings. 
However, combining the data between the two codes into a single authoritative database 
has not yet been possible. Two attempts to resolve this include the Global Repertoire 
Database (GRD) and the new US database envisaged as part of the Music Modernization 
Act (MMA).
From 2008 various stakeholders began to collaborate at the behest of the EC105 on 
creating a central, authoritative database, the GRD, to help streamline online music 
licensing. Despite the broad range of participants and very substantial funding, the project 
was abandoned in July 2014. 
The MMA is an overdue outcome of the US industry’s recognition that the existing highly 
regulated and fragmented licensing system especially for mechanical rights (but also, with 
four PROs, performing rights) conflicts with the needs of the oligopsony of digital service 
Digital Rights Management, pp. 233-244. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
103 Osborne, R., 2017. Is Equitable Remuneration Equitable? Performers’ Rights in the UK. Popular Music and 
Society, 40(5), pp.573-591.
104 Parker, N., 2004. Music business: Infrastructure, practice, and law. Sweet & Maxwell. p.199
105 EC Commissioner Nellie Kroes in September 2008 https://www.prsformusic.com/press/2010/global-
repertoire-database-working-group
34  |  Intellectual Property Office
providers and the oligopoly of content owners and providers. The MMA’s road map, among 
several other innovations, ameliorates certain dysfunctional aspects of the digital supply 
chain in the US by reforming the mechanical licensing system through introducing a single 
point blanket licensing structure, amending compulsory licensing to allow introduction of a 
‘willing seller- willing buyer’ rate standard as well as establishing the Mechanical Licensing 
Collective (MLC). Building an authoritative and comprehensive database is a prerequisite 
for the MLC to be able to function.
3.2 Architecture for music data management 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In software development the term architecture is used to emphasise ideas of ‘codification, 
abstraction, standards and style’106. This is also an acknowledgement of the existence of 
formal training networks which exist as a framework for:
• establishing and satisfying system requirements; 
• technical design and implementation;
• cost estimation and process management;
• effective and efficient reuse/reapplication;
• dependency and consistency analysis.107
Architecture, in a music industry sense, can describe the business models and systems 
that have evolved to acquire, represent, manage and exploit exclusive rights on 
repertoire. Hence, record labels and publishers seeking the assignment of rights from 
authors/composers enact a structure which is replicated systemically. The application of 
technology is not then a neutral process. It engages, interacts, resists and/or supports the 
frameworks which have evolved historically, socially and politically.108 As a working out of 
the ‘Socio-technical Constellation’ methodology, architecture becomes a way of ‘housing’ 
foundational ideas, which can be unearthed and brought to light through archaeology. As 
an approach, architectural analysis seeks to map the way in which inherited frameworks 
are constructed by conspicuous and sometimes inconspicuous agents. As far as possible 
our approach has been:
• topographical - a mapping and interpretation of models, conduits, flows and barriers;
• dynamic - an ongoing appraisal of objectives, contingencies, problem solving, 
resistances and their effects;
106 Perry D.E. & Wolf A.L., 1992. Foundations for the study of software architecture, ACM SIGSOFT Software 
Engineering Notes Homepage Archive, 17(4) pp:40-
107 Ibid 52 ACM New York, NY, USA DOI>10.1145/141874.141884
108 Feenberg A. 1999. Questioning Technology, Routledge; 1 edition
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• economic - an analysis of commercial imperatives, (dis)incentives, risk and reward 
structures and zero sum/collaborative games;
• organisational - an observation of the structures, frameworks, hierarchies, divisions 
and allegiances as they emerge, take form and are dissolved/disrupted;
and has:
• acknowledged that the key to understanding the way in which the data architecture of 
the music industry is constructed, is to appreciate the importance of attribution and 
identification;
• accepted that ‘Judgements of identity and recognition lie at the heart of infringement 
issues in intellectual property.’109
3.2.2 Topographical modelling 
Music industry discourse has tended to frame itself around particular business interests 
relating to the ownership of rights and the exploitation of intellectual property. This has 
developed and evolved as a result of legislative responses and technological interventions 
which incumbents often perceived as challenges to their business models. In the 20th 
Century, the music industry coalesced around two initially opposing but ultimately inter-
related sectors; music publishing and the phonographic industry. Within the music 
publishing sector, societies representing authors, composers and publishers were 
authorised to collect license revenue from those who used music commercially and to 
distribute this accordingly. Similarly, once related rights were established for producers 
and performers on sound recordings, parallel societies emerged which collected license 
revenue for the phonographic industry.110 Historically, collecting societies mirrored the 
division of the industry, representing the separate but related interests of the publishing 
sector and the recording sector. This ‘binary’ model allowed the music industry to define 
itself upon a specific axis and promoted a framework that legitimised a discourse around 
what were believed to be firm points of reference. Constructed on the basis of linked 
rights, this binary model dictated the analysis of data operations and reporting structures, 
which were focused upon the content/repertoire held or owned by these interests. 
Figure 3: Label/Publisher Binary Model
109 Drahos P. 2016. ‘A Philosophy of Intellectual Property’, Taylor & Francis
110 It should be noted that it has only been a very recent development that these separate collection systems 
have been amalgamated (see PRS/PPL joint licensing- https://pplprs.co.uk 
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Figure 4: Music industry data binary model 
The legislative ‘correction’ that ushered in equitable remuneration created in its wake 
a new kind of collecting society which specifically represented the performers on a 
phonographic recording. This was to address problems with regard to the distribution 
of the performers’ share of collected revenue in respect of related/neighbouring rights. 
Performers were encouraged to join these new societies and to make claims for payment. 
This presented a significant challenge because contribution data had not been a priority 
for the record labels and so there was a dearth of authoritative information regarding 
attribution. The establishment of a designated directory of performer IDs (International 
Performer Database), managed by an authority body (SCAPR) was therefore a significant 
intervention. In the UK, performer CMOs were not given the right to collect from venues 
directly but relied on the distribution of revenue collected nationally by the previously 
established record label owned society. 
The performers themselves are not a homogenous group. Some are ‘featured’ artists who 
are contractually involved with record labels while others are ‘non-featured’/‘session’ 
contributors who generally operate on a freelance basis. Moreover, some of these 
performers may also be writers who have publishing relationships. It could be argued 
that these differences in categorisation simply reflect the operational practices of the 
incumbent label/publisher binary mentioned previously.
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Figure 5: Triangular relationship structure
However as content creators/music makers, these actors have shared interests with regard 
to rights, payments and working practices which have emerged through the advocacy of 
representative groups such as the Musicians Union (MU), Featured Artists Coalition (FAC), 
British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) now known as the 
Ivors Academy), and related sector bodies such as The Music Managers Forum (MMF) 
and The Music Producers Guild (MPG). Acknowledgement and understanding of shared 
interest coalesced into the formation in 2018 of The UK Council of Music Makers, which 
acts as an umbrella for organisations with a distinct creator-focused agenda. The assertion 
of a defined creator sector constitutes an interjection into received industry discourse, 
positing a ternary relationship which challenges prevailing binary notions about the 
operation of the music industry, intentionally drawing attention to the divisive nature of the 
inherited contractual frameworks. New relationships are also discernible in the emergence 
and assertion of new business models which acknowledge the artists’ desire to retain 
ownership of their copyright and eschew the assignment of their rights under the terms of 
what are often presented as ‘standard’ record or publishing contracts built upon concepts 
such as ‘recoupable’ advances.
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Figure 6: Music industry data ternary model
The technological innovation of the World Wide Web in parallel with the widespread 
adoption of the MP3 digital file allowed digital service providers to develop platforms 
which have challenged the systems of content distribution. With unprecedented levels of 
responsibility being devolved to them, Digital Service Providers (DSPs) have emerged as a 
fourth pillar of the industry and now negotiate licensing deals with publishers, record labels 
and creators directly and/or through collecting societies. This fourfold (quaternary) model 
has been fraught with competing and conflicting interests, as creators, rights holders and 
DSPs negotiate control over content. 
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Figure 7: Pyramid relationship structure
Figure 8: Music industry data quaternary model
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The complex and dynamic negotiations which continue to frame the relationships between 
these pillars has resulted in the authority of systems and operational frameworks, inherited 
from the pre-digital era, being challenged and limitations being presented as opportunities 
for commercial exploitation. For example:
• digitisation has facilitated user upload and sharing of digital content. This has been 
enabled and promoted by social media with an emphasis on no fee for access;
• national structures for the collection of fees from venues and broadcasters for music use 
have operated as membership organisations when it comes to distribution of funds;
• direct upload to DSPs has emboldened and promoted independent/self-release of 
content while emphasising models of revenue linked to advertising.
This has given rise to a multiplicity of fragmented allegiances which have altered the 
competitive landscape allowing the entry of disruptive agencies. These have often sought 
to capitalise on the opportunities and threats brought about by the discrepancy between 
technological innovation and legislative or regulatory responses (law lag) to:
• create layers of interaction and combined services which depend upon inherited/
established structures, but which present themselves as innovative or new;
• introduce new disruptive services which exploit loose or light touch regulation and the lack 
of information/awareness of normative operations/requirements around content rights;
• benefit from a competitive landscape which breaks up natural monopolies while still 
observing a symbiotic relationship with the structures that support these.
Typically, agents offer services promoted as introducing increases in cost efficiency, 
speed of delivery and the use of new technology. These agents, engaged in problem 
seeking/solving behaviour to attract investment for their products and services, can 
magnify fractures and anomalies inherent within the system, which they often characterise 
as symptoms of a paradigm shift, even when any technologically-driven innovation in 
business and enterprise is, in effect being ‘tamed’ by their operation/intervention. 
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Figure 9: Music industry data quinary model
The impact of disruption and the conditions of flux and resistance that characterise 
the initiatives and interventions enacted through multiple agents has warranted 
acknowledgement in the form of a Quinary model. These dynamic interventions introduce 
pivot points and contortions into the established framework so that inherited static models 
become distorted, challenged by the activities of the disruptive agents. Driven by venture 
capital, many agents have sought to build businesses around problem-solving activities, 
particularly where the existing data frameworks have been challenged by digitisation. 
These companies are incentivised to locate and maximise the opportunities afforded by 
system fragmentation, a process that, arguably, they contribute to and exacerbate.
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Figure 10: Irregular relationship structure
This disruption across the system has necessarily given rise to a counter impulse which 
has sought to stabilise the existing and inherited framework. This resistance can (in 
keeping with our topography) be posited as a Senary model, construed as a push towards 
the standardisation of system processes and protocols. In organisational terms this should 
be a body whose role is the promotion of system interoperability and practical responses 
as an agnostic agent to a range of divergent and often competing interests. (De)centralised 
procedures and policies must interconnect and be interoperable if the ecosystem is to 
have functionality. In practice, this means messaging protocols and reporting structures 
that can accommodate a wide range of business models. 
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Figure 11: Music industry data senary model
Figure 12: Regulated relationship structure
Finally, the role of education throughout the ecosystem has to be considered. This 
expands the discourse significantly, and includes the academies and educators who 
research, analyse and historically document the industry, as well as initiatives undertaken 
by operating agents to up-skill and re-skill their employees, members and contributors. 
The changes in the education sector have reflected a wider societal change that now 
recognises the importance of the creative industries as an important contributor to the 
national economy. Industry skills are now frequently taught as part of broader academic 
schemes with practical and theoretical elements being brought together and assessed as 
part of a qualification framework. From the moment that copyright is expressed, informed 
decision-making needs to be aligned to an awareness of system requirements and the 
legislative framework that impacts content production, rights ownership and remuneration. 
Education is critical to the recognition that informed practice is mutually beneficial to all 
actors and helps to incentivise and realise the inherent value of creative contributions. 
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Figure 13: Education septenary model
Figure 14: Expanded relationship structure
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3.2.3 Industry identifiers 
“You cannot solve the problems of rights and licensing without consistently applied 
identification systems”.111
Identifiers are representations of an object’s identity. They are imposed as abstract tools 
that can simplify relationships, allowing for the effective management of complex or 
ambiguous phenomena. They also call attention to specifically defined frameworks and 
perspectives that fulfil the requirements of given authorities and are constructed with 
‘customary boundaries and systems of regularities.’112
The ways in which these ‘abstract’ representations are applied and relate to each other 
reveals much about how authority is practiced, distributed and defended by those 
who define rules for systems of information exchange. Criticism that identifiers can be 
mediated, determinative and in some instances corrupted, has often been conspicuously 
countered using responses borrowed from a traditional scientific defence. For example:
• appeals to authority and hierarchy of knowledge (e.g. ‘rights owners/writers/ 
contributors are the source of truth’);
• reference to localised difficulties (e.g. ‘what is needed is a global solution/ standardisation’);
• pretence that the problem doesn’t exist, or that it is someone else’s problem (e.g. ‘our 
data systems are fine and work well for us’).113
Any dynamic framework, dealing with uncertainty and built upon the consensus of 
authority will undoubtedly encounter anomalies, inconsistencies and interruptions, which 
may have serious implications for its operation. This should be carefully considered, and 
flexibility is essential in architectural design, so that system confidence can be maintained 
when encountering the inevitable disruption. This necessarily means the availability of easy 
to access, low cost, early intervention dispute resolution services, as the identification of 
any particular object relies fundamentally upon consensus between parties.
111 Paskin N. & Rust G., 2014 Principles of Identification V1.1 Linked Content Coalition http://www.
linkedcontentcoalition.org/index.php/downloads/category/4-principles-of-identification?download=11:lcc-
principles-of-identification-v1-1 
112 Foucault M. 1970. The Order of Things, (Les Mots et les Choses) first published 1966 by Editions Gallimard, 
Paris English edition first published in the United Kingdom 1970 by Tavistock Publications, Routledge 2002
113 Woolgar S., 1988. Knowledge and Reflexivity - New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge, London Sage 
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This in itself is not as straightforward as it sounds, given the range of context and the varied 
information models that an identifier must navigate. An identifier, if it is to be unique and 
persistent, must balance the contradictions and distinctions specific to the multiplicity of 
domains where it is used, while also maintaining consensus between parties. Fundamentally, 
managing and directing a system of identifiers requires an understanding of:
• what is to be identified;
• what the purpose of the identification is;
• who is asking for the identification.
Taking the conditions around the creation of a song (i.e. musical work) as an example, it 
becomes clear that particular distinctions are already in evidence due to the imposition of 
the system of copyright. In this respect any combination of the following actions (whether 
individual and/or collaborative), has implications for the assertion of ‘authorship’ and 
therefore ‘ownership’ of a piece of music and thus determines its attribution:
• direction of a performance (use of a lead sheet or similar instructions); 
• use of an already existing work (cover version/sample);
• iterative composition (‘jamming’ through an evolving idea).
These processes can be further complicated by the use of, or reference to, unintended and/
or unattributed contributions from Orphan Works, Public Domain Material and User Generated 
Content, which are often difficult to quantify, given that a comprehensive, agreed identification 
system has yet to be applied to common pool resources.114 The basis for any systematic 
application of identifiers is the simplification of complex processes of interpretation, thus 
enabling clear actionable decisions. A model or system will usually contain: 
• entities, including actors and identifier systems; 
• relations, between entities; 
• qualities, as desirable properties of entities;
• actions, as processes carried out upon entities. (Typically undertaken in order to make 
qualities apply to entities).115 
114 Ostrom E., 2015. Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press
115 Nicholas N., Ward N. & Blinco K., 2012. Abstract Modelling of Digital Identifiers http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/
issue62/nicholas-et-al/ 
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This is the basis of an identifier framework which operates and generates collective 
authority, attribution and provenance in relation to the above processes. (Note - the 
asserter is also an entity/actor and their assertion of an association between (say) an 
identifier and its referent is critical to the trustworthiness of the association).
The Linked Content Coalition,116 have proposed guidelines for the practical application of 
an identifier framework, and pointed to critical underpinnings and requirements needed for 
a functioning dynamic identifier system, these are:
• public persistent identifiers;
• ongoing flexible managed change;
• mapping of links between identifiers; 
• standard technical protocols;
• readily available access to identifiers and registration.
Furthermore, four key principles of identity management117 have also been recommended:
• unique identification - every entity should be uniquely identified within an  
identified namespace;
• functional granularity - it should be possible to identify an entity whenever it needs to 
be distinguished;
• designated authority - the author of an item of metadata should be securely identified;
• appropriate access - everyone requires access to the metadata on which they 
depend, and privacy and confidentiality for their own metadata from those who are not 
dependent on it.
116 The Linked Content Coalition (LCC) is a not-for-profit global consortium of standards bodies and registries. 
LCC members are organizations who create and manage data standards associated with content of one 
or more types, particularly for identifiers, metadata and messaging. The purpose of the LCC is to facilitate 
and expand the legitimate use of content in the digital network through the effective use of interoperable 
identifiers and metadata. http://www.linkedcontentcoalition.com 
117 Rust, G. and Bide, M., 2000. The< indecs> metadata framework, principles, model and data 
dictionary. WP1a-006-2.0, June.
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A system-wide view is encouraged with regard to the use of identifiers, particularly as 
interpretation of their use varies with context. Misinterpretation can arise in various ways, 
and it is important that those using any system be aware of implementation guidelines and 
can challenge instances of false assertion. It is recommended that registries should therefore 
represent information persistently within a defined scope that is subject to clear and agreed 
procedures and policies. Problems that could be minimised or countered through the 
operation of an interconnected registry of identifiers includes three particular issues:
• co-reference – where there is more than one ID for each referent (as in shared 
ownership of the ID);
• ambiguity – where the same ID is used for two or more referents;
• malign actions – where the ID is fraudulently or erroneously manipulated.
The following diagram (Figure 15) shows the framework that bounds the application of 
an identifier; both the referent and the recipient of an agreed identifier are joined in a 
relationship of co-responsibility which creates the consensus which allows its operation. 
The identifier does not contain metadata itself but refers to the range of fields that have 
been allocated and agreed under the terms and rules of governance.
Figure 15: Metadata 
“The introduction of international standard numbering systems is critical for the ability of the 
music rights societies to manage their businesses more effectively in the digital age.” 118 
Figure 16 shows the division of the data flow into layers to show the sedimented nature 
of information that is ingested from workflow. The term sedimented is preferred because 
‘stratified’ or ‘structured’ data is the result of an organised process, whereas here there 
is a lot of raw data that has not been processed in any way (particularly in terms of User 
Generated Content). In addition, sedimentation promotes the idea of filtering (as in the 
118 Hill, K., 1999.
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use of organic silt beds) while also alluding to layering of data over time. At the base 
level is the ‘Event’ information, which is essentially captured workflow. At a specific time, 
the ingested information has a complex field of reference; questions of relationship, 
consent, information asymmetry, employment, ownership and value imbue the contextual 
framework of the song creation. The structuring of ‘raw’ information into structured data 
fields and data sets forms the basis of any subsequent actions. The data layer provides the 
bedrock for the application of an identification framework.
Figure 16: Sedimented information
Attribution between contributing parties and content is dependent upon this identification 
process which determines contributions in the context of content creation, although it 
should be noted that this does not automatically confer rights ownership. It is important 
that this distinction between attribution and payment be understood and maintained 
as not all contributors are entitled to the ongoing revenue attached to content creation. 
A Rights Layer exists as a further abstraction from the Attribution Layer which takes 
into account the legislation, practice and contractual interest of key stakeholders with 
regard to copyright (which changes with each territory/jurisdiction). This in turn allows 
payment systems to operate so that revenue from the exploitation of the work/recording 
commercially can be determined and distributed.
The difference between (Core) Payment Metadata and Descriptive Metadata (Credit) is 
critical to understanding the origins of the suite of IDs used by the music industry.119 As 
organisations developed identifier frameworks, they were employed to maintain revenue 
structures in accordance with the business objectives pertinent to each sector. Thus, the 
systems of ISO Identification reflect the operational objectives of the stakeholders within 
each given sector.120 This is particularly evident in the music industry, where the use of 
two distinct content ID systems (ISWC/ISRC), reflecting music publishing and record label 
interests respectively were generated by the nature of copyright and related rights used on 
a recorded medium.121 
119 DDEX 2018?
120 Brooke T. 2014. Descriptive Metadata In The Music Industry: Why It Is Broken And How To Fix It - Journal 
of Digital Media Management
121 Hill, K., 1999.
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The diagram shown at Figure 17 represents the relationships between entities on the 
publishing side of the system and how these contrast with relationships around the sound 
recording. In mapping the use of the common identifiers for music content (e.g. ISWC and 
ISRC), it can be revealed that systems are asymmetrical. This reflects the fact that the 
identifier frameworks have evolved out of business operations as opposed to a holistic 
system design. 
Figure 17: Data flow model for ISWC/ISRC 
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A layered approach to data and information offers a way of clarifying and making visible 
the particular process and objective of identification, which is generally opaque to the 
majority of consumers and creators of music.122 However, this process is far from neutral, 
as the record of an event or action is characterised by an ‘intentionality’,123 which in effect 
means asking:
• who requires the information?
• what is it to be used for?
• how will access be managed/categorised?
• where will it be stored?
• when is it needed?
• how can the information be trusted?
• where has it come from?
Music data has also to be considered against the backdrop of previous and future 
requirements as well as the current need.124 This produces further problems when 
minimum data sets are proposed; the question ‘for what purpose?’ needs to remain 
constant when referring to the construction and implementation of any system 
architecture. The table below shows that there are particular intentions behind the 
application of identifiers to music content which relates to royalty payment structures and 
the application of copyright.
Resource Attribution Person ID Content ID
Musical Work Author IPI/ISNI ISWC
Composer IPI/ISNI ISWC
Score Arranger IPI/ISNI ISMN
Lyric Sheet Lyricist IPI/ISNI ISTC
Publishing Administrator IPI/ISNI ISWC
Sound Recording Performer IPN/ISNI ISRC
Producer ISNI ISRC
Engineer ISNI ISRC
Label ISNI ISRC
Table 2: Application of identifiers
122 Ludovico, L.A., 2009. IEEE 1599: A multi-layer approach to music description. Journal of Multimedia, 4(1).
123 Drummond. J., 2003. The Structure Of Intentionality from Welton, D. ed., 2003. The new Husserl: A critical 
reader. Indiana University Press. p 66 
124 Brooke T. 2014.
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The musical work identification ISWC, has three significant challenges which contribute to 
the current problem of linking:
1. Timeliness of assignment; recent changes have improved matters, but it is still not 
possible for a work to secure an identifier when the recording is still being finalised in 
the studio. This means that the recording leaves without any work identification and it 
is necessary to ‘match’ the work and recording later. 
2. The database of ISWC codes although well engineered is however treated by 
the societies as a proprietary resource with only a web-page made available for 
queries. Many have suggested that an API is important to allow machine to machine 
interactions, but this is being resisted by the societies, presumably due to a fear of 
substitution by some other entity that could aggregate the data they currently hold.
3. There is considerable uncertainty about the quality of the data and very little public 
information about how it is used or can be used (ISWC is said by some not to be 
implemented comprehensively, although PROs are incentivised to make assignments 
so that payments from international societies can be processed).
The systems for recording identification ISRC are regarded by IFPI as reasonably good. 
The granularity (the way in which new identifiers are assigned based on a recording being 
the same as, or different from, another recording,) is generally accepted as appropriate 
for industry needs. The identifier is compact and easy to obtain and to parse so it can be 
checked for compliance. In some respects, however, it has some shortcomings, for example:
• country code and registrant code are often assumed to have significance beyond their 
designation as the origin of the identifier. (It is known that royalties have been sent to a 
country on the mistaken understanding that the country code means that the content 
itself is owned in that country);
• although large companies in general comply with guidelines, they sometimes take 
minor shortcuts or make decisions without seeking advice from experts, but this 
seldom creates dislocation in the system as a whole. On a wider scale guideline 
adherence can be patchy;
• when smaller labels move from one distributor to another, there is little control if the 
new distributor decides to assign new consecutive codes rather than ingest all the 
codes assigned by their predecessor. This could be to the detriment of the label who 
finds that their sales and reputation do not roll up over the transition;
• some assignors don’t understand that the code has to be assigned in compliance with 
a standard and in accordance with the instructions of the registration authority.
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3.2.4 Interconnecting systems
Interoperability
“Interoperability is the ability of independent systems to exchange meaningful 
information and initiate actions from each other, in order to operate together to mutual 
benefit. In particular, it envisages the ability for loosely-coupled independent systems to 
be able to collaborate and communicate”.125
To facilitate identifier interoperability, three areas for development were suggested by  
the ISO:126
• information associated with an identified entity should be ‘painlessly referenced’ in the 
context of one class of entity even though it originated in another;
• agreed meanings and vocabulary should be defined and mapped between  
identifier schemes;
• agreed methods of information sharing should be implemented. (Minimum data  
sets cannot fulfil the requirements of all parties, and therefore need to be  
carefully considered).127
“Until recently almost every Industry Sector, if not every Industry Player, had its own 
Party Identifier, making it all proprietary and not at all interoperable. This was due to 
the fact that Party-related information carries a lot of sensitive data such as birth dates, 
personal contact information, contractual clauses, or commercial terms. Information 
sharing in this context may have grave implications and repercussions.”128
Although there has been considerable emphasis on promotion of identification schemes 
and the adoption of standard or reference metadata sets, there has been less emphasis on 
the impact of cross-sector interoperability. While the music industry has been attempting 
to solve the problem of matching the distinct ISWC/ISRC systems for over a decade, the 
explosion of digital multimedia content, in response to demand generated by technological 
innovation in content distribution and the ubiquitous use of media recording and playback 
devices, has made it imperative that organisations understand the implications of using 
one industry identifier in another context, and the importance of importing metadata from 
one identification scheme into a system based on another.
“It is clear that interoperability of all these media identifiers and metadata schemes will 
be required... and metadata is now becoming key to interoperability.”129 
125 Paskin N., 2006. Identifier Interoperability A Report on Two Recent ISO Activities, D-Lib Magazine Volume 
12 Number 4
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Nuttall F.X. & Oh S.G. 2011 Party Identifiers, Cataloging & Classification Quarterly, 49:6, 528-537, DOI: 
10.1080/01639374.2011.603075
129 Paskin N., 2006.
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Interoperability means much more than the technological systems of metadata exchange, 
however. It is fundamentally about the quality of the relationships across an ecosystem and 
the actions required to make these relationships productive.
Standardisation 
This process, fundamental to interoperability, is aligned to messaging systems and 
information protocols which involve consensus, collaboration, negotiation and adoption 
across a range of shared interests. Standardisation of terminology and identification 
provides faster time to market, improved operational and data quality, shared cost 
reductions between partners throughout the digital supply chain, and counters duplication 
of work by homogenising the required data feeds. However, parties with systems that 
support a standard have also to consider that others in the data supply chain may operate 
systems built around their own proprietary models or may have already committed to 
supporting different or competing models based on their distinct ‘intentionality’. The 
granularity required for these systems will therefore be different for each application. 
Although standardisation is desirable, industry has to consider how first to establish an 
agreed system of governance across these multiple, variable frameworks. Any proposed 
holistic solution needs to address the current, system imbalances, while offering potential 
adoption to wider constituencies. In this way, standardisation can offer benefits to all parts 
of the value chain.
Digital Data Exchange (DDEX), a “consortium of leading media companies, music 
licensing organisations, digital service providers and technical intermediaries, focused 
on the creation of digital supply chain standards”,130 has been instrumental in promoting 
practical, technical solutions throughout the ecosystem. DDEX governance structure (see 
below) aims to reflect a balance of members, “currently split roughly one third for owners 
or administrators of musical work, one third owners or administrators of sound recording 
rights owners and one third digital music retailers and technology service providers.”131 
Figure 18: DDEX Governance structure (DDEX 2019)
130 About DDEX http://ddex.net/about-ddex/Accessed 30 April 2019.
131 Ibid
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DDEX offers three types of membership (Charter, Full and Associate) with corresponding 
degrees of access and benefits. Membership fees reflect these levels of access although 
any organisation can take out a license to use DDEX standards, free of charge.
Data privacy and confidentiality
In most countries, the aggregation of private data within a database is highly scrutinised. 
Furthermore, legislation has sought to strengthen the protections given to individuals 
through the establishment of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).132 To be 
usable in an international environment, descriptive elements of contributing parties have 
to be kept to a strict minimum. The dates of birth and death (or creation and dissolution 
for legal entities) are widely used, as they provide due to their permanence, a unique 
and reliable indication of the party, yet some countries prohibit public exposures or 
exportations of such information. 
“In many, particularly European, countries, it is required by law that any database that 
maintains information about individuals be declared to a governmental organisation. 
Party Identification databases typically fall in that category; anyone creating such a 
database is bound to a legal obligation to declare it.”133 
Although this promotes transparency and redress mechanisms, there is a concern that the 
cross linking of identifiers across a system could expose confidential and sensitive data. 
One proposed solution is to consider proprietary identifiers as a ‘private layer’ operating in 
individual secure silos. On top of this private layer, an open ‘public layer’ could be built as 
a cross identifier. Some propose that this would maintain confidentiality without the need 
for modifications to existing IT systems.134 (Effectively, data associated with the IPN/IPI etc. 
is kept private even if the identifier itself becomes disclosed.)
Figure 19: Party identifiers - Public/private layers (Nuttal & Oh 2011)
132 The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (“GDPR”) is a regulation in EU law on data 
protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area 
(EEA). http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf )
133 Nuttall F.X. & Oh S.G. 2011
134 Ibid
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3.2.5 Recent technological initiatives and developments
Elixir
Elixir is a project initiated by three major PROs, PRS for Music, SACEM and ASCAP in July 
2017 with the vision to create a trusted and authoritative reference of recordings linked to 
works using ISRCs, ISWCs and other related proprietary identifiers. This project aims to 
resolve the issues around ISRC and ISWC reconciliation and to address the complexity and 
confusion around licensing, payments and data fragmentation. Establishing robust links 
between these two pieces of data offers a practical solution with enormous potential for 
improving the processes of royalty matching, which will in turn speed up licensing, reduce 
errors and reduce costs. The goal of the project is to prototype how the music industry could 
create and adopt a shared, decentralised database of musical work metadata with real-
time update and tracking capabilities. While the project has adopted an inclusive approach, 
the question of authority and control has been raised with regard to governance and the 
acceptance of competing systems which may challenge determinations. 
Some commentators viewed the SACEM /PRS /ASCAP project as ‘partly defensive’, 
noting, “if metadata management is coming to the music business anyway, better that it be 
designed to the benefit and specifications of the PROs than risk having to conform their 
processes to a system designed by and for others.”135 
This reflects the impact of two underlying, related dynamics: 
• the increasing complexity of the market for music rights, as the number of use-cases for 
music explodes, creating a demand for more efficient and integrated licensing solutions;
• the need to track more uses and make more but smaller payments to more but smaller 
rights owners. This is likely to generate pressure to drive down costs through greater 
scale, shared infrastructure around cost-centres like metadata management and the 
adoption of technology.136
PPL’s new feature to link the musical work at the point of registering the recording on its 
registration portal has been regarded as highly complementary to Elixir, which focuses on 
sharing the links between organisations: a) because new links created ‘at source’; and b) it 
allows for PPL to verify links with the recording rights holder (a key question is whether this 
validates the ISWC by accessing the CISAC registry at the point of recording registration).
PPL/PRS collaboration on linked data and joint licensing is significant in establishing the 
context for future relationships that can build interconnected, interoperable systems.
135 Sweeting P., 2017. Why Rights Organizations Want to Make Music Together, Rights Tech Project, https://
rightstech.com/2017/04/why-collection-societies-want-to-make-music-together/
136 Sweeting P., 2017.
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Back-office
ICE is a pan-European multi-territorial copyright administration, online processing 
and licensing hub operating as a back office on behalf of seven collecting societies137. 
ICE presents a model that may be applicable to multiple territories. However, CMO 
consolidation may encounter resistance from localised groups if there is a perception that 
there is a threat to local interests, authority and control, particularly if the system is seen 
to favour Anglo-American repertoire to the detriment of indigenous content. PPL provides 
back-office services to seven countries, although the structure of relationships between 
performer and producer (label) societies in these territories may not mirror the UK, which 
could be regarded as an outlier in organisational terms. In one of the countries cited, 
Ireland, for example, these two types of societies are completely separate organisations 
and PPL provides services to the label/producer society only. 
Smart speakers
The rapid adoption of this technology suggests voice recognition could drive how 
music is discovered and consumed. It highlights the importance of the recommendation 
algorithms of voice assistants and the underpinning issues around metadata for the 
song’s era, genre, lyric themes, place in culture and other context-rich topics. Smart 
speakers therefore could incentivise the supply of accurate metadata to streaming 
services on songwriters and publishers related to individual recordings to ensure relevant 
songs are served up to listeners.
Smart registration
Performer/creator registration at the point of creation is compounded by a host of 
problems, not least the focus on creative ‘flow’. The ingesting of data at the point of 
creation needs to be aligned to low cost, easily attainable party and content identifiers 
that operate in accordance with industry accepted standards, to be effective. DDEX 
RIN is a metadata standard innovation aimed at capturing studio performance data and 
‘cohabiting’ contribution data. This is an important development that can incorporate 
music production data direct from recording software platforms and which provides a 
potential framework for IoT (Internet of Things) data transfer. PPL has already developed 
an innovative recommendation engine that speeds up the process of reviewing sound 
recording metadata to ensure performer line-ups are accurately completed, while the 
myPPL portal facilitates iterative reporting, registration and enquiry by rights holders. 
Auddly/Session, a Swedish technology company backed by Björn Ulvaeus (ABBA) among 
others, has partnered with PPL, PRS and AVID to implement a registration application 
that attempts to address registration of music content contribution at the writer/performer 
level. Given the democratisation of music production and the ubiquitous use of technology, 
education and awareness is critical with regard to any prospect of widespread adoption of 
registration solutions. 
137 PRS, STIM, BUMA-STEMRA, SABAM, TONO. TEOSTO AND KODA
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Content recognition systems
Many organisations, and particularly DSPs, continue to invest in Content Recognition 
(Fingerprinting) Systems for content attribution. Installation of Content Recognition 
Systems in venues for monitoring public performance brings another layer of complexity 
to the variety of data sources being added to the disambiguation process. Developments 
in this area reflect an increase in the amount of businesses seeking to capitalise in the 
‘problem’ area of data and content. Again, this introduces complexity and opportunities 
for disruption as a variety of reporting methods and data sources are introduced. 
‘Watermarking’, the process of hiding digital information in an audio recording can be used 
to verify the authenticity or integrity of the recording or to show the identity of its owners.138 
Issues around their application include robustness and perceptibility however the use of 
hidden information to refer to relational databases is currently a focus of research.
Blockchain solutions
Adopting Distributed Ledger Technology, specifically blockchain, is not merely a 
technological decision but also a business decision. Good use cases should solve 
real problems for organizations. Great use cases solve real problems at a cost that is 
significantly lower than the benefits the adoption brings. Blockchain’s unique properties, 
however, mean that a new analytical framework is useful, in part because of the fact 
that Blockchain has emerged at a unique point in society’s technological development. 
Blockchain is about the exchange of value; it is intended to enable individuals to exchange 
currency and other assets with one another without relying on a third party to manage the 
transactions. It also implies the dramatic redefinition of the business processes associated 
within and between companies. The major weakness of Blockchain in providing a solution 
for the music business is that storing data or large files on the Blockchain is a non-starter 
as it can barely sustain small strings of text that simply record a balance transfer between 
two parties. 
It remains unclear as to whether Blockchain is a practical solution for music publishing 
due in main to the complexities of modern song writing (especially for hit records and 
catalogues) and the multitude of outlier cases such as what happens to song infringements 
or when sampling of songs occur. There is also the immutability of the Blockchain which 
can be an issue when we later discover that a recording needs amending due to incorrect 
attributions. Blockchain’s most compelling use cases are in areas such as cryptocurrencies 
or harvesting unused computer processors where in both cases, all parties involved are 
untrusted and transactions must be immutable. Although Blockchain generates trust in the 
database, its shortcoming is that it cannot resolve the music sector’s  problem with trust in 
the data, an issue, which is something that requires a different sort of governance to what 
DLT provides.
The music business is complex. The different actors, the various jurisdictions and their 
concomitant licensing constraints make predicting the actual effects of changes very hard. 
Blockchain looks like a partial solution to ease the strictures of the royalty framework, but 
in practice the music industry requires more exceptions and localised ad-hoc solutions 
138  Cox, I. et al., 2007. Digital Watermarking and Steganography 2nd ed., Elsevier Science.
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than the seamless application of a top down business process. What would be needed is 
the bringing together of representatives of all the activities in the music value chain, from 
individual creators up to multinationals, covering all stages of music making (composition, 
performance, production, metadata capture, registration, archiving, contracts, distribution, 
merchandising, accounting and collection of royalties, and legal issues). 
If a Blockchain is to be implemented, then the most sensible route would be through a 
permissioned public shared ledger. A permissioned, public, shared Blockchain is a form of 
hybrid system that can provide for situations where whitelisted access is required but all the 
transactions are publicly viewable. It applies here where only key players within the music 
rights industry can write to the network, but all transactions can be publicly verified. 
3.3 Research findings from the interviews
This section outlines the diverse range of views highlighting key issues around music data 
management which emerged from the semi-structured interviews.
3.3.1 Critical juncture for change
From the interviews, it was evident there is a growing consensus for urgent change to 
address the mounting data issues. This consensus is partly attributable to the increasingly 
fast-changing business environment driven by data and by the recognition that better 
quality data is vital to realising the full potential of the digital music economy. 
3.3.1.1 Unparalleled growth of data
The accelerating growth of data sparked by the rise of music streaming is the catalyst for 
change in the new data-driven music industry economy. Faced with unprecedented levels 
of data volume, the industry is undergoing a potentially transformational change in the way 
music is consumed, licensed and remunerated. As one interviewee put it, 
“The reason for doing it is now stronger than ever. Now there is growing recognition that 
we’ve got to do something.” 
At the same time, there is an increasing recognition across the industry that current models 
of music data management need to become much more efficient. 
3.3.1.2 Existential threat
Historically, significant changes in the music industry have been in response to 
technological development. More recently, the industry has experienced structural 
changes where “the concentrating power of multinational companies is considered a 
‘threat from within’ for CMOs.”139 The music industry is also experiencing the shift to an 
‘oligonomy’, which is a market dominated by an oligopoly of suppliers and oligopsony140 
139 Kefalas, A., 2017. The relevance of traditional Collective Management Organisations in the digital age: 
Current challenges and future possibilities Master’s thesis, University of Agder. p.24
140 De Voldere, I., Romainville, J.F., Knotter, S., Durinck, E., Engin, E., Le Gail, A., Kern, P., Airaghi, E., Pletosu, 
T., Ranaivoson, H. and Hoelck, K., 2017. Mapping the Creative Value Chains: a Study on the Economy of 
Culture in the Digital Age. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. p.32
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of rights purchasers (FAANGs).141 Apple, which opened the gates to the digital music 
business,142 set the rules for digital music management, including a requirement for a 
mandatory ISRC. Apple continues to exert formidable influence in how digital music is 
consumed and distributed. There is an increasing awareness within the music industry that 
the big technology companies have brought about a fundamental shift in how the music 
and wider cultural industries work which may lead IT-driven businesses in time to become 
the dominant players in the industry.143 Apple, Amazon and Google are arguably the 21st 
Century equivalent of earlier technology companies such as Philips, RCA and Sony, that 
drove the music industry in the 20th Century. However, some question whether these new 
tech companies are as interested in investing in new talent or in nurturing existing talent as 
those earlier companies were.144 
Google however has shown it is invested in the music business through its adoption 
of ISNI as a bridging identifier. If adopted more widely this is perceived by many as a 
potential game changer. The oligopsony music services such as Spotify, Apple and 
Pandora are also exerting an ever-increasing control over the licensing of repertoire and 
the market more generally. Our observations indicate that the potential challenges from 
a multitude of directions to the industry incumbents contribute to a sense of existential 
threat for conventional intermediaries but can be viewed as the catalyst for improving data 
transparency and efficiency.
3.3.1.3 Economic imperatives
From a business perspective, having good quality data is fundamental to generating value 
from creative content. Data is increasingly becoming an important source to understand 
consumers and their patterns of consumption.  One interviewee called this a “strategic 
shift” that had to take place in the age of what Herbert Simon (1974) called ‘Attention 
Economy’.145 The sheer abundance of content available makes it difficult for consumers to 
choose their music, creating the ‘Tyranny of Choice’.146 With the emergence of increasingly 
automated search and discovery systems, many stakeholders argued that good quality 
data is essential to help users find the music they want and therefore is conducive to 
growth of the digital music economy. Another interviewee stated:
“The industry is starting to recognise that we have got to find a way to unlock the 
potential value of music across all these other potential licenses and distributors. There 
is a real awareness of it.”
141 Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google
142 Arditi, D., 2014. iTunes: Breaking barriers and building walls. Popular Music and Society, 37(4), pp.408-424.
143 Negus, K., 2018. From creator to data: the post-record music industry and the digital 
conglomerates. Media, Culture & Society, p.0163443718799395.
144 Hesmondhalgh, D. and Meier, L.M., 2018. p.1565
145 Simon, H.A., 1971. Designing organizations for an information-rich world. in Greenberger, M., (ed) 
1971. Computers, communications, and the public interest. Johns Hopkins University Press.
146 Mulligan, M., 2014. Tyranny of Choice. Music Industry Blog.
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3.3.2 Issues with ISRC and ISWC
As mentioned earlier, there was an intention to link ISRC numbers to an ISWC and to 
establish a data exchange relationship between the sound recording and the musical 
work.147 Whilst both were developed to promote standardisation and interoperability within 
their specific areas of operation, our findings conclude that linking ISRC and ISWC has 
remained a perennial and substantial issue since inception. This report sought to find 
where the problems lie with ISRC and ISWC respectively and explored the difficulties in 
linking the two. 
3.3.2.1 ISRC
As an ISO standard, ISRC was developed in 1986 to identify a recording. In the UK, IFPI 
was designated as the registration authority in 1989. Currently, ISRC is claimed to be 
the most widely used and accessible identifier. Its significance is heightened as it is de 
facto the unit of consumption. The main function is to fix the performance, but it does not 
capture all of the information associated with the recording. 
As a rule, each new recording needs a new ISRC; for example, any new musical elements, 
such as a new drum beat, new sessions etc. should require a new ISRC. This is to give a 
unique identification for each type of use, which, in principle, is not a problem as long as it 
is well managed.
Another important step is to map multiple ISRCs as a cluster of recordings; this can refer 
to (a) clustering together of different instances of the same recording that have been 
erroneously assigned different ISRCs, or (b) clustering together similar recordings that 
have something in common such as parental advisory/edited versions. Through ISO 
standardisation, ISRC ensures interoperability and interaction with other registries. In 
the UK, PPL strives to ensure that ISRC registration is well managed and maintained. 
An employee at PPL asserted that PPL’s success at effectively collecting revenue and 
distributing it to members stems from its sourcing of data directly from rights holders 
and the operation of a transparent process to detect conflicts, which makes its data 
‘collectively authoritative.’ 
It was observed that the ISRC, as an official industry identifier for sound recordings, was 
generally regarded by record labels as working well, although there are issues around the 
ISRC that vary according to where in the value chain an organisation sits and whether 
they have the capacity for managing the ISRC process. In addition, the granularity of 
ISRC requires a consensus process across the value chain which is often subject to 
misinterpretation and can lead to misuse, as discussed below: 
1) ISRC misuse
Many interviewees agreed that whilst the ISRC as a system of identifying recordings is not 
broken, there is room to improve. For an industry identifier to function well, good practice 
needs to be maintained throughout all of the networks. Music value networks comprise a 
147 Hill, K., 1999.
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number of diverse parties ranging from major labels to bedroom artists each with different 
levels of expertise, capacity and available resources. The ease of ISRC assignment can 
lead to misuse without strict policy implementation and this can become the source of 
dispute, especially when a recording becomes popular.
When the ISRC was first designed in 1989, the first priority was to ensure cost-efficient 
and convenient ISRC registration. Although the ISRC was updated in 2001 and more 
recently in 2018, as an industry expert says, the very ease of use that was once its 
strength is now its weakness. 
Ease of use, per se, should not be a problem, as long as there is a mechanism to ensure 
proper use. In addition, there is no standardised cross-industry policy on, or obligation 
for, proper use of the ISRC, which is run on a self-policing principle without a current 
mechanism in place to incentivise good practice or penalise bad practice. There is also 
no obligation to ensure that the data is correct or is corrected. An interviewee succinctly 
described this situation: 
“It comes back to authority and authentication again. There is no mechanism in place 
within the ISRC standard where you know if you do it wrong you can be penalised or 
get a slap on the wrist of some sort. I mean those are the sorts of things that have got to 
start to come in.”
2) Examples of ISRC misuse
Here we present examples of ISRC misuse relating to production, record labels, 
intermediaries and DIY artists. 
Production
ISRC misuse could start from the issuing of ISRCs at the production phase of the 
recording process. No formal education process is available for those who register 
ISRCs or administrate data and it was generally observed that artists do not pay enough 
attention to properly recording metadata relating to their work. Some issues relate to the 
complexities of the creative processes involved in producing a sound recording with few 
who participate being fully aware of the important principles of issuing ISRC.
Record Labels
Record labels and aggregators acting as ISRC managers generate most of the ISRC 
codes; how they register and maintain ISRCs is crucial for maintaining good practice. We 
heard that there is widespread misuse of ISRCs by some record labels. ISRC was never 
designed to include all information and has a very specific purpose. Ironically, that leaves 
ISRCs subject to misuse which, as one person explains, “does not break the system,” and 
allows poor practice to continue. ISRC misuse causes the duplication of ISRCs, which 
undermines its value as a unique identifier.
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Intermediaries
Some interviewees suggested that some issues around ISRC are linked to levels of human 
and system resources, capital and knowledge that an organisation can allocate to data 
management. The varying levels of resources devoted to data management is particularly 
pronounced, especially in the independent label sector where the size of labels can vary from a 
large company like Beggars group to single owner-/manager operations. Beggars’ experience 
demonstrates how good quality data management is possible when sufficient resources are 
dedicated to a manageable number of catalogues. For smaller labels, indie distributors such 
as The Orchard, 51 State, or INgrooves, serve as a middleman to ensure data is well managed. 
However, this process is not immune from ISRC misuse, as some stated how the large number 
of processes involved in the system can lead to data mismanagement.
In addition, smaller companies do not always control their own data; they are faced with 
the problem of having to prepare various sets of data for a range of different parties. 
However, what matters is not necessarily control of information but whether that data can 
be used to ensure that reports are correctly compiled, and royalties are accurately routed.
DIY Artists
ISRC problems are compounded with the advent of DIY artists, most without essential 
digital business acumen or the ability to rigorously conform to standards and handle 
administration correctly. Even aggregators that help such artists to distribute their music 
to DSPs, have data systems that largely rely on self-policing and cannot comprehensively 
guarantee good practice.
3.3.2.2 ISWC
Introduced in 1995, ISWC was developed to identify musical works. Its main aim was to 
replace the antiquated practice of paper-based management used for musical works with a 
better system to ensure greater efficiency, automation and speed in processing information 
by “enabl(ing) the creators, rights holders, and their societies to be able to identify uniquely 
musical works across all geographical boundaries.”148 Three major issues relating to ISWC 
were identified: (1) the complex nature of music publishing (2) competing time pressures (3) 
open standard, closed data; although the ISWC standard is open, the data associated with it 
is ‘closed’ and this undermines confidence that the information is reliable. 
1) Complex nature of music publishing
There is systemic complexity within the ways rights in musical works are managed 
around the world with competing IP Rights systems and different collective licensing 
business models (private agencies versus statutory mandated societies) together with an 
international licensing system that was already under extreme pressure in the analogue 
era. The increasing complexity of publishing data mirrors the dynamic nature of rights 
assignment and control due to increased portability of rights for ‘hit’ repertoire, multiple 
writers with divergent ownership and/or control and widespread use of samples. 
148 Hill, K., 1999. p. 1230. 
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The complex nature of publishing data often renders it difficult to track and maintain good 
quality ISWC data, resulting in inconsistent use of the ISWC. Most currently successful 
songs often have multiple songwriters usually with different publishers and different 
types of ownership and rights controlled, all of which are subject to constant change. 
One particular problem is that there is no standardised way to fill out the information; for 
example, in the case of Elton John, it also can be logged as E. John, Elton John, John 
Elton etc., which creates challenges in identifying the correct version. 
2) Competing time pressures
One of the critical issues with ISWCs lies with the delay in assigning the ISWC. Currently 
an ISWC can only be assigned when all of the creators and rights holders have been 
uniquely identified. The multiple ownership of and associated complexity in licensing of 
rights however often mean a significant time delay in issuing the ISWC and in some cases 
ISWCs are not assigned at all. This is particularly problematic because the ISWC is rarely 
linked to the recording at the time of its release. Although the complexities of publishing 
partly explain this problem, it could also be the result of the ‘different sense of urgency’ felt 
within the publishing sector which has arguably been less impacted by digital disruption 
than the recording sector. Equally, this could be the result of the additional complex layers 
of intermediation that exists in the licensing of music publishing rights that contribute to 
the delays in assigning ISWCs.
3) Open standard; closed data 
Authoritative and up-to-date information is essential to pair sound recordings and the 
underlying musical works. ISWC codes are maintained exclusively in CISAC’s repositories 
and these follow proprietary standards that offer no common interface or integration 
beyond a web page where low volumes of data can be accessed. Although this has 
ensured a high level of data security, it is felt that restricted access hinders timely 
identification of the appropriate ISWC. 
The largest rights owners internally match the ISWC and ISRC of any and all common 
repertoire under their control internally. For example, WMG can match Led Zeppelin 
masters and publishing. Sony can match Bob Dylan recordings and compositions and 
UMG can link Abba’s recordings with their songs. The key issue, therefore, for every 
company is linking ISRCs and ISWCs where this common ownership does not exist. For 
example, WMG own Jay Z’s publishing, but his masters go through UMG. UMG own 
Coldplay’s publishing but WMG owns the masters and Sony own Ed Sheeran’s publishing 
but WMG own his masters. The absence of punctual, reliable data for ISWCs is therefore 
considered a major problem,
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3.3.2.3 Issues with linking ISRC and ISWC
Proper linking of the ISRC and ISWC is essential to ensure proper remuneration for all 
parties involved in value networks. When matched with the associated metadata, the 
linked ISRC and ISWC becomes a valuable resource for rights remuneration. Many 
stakeholders, whilst acknowledging that CMOs in the UK are exemplars and have high 
levels of trust within the industry, stressed that issues still remain in linking ISRC and 
ISWC. Not only is this inefficient, as some indicated, it also raises questions on the 
reliability of industry identifiers: 
“You can’t easily join them (ISRC and ISWC) to get a complete set…We are not really 
making use of the identifiers in the music industry identifiers in our systems properly, 
because they have never been reliable enough…matching ISRCs to ISWCs...it would 
require wiping the slate starting again and because the existing repositories that all 
contribute to it have so much strange anomalies in it.”
We discuss this in more detail below, under: ISRC duplication, delay in ISWC assignment, 
and royalty inconsistencies. 
1) ISRC duplication
As discussed in the previous section, there are duplicate ISRCs which creates problems in 
identifying the correct ISRC to be matched to ISWC. Many stakeholders emphasised that 
the duplication of ISRCs is the crux of these problems and some suggest that it would be 
beneficial to be more open and honest about this.
2) Delay in ISWC assignment
Proper linking of the sound recording and the underlying musical work requires 
authoritative data sources and authoritative matching.149 Currently, these requirements 
cannot be met easily given the ISWC is not always available to link to ISRC at the time 
a recording is first released. When a recording is released, DSPs receive the recording 
information from the labels, however they rarely get the corresponding ISWC information 
in a timely fashion, resulting in the CMOs having to play catch up to match the ISWC 
information to the relevant ISRC. 
3) Royalty inconsistencies
Within the music publishing system, the royalty particularly on the streaming services will 
often only be paid when the total shares agreed by all relevant parties equals 100%. There 
is also the systemic complexity and the fluctuation of the rights and ownership of songs 
and writers, that can contribute to the inconsistencies within royalty distributions. An 
interviewee explains how easily income can remain unattributed:
149 Nuttall F.X. & Oh S.G. 2011. p.26. 
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“In reality what happens is that because that process is mainly manual, those two (data) 
records are just kept on file somewhere so there’s one (data) record that says you have  
half (the information) and the rest is blank, and the other half  (of the information) is 
on the (other data) record. That’s before you even get to any overlapping claims and 
conflicts and anything else… no money is being paid on it.”” 
3.3.3 Embedded industry practices
Earlier we outlined how many structures in the music industry were designed around 
physical products; this accounts for some of the problems the industry now faces, including 
legacy data, archaic systems and manual processes, NDAs, and unallocated income. 
3.3.3.1 Legacy data
Before the digital era, data management was more loosely structured and related to 
physical products for which a Universal Product Code (UPC) was assigned which involved 
less tracking of the data. Although data has long been the basis of royalty payments, 
arguably the industry’s business practices were less data-centric than now. Over the 
past 20 years, the record industry’s main new services licensing model involved securing 
large advances accompanied by Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) and this also meant 
many tech services operated without licenses. As such the industry at the time had little 
incentive to improve the accuracy of its data.
Despite the meteoric growth of incoming data, when it comes to making money, 
according to an interview with a major record label executive, approximately 80% of the 
music business relies upon their back catalogues. Yet not all of the metadata on these 
back catalogues is accurate because the data was often lost in the creative process; 
sometimes, old tracks were recorded using now obsolete technologies making it almost 
impossible to retrieve all of the data. At the time few could have expected that keeping 
accurate records at the outset would become so important.
3.3.3.2 Archaic systems and manual processes
The UK, as a global supplier of music content, has had a profound influence on the way 
music is made, distributed and consumed. Whilst the cultural and economic benefits are 
vast, managing the immense historical catalogues is not easy. The majority of active data 
relating to both the publishing and recording industries has long been digitised. However, 
much of the music industry’s still archaic systems, many built on paper-practices, still 
require intensive re-investment and further manual processing to repurpose it for the 
digital world. The substantial costs involved in reconciling the incoming data, where this is 
possible, often leads to a ‘follow the money’ philosophy in prioritising the high value items.
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3.3.3.3 NDAs 
Contracts are the most common means for artists and companies to share the risks involved 
in the production of musical content and the control of rights in the output. Companies 
are typically better placed to control the rights and most recording agreements favour 
the companies over the artists. This is because artists, apart from a select few, are given 
advance payments in exchange for control over the rights in their works.150 The use of NDAs 
has been criticised as a barrier to transparency151 and our findings confirm the view that 
use of NDAs creates increased opacity in the data flow. NDAs are commonly employed in 
transactions between labels and many other parties from artists to DSPs. It was also argued 
that the major labels received lump sum payments from streaming services, and they were 
also given equity shares by at least one of the streaming services in exchange for licensing 
deals for the use of their catalogues. The lack of transparency in data, compounded by 
the industry practice of advance payments, has been perceived by some as reducing the 
incentives for the major players to maintain correct data because these companies could 
benefit from market share-based distributions of unattributed income.152
3.3.3.4 Unattributed income 
A key justification for promoting data accuracy, improved data integrity and velocity is to 
ensure income is allocated to the correct people in an acceptable time frame. Without the 
timely exchange of accurate data, repertoire cannot be properly and punctually licensed, 
meaning creators cannot always be paid accurately or in a timely way for the exploitation 
of their copyright. 
Opacity in music data arising from inaccurate or missing datasets as well as the absence 
of a link between the ISRC and ISWC has been widely criticised,153 especially in relation 
to unallocated income. As a result, there is a belief in parts of the creative community 
that artists do not necessarily benefit from the increasing revenues generated from music 
streaming platforms. Referred to as ‘black box’, this unallocated income is one of the 
more contentious issues in music data management. One interviewee stated they had not 
received any accountings or royalties after their original label was purchased by another. This 
suggests that key data can go missing during a merger and acquisition process, creating 
ideal conditions for royalty income to remain unattributed. Paul Resnikoff, editor of Digital 
Music News has raised concerns “over unmatched ‘black box’ royalty holding balances now 
believed to be in excess of $300 million”154 held by US collecting society Soundexchange. 
150 Caves, R.E., 2000
151 Rethink Music. 2015. Fair Music: Transparency and Payment Flows in the Music Industry. Rethink Music. 
http://www.rethink-music.com/research/fair-musictransparency-and-payment-flows-inthe-music-industry.; 
Cooke, C., 2015. Dissecting the digital dollar part one. In The Music Managers Forum, London.
152 Singleton, M., 2015. This was Sony Music’s contract with Spotify. The Verge, 19. https://www.theverge.
com/2015/5/19/8621581/sony-music-spotify-contract.
153 Rethink Music 2015; Cooke, C., 2015.
154 Resnikoff 2019
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3.3.4 CMOs’ roles and responsibilities
Historically, CMOs have played a crucial role in managing music data, especially given their 
‘trusted’ intermediary role between rights holders and licensees. The CMOs’ primary role 
is to provide efficient administration of rights for creators and rights holders who are not 
in a position to track each and every use of their content, as well as providing a fair and 
cost-effective means of licensing for licensees who cannot afford to contact all the relevant 
rights holders around the world. As they can aggregate large volumes of catalogues, users 
can benefit from using this resource at a reduced cost. CMOs typically have operated as 
a natural monopoly as there were few if any legal alternatives to gain such access to the 
global music repertoire. In general, the positives of the CMO model are seen to outweigh 
the negatives of a monopoly but this has sometimes nonetheless led to complaints 
about potential abuses of market power. Despite the rationale of cost-efficient collective 
administration of rights, the unchallenged high cost of administration in certain markets, 
together with a lack of competition, raised concerns that some CMOs have little incentive to 
invest in improvements to meet the new market conditions. Even with the aforementioned 
UK CMOs’ relative high standards of operation, it was observed that for CMOs in general, 
there remain concerns about bureaucratic and archaic governance structures.
3.3.4.1 Roles and responsibilities 
On the publishing side, systemic complexity and increasing fragmentation of datasets, 
as well as flaws in legacy data, produce inefficient data processing and difficulties 
in correctly identifying musical works to be linked to sound recordings. PRS has a 
very long history of collective management and its old management system, as some 
pointed out, is difficult to integrate with other systems and is therefore not efficient. 
Slow data processing and slow payments continue, partly also a result of CISAC’s 
rigorous processes. Whilst designed to ensure data privacy and security, this process 
adds an extra set of challenges, especially given situations where the IPI becomes 
complicated through the dynamic process of ISWC assignment and multiple song splits. 
Many interviewees pointed out that for data accuracy and efficiency, speedier allocation 
of ISWC is essential. Yet CISAC have shown they are aware of the problem and are 
investing in improved technology in an effort to upgrade the system.
As to PPL’s role, some suggested it would be beneficial if collective licensing were applied 
to interactive streaming, especially given a key benefit of collective management of licensing 
is to provide equal access to all parties, including those without the same bargaining power 
as the major stakeholders. Since collective licensing is not used in interactive streaming, 
artists have to negotiate their streaming royalty rate and distribution directly with the labels, 
which is concerning when most artists lack sufficient bargaining power to negotiate their 
contract terms with labels. This was even more of a concern for ‘session musicians’, ‘non-
featured artists’ and contributors because they are not entitled to ongoing remuneration from 
the exploitation of their performance, as neighbouring rights are not recognised under the 
‘making available’ designation of interactive streaming platforms.
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3.3.4.2 Data control
CMOs have maintained databases to provide ‘collectively authoritative data-sets’ 
where unique and persistent identifiers could be assigned to musical works and sound 
recordings so as to ensure appropriate payments are made. As a result of the unresolved 
issues around linking ISRC and ISWC, combined with the absence of a comprehensive 
and authoritative database publicly available to affirm identifiers, tensions have arisen in 
relation to the exclusive database owned and controlled by CMOs. 
CMOs have invested substantial effort and capital to build their own data systems, which 
they naturally see as valuable assets. In addition, CMOs are required to take measures to 
protect data as commercially sensitive information. New technologies sprang up to disrupt 
this model where music content can be distributed online. New solutions also emerged to 
provide alternative ways to access contribution data such as MusicBrainz and Gracenote. 
There is a common belief that these changes put pressure on CMOs to change their 
protective mind-set over their databases. Given these circumstances, one interviewee 
indicated that the CMOs’ protective mindset could actually make their role less relevant. 
“[The] Collection Society mindset, where everything has to be protected and 
hidden, and the name of the song writer is the greatest secret on the planet. So, it’s 
protectionism. In technical standards it gets a bit worse because technical standards 
define how you exchange information...It actually creates the opposite effect...by 
blocking the system, they’re actually isolating themselves.”
3.3.5 Recent industry initiatives
Acknowledging the significance of data issues, the industry has embarked on a number of 
industry-wide initiatives to tackle data issues, such as Global Repertoire Database (GRD) 
and DDEX. In addition to these initiatives, many companies are also developing their own 
solutions that could mitigate problems they face in music data management. This section 
discusses the achievements and shortcomings of these initiatives. 
3.3.5.1 GRD 
The intention of GRD was to build a central database of musical works. Despite 
widespread anticipation that this could offer a solution in resolving data information 
deficiencies, the project was abandoned. Many pointed to political issues as the main 
reason why this ambitious initiative did not work out as envisaged. One industry executive 
who was directly involved with the GRD initiative believed, fundamentally, that failure was 
due to diverse stakeholders not being able to reach agreement on who should have control 
of what. They stated:
“It was all about control. It was essentially, you’re asking me to pay 4 million bucks into 
a project, when I’m not on the board. We had 30 people on the board and every single 
party [but]...Society A would not allow Society B to represent them…. so, it became 
unwieldy and unmanageable, [with] lots of political vested interest.” 
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3.3.5.2 DDEX
Formed in 2006, DDEX is an international consortium set up to address data issues by 
encouraging participants to adopt standards for data messaging and communications 
based upon accepted and agreed protocols and identifiers. Many interviewees were keen 
to highlight the positive impact of DDEX’s approach to promote collaboration.155 DDEX 
indeed has achieved substantial success in gaining increasing adoption and membership 
around the world. However, DDEX is not considered to be the magic bullet for all the data 
issues facing the music industry; for example, market dominance still remains an issue, 
even among DDEX members. In addition, it does not solve the problem of duplication 
of resources across the industry but as an instrumental approach that offers flexibility of 
interoperation, it leaves the responsibility for structuring internal silos to the asset holder. 
Critically, without a framework of meaningful incentives and sanctions that promotes 
mutually beneficial processes, interconnected protocols are threatened by fragmentation 
and non-adherence to and divergence from standards. 
Whilst industry-wide implementation is essential for the standardisation to be truly 
meaningful, DDEX relies upon self-regulating principles which can leave some parts of the 
value networks, such as the mushrooming DIY artists or small independent labels, on the 
fringe of the participation. Although DDEX has implemented measures to resolve some 
anomalies and merge silos developed by individual companies,156 the effort required to 
manage change and the possible political fallout suggest that a more sophisticated form of 
governance is required to coordinate and guide collaboration. 
3.3.5.3 Internal systems/silos/duplication
Industry stakeholders all agreed on the need to improve their data management and we 
observed many in the value networks striving to improve the accuracy of their data by 
investing more capital and human resources. However, our findings show that much of 
this is happening locally using isolated systems. We observed that many companies are 
building their own internal systems to match ISRCs and ISWCs and all the repertoire under 
their control. Furthermore, every company on the twin sides of the music licensing system, 
both tech and content, operate their own internal systems with purpose built IT unique to 
them. The main difference between the two sides is illustrated in the following observation:
“The largest content owners are usually part of a much larger conglomerate (e.g. Sony 
and UMG) that dictate the internal data system standards. As such any industry data 
standards need to be interoperable with each content owner’s own system. Even so 
the difference in royalty processing systems is not substantial as almost all publishers 
use a bespoke version of a standard system originally designed in the 1980s or 1990s. 
Therefore, many companies are more accustomed to adapting any standard to its own 
internal reporting and data systems.”
155 It should be noted that DDEX was not conceived to deal with these types of problems, but acts when 
requested to do so to facilitate meaningful discussion and guide collaboration
156 This is discussed in more detail in the next section Internal systems/silos/duplication
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The tech companies by contrast have an avowed walled-garden approach to their entire 
operations. Apple, Google and Microsoft each sought to dominate the Internet by applying 
its own ‘closed’ standards across their hardware and software.157 
The duplicated expenditure and effort invested by individual companies which, it is said, 
amounts to ‘a behemoth of an entity,’ indicates that industry-wide collaboration could save 
significant money and resource: 
“The problem is that they’re all dealing with the same problem locally. So what that 
means for our industry is that they are all wasting time and money fixing stuff locally...
To actually build their own internal systems that manage all the data requirements. It’s a 
behemoth of an entity because you’ve got to deal with every single eventuality of data 
requirement that the industry needs because they have clients who are representing 
rights in all of those different spaces.” 
There is recognition that industry-wide measures could be developed and adopted to fix 
the problems. Despite the apparent benefit that can be achieved from the collaboration, 
the market-led competition has been the sine qua non in dealing with data issues. 
3.3.6 Further barriers to progress
3.3.6.1 Lack of understanding of data
We observed there are varying degrees of awareness and understanding of the importance 
of data management. Digitisation has produced an increasingly diverse range of creators, 
including what are known as ‘new amateurs’.158 Whether on an amateur or professional 
level, there are not enough mechanisms to ensure that all those who need to deal with 
identifiers have the tools and knowledge necessary for effective data management. 
Many interviewees indicated a lack of awareness of the importance of data as a core issue. 
This is partly due to the historical context where the importance of getting the data right 
at the point of creation has not been deemed a priority and has often been perceived as a 
chore for many creators. For them, creative work is their priority, and the creative process 
has often been more chaotic than systematic. In many cases, not enough attention was 
paid to effective data housekeeping until a piece of music became popular. Essential to the 
efficient management of data should be a focus on the generation of accurate data at the 
point of creation. 
Although there are many education programs available throughout the industry, they 
function with a limited remit and therefore do not have the necessary impact across the 
entire sector. Many were of the opinion that the knowledge resulting from education 
about the importance of the data relevant to their music could positively impact creators’ 
earnings. However, it should be noted that this lack of awareness lies not only with 
creators but also with many other stakeholders in the value networks. In general, there is 
157 Arthur, C., 2012. The history of smartphones: Timeline. The Guardian, 24. He explains this as part of “Digital 
Wars” Some of these are more closed than others, though; notably Apple is more restrictive than Microsoft
158 Prior, N., 2010. The rise of the new amateurs. Handbook of cultural sociology, pp.398-407. 
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insufficient awareness and understanding of the incentives for good practice nor of the 
impact of bad practice. This situation is compounded by the emergence of DIY ceators 
and more diverse ways of distributing music that have brought further changes in the way 
music data is registered and managed.
3.3.6.2 Politics and asymmetrical power relations
The music industry, with its diversity of stakeholders, comprises a range of asymmetrical 
power relationships, which, as many interviewees noted, create obstacles to industry-wide 
collaboration. It was suggested that, no matter how complex the data issues are, with the 
right approach they are not beyond resolution. 
“I think it’s fixable. But there’s been too much messing about  that has prevented 
it being fixed because there’s too many vested interests, I don’t think it’s just data. 
So, speaking particularly of the music industry, things that are basic to much more 
automated industries, like web services, barely exist (in the music industry) which 
in the 21st Century is frankly ridiculous. And so, everything is done here. Certainly, 
exchange data is done very clunky old fashioned…(but) technology is not the problem, 
people are.” 
Many agreed that the main issues which hampered industry-wide collaboration and 
created lack of trust were less about technology than about political will and understanding 
across the range of industry interests.
3.3.6.3 Fragmentation and insufficient collaboration
The rapid growth of data along with the diversification of music distribution outlets and 
increasingly sophisticated communications have resulted in unprecedented levels of 
complexity in data management. The lack of cooperation in data exchange in the industry 
has resulted in increasing fragmentation of datasets. For example, it was suggested that 
one major publisher’s licensing model differed from other publishing companies, as it 
had its own unique system to reconcile ISRC and ISWC without relying on the CMOs for 
accurate data. This company like many others, maintains its own centralised proprietary 
global database to reflect the data for all of the repertoire under their control. Despite 
efforts to match the two codes, there remain delays in confirming the ISWC as this is not 
always issued quickly by the relevant CMO members of CISAC.
Extensive merger and acquisitions amongst record labels and publishing companies 
during the 21st Century has exacerbated fragmentation in the datasets. The problem 
is particularly acute in the publishing sector where rights have been disaggregated and 
re-aggregated especially since the 2005 EC Recommendation that led to the widespread 
adoption of ‘Option 3’.159 This fragmentation of data also explains the recent industry wide 
impetus to improve reconciliation between ISRC and ISWC.
The competitive environment within the market, however, has driven most companies 
159 Option 3 was to provide rightsholders with the right to authorise a single collecting society to license all 
uses of their repertoire across the EU. Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-369_en.htm
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to develop their own solutions, in isolation, which further increases fragmentation. In the 
absence of overarching rules to regulate the efficient flow of the data, we observed some 
stakeholders often manage their data in their own way, creating inefficiencies as well as 
fragmented datasets. 
“The fragmentation of this industry is its own worst enemy. That’s what’s killing this 
industry or stopping it from thriving in the way it should be thriving... If you’re trying to 
unlock the value of music, there are people who value music tremendously and they 
start the conversations going.” 
3.3.6.4 Lack of governance
From the interviews we conclude that a lack of governance in data exchange can result 
in serious inefficiencies. Reflecting upon the processes of data ingestion, registration, 
and verification, as well as the ability to effectively and efficiently enquire, audit, hold 
to account and challenge decisions, many stakeholders felt that the current market-
led approach has created hierarchies and friction which make it difficult to realise the 
full potential and value of digital music. Preoccupation with market control and cost 
management structures within the current framework can hamper investment in innovation 
and lead to entrenched defensive positions that inhibit the development of collaborative, 
interconnected systems.
Describing the music industry as “a complex monopoly with a lack of governance”, one 
expert emphasised that the industry needs governance to encourage stakeholders to 
move beyond their own interests and to find ways to tap into the huge potential of digital 
music value.
Standardisation of data exchange is necessary to meet the requirements of bilateral 
agreements between music licensing companies (MLCs) that administer the rights of 
producers and performers across multiple territories. This is based upon an understanding 
that reconciling and mapping identifiers is beneficial to a wide range of parties and is 
fundamental to any system which aspires to realise the opportunities of a data-based 
economy. There is no doubt that DDEX’s contribution to data governance and their 
promotion of practical collaborative data frameworks and standard protocols is significant 
and deserves continued support. It was argued, however, that standardisation alone is 
not sufficient; the industry needs a mechanism that can ensure all stakeholders can work 
together productively. Without this, particular actors across the industry will find ways 
to manipulate solutions to suit their own needs, which may be detrimental to the overall 
ecosystem. An industry executive suggests:
“We need an industry protocol that is beyond metadata to be able to work out how 
we behave with each other. And there’s got to be some sort of incentive to get people 
to come to terms in a way that enables us to pay out accurately because if no one is 
deciding who owns what, how on earth can you do it. You find that the business is 
adapting in all sorts of ways rather than solving the problem and they come back to 
it again. It’s not just the metadata issues themselves and of course we’re coping with 
it….This cannot simply be seen as a technical problem. The data…I describe it as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition.” 
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3.3.7 Creators in music data value networks
A primary rationale for an efficient and transparent data management is to remunerate 
creators properly. It is widely claimed that a large amount of royalties often goes to major 
rights holders or a few high-earning creators.160 Despite the growth in revenues being 
generated by music streaming platforms, we noted a clear perception that this ‘winner 
takes all’ trend is growing in digital music bringing problems relating to creators’ earnings 
and the divergent views around the legal structure of streaming.
3.3.7.1 Music data and creators’ earnings
As the music business has become increasingly data-driven, the importance of that data 
has been heightened and there is an increasing awareness that data is an important asset. 
The creators’ ability to understand data on the uses of their music therefore has increasing 
significance but our interviews revealed that many of them were not fully aware of this. To 
compound this problem, there are insufficient mechanisms in place to ensure data accuracy.
3.3.7.2 Data as an asset 
Creators’ enhanced ability to track uses of their music through technology increases their 
access to essential information and this data enhances their knowledge about their fan 
base, their career development and their potential future revenues. Although creators’ 
increased awareness of data ownership is important, as one interviewee advocated, this 
needs to be accompanied by resolving the problems of ownership and politics in the 
industry, which have hampered innovation. The main benefit of resolving these problems 
could be to ensure proper remuneration for creators. For this change to take place, 
however, there has to be a new understanding of the creator’s role, at the centre of the 
music business rather than at the periphery.
3.3.7.3 Creators’ earnings and attribution
It has been widely acknowledged that in the music economy a small minority of high-
earning artists receive the majority of music sales revenues,161 and this is equally evident 
in the growing digital music economy. However, many feel revenue distributions have 
become even more skewed towards the ‘top’ artists. To balance this trend, especially 
given the increasing significance of discovery in the digital music economy, the need for 
proper attribution of all those in the creative value chain is gaining importance.
160 Towse, R., 2001. 
161 Towse, R., 1999. Copyright and economic incentives: an application to performers’ rights in the music 
industry. Kyklos, 52(3), pp.369-390; Kretschmer 2001
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3.3.7.4 Debates on the legal definition of streaming
In relation to artists’ earnings on streaming platforms, a range of interviewees raised 
concerns over the current legal definition of streaming. Currently, streaming is subject 
to the making available right whose main purpose was to ensure rights holders had the 
exclusive right of “making available to the public, by wire or wireless means, in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.”162 A number of interviewees questioned whether it was appropriate to 
define streaming under the making available right. The prospect of a successful challenge 
would mean that neither the traditional broadcasting right, nor the making available 
right properly defines streaming, leaving streaming in a “legal limbo”.163 The crux of the 
challenge is likely to be that the passive listening populated by automated streaming 
playlists raises questions whether streaming can continue to be defined under the making 
available right; in the case of the making available right, the recording should be accessed 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by the user. The significance of redefining 
streaming is not merely about the law, but also the practical ramifications, such as the 
designation of royalty rates, the applicability of equitable remuneration and the role of 
collective management. 
There were divergent views on the current legal framework for streaming, even though 
labels robustly defended their interpretation of the current law Some interviewees argued 
that labels’ interpretation of the existing legal structure enables them to typically pay 
creators a 15-20% rate for a retail sale, rather than the 50% rate that would apply for 
broadcasting uses. It was also noted that labels have significantly greater bargaining 
power by not going through PPL for the licensing of streaming. This was in contrast to the 
views of certain creators, who tended to believe the current legal structure unfairly benefits 
the labels and that revenues would be much greater for creators if streaming were defined 
as a broadcasting right. It was also clear that on revenue distributions, creators tended to 
trust PPL more than the labels.
Calls to challenge the current definition have come from performer representatives, 
particularly those representing session musicians. Currently only featured artists are able 
to negotiate their royalty rates for streaming with labels, whereas session musicians or 
non-featured artists are paid a one-off fee for their performance. The majority of session 
musicians or non-featured artists have relatively weak bargaining power to negotiate 
terms. In the absence of legal protection such as equitable remuneration164 which is not 
applicable in the making available right, this group of creators receive no ongoing payment 
from interactive streaming.165
162 WCT 8, WPPT 10, 14
163 Borghi, M., 2011. Chasing copyright infringement in the streaming landscape. International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 42(3).; McGugan, F., 2015. Making Available, Communication to 
the Public & User Interactivity. pp.04-16. https://www.musictank.co.uk/resources/reports/making-available-
communicationto-the-public-user-interactivity. The making available right is exercised differently in different 
regions, creating deep disparity of rules under cross-border situations.
164 It entitles performer to be paid when their performance is played in public or otherwise communicated to 
the public, is not applicable in interactive streaming and is not waivable other than a collecting society.
165 For more discussion on how vies on this varies amongst diverse stakeholders, see Aguilar, A., 2018. We 
Want Artists to Be Fully and Fairly Paid for Their Work: Discourses on Fairness in the Neoliberal European 
Copyright Reform. J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L., 9, p.160.
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3.4 Conclusions and recommendations
3.4.1 Conclusions
Data management issues are at the core of the future of the music industry. In the midst 
of the growing digital music economy, concerns have been raised over some of the major 
issues such as the remuneration for artists and the stifled innovation arising from the data 
management inefficiencies. Although there was a consensus that these data management 
inefficiencies should be improved, there was a lack of understanding and agreement 
on how and where to start. The existing discourse has often been dominated by legal 
considerations. Whilst important, these often limit the focus on the other key issues 
impacting upon the market. Music data management is multifaceted, and the context is 
evolving around social, technological, legal, cultural, political, and industrial factors. 
We therefore designed the research to capture the complexity involved in the management 
of music data process. Drawing upon the framework of socio-technical constellation of 
the music data management, we sought to take on diverse views from a broad range 
of stakeholders. The empirical analysis gained from over 50 interviews with the industry 
stakeholders from across the music value networks allowed us to move beyond the 
prevailing linear views which often resulted in blaming certain parts of the industry or an 
over-emphasis on the changes in the legal structures. Instead, we observed that the issues 
around music data management are much more sophisticated and nuanced. Whilst the 
industry stakeholders are striving to adjust to the changes brought by digital technology, 
there are fundamental issues that need to be addressed. To borrow Einstein’s famous 
quote, we cannot solve our problems with the same level of thinking that created them. It 
is our hope that our holistic view of the data issues can serve as an opportunity to re-
examine this critical matter and facilitate conversations that the industry needs in order to 
make meaningful and constructive changes in this field. 
3.4.2 Summary of key findings
Five main themes emerged from the interviews with industry stakeholders. 
Firstly, the music industry universally agrees that there is a need to change the way 
in which digital music data is managed. The impetus for change is three fold: (1) the 
unparalleled level of growth in data volumes poses a challenge in managing that data, (2) 
the potential existential threats arising from the power of multinational companies on both 
sides of the licensing system, and (3) the economic imperative that better quality data is 
essential to building a digital music economy that benefits all parties in the value networks.
Secondly, our report concludes that considerable inefficiencies arise from difficulties 
in linking two industry identifiers, ISRC and ISWC. When matched with the associated 
metadata, the linked ISRC and ISWC becomes a valuable mechanism for accurate and 
timely rights compensation. Despite stakeholders’ strenuous efforts to modernise the 
system of managing the identifiers, many of the issues in linking between ISRC and ISWC 
remain unresolved. In response, the UK’s two major CMOs, PRS for Music and PPL, have 
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developed systems to link these identifiers; although these initiatives are encouraging, 
the on-going lack of a single authoritative source of data poses a challenge to any future 
developments. ISNI, on the other hand, has been developed with the potential to act as 
a ‘bridge’ across other types of party identifiers. ISNI has the potential to change the 
way music data is managed when linked to a content identifier, however it still needs to 
overcome some technical issues and resistance from parts of the industry to be widely 
accepted for applications in music. Fundamentally, we believe measures to ensure link 
ISRC and ISWC could significantly improve the efficiency in music data management.
Thirdly, we concluded that a lot of standard industry practice has not sufficiently adapted 
to the digital environment and this poses challenges to a more efficient and transparent 
management of digital data. We discuss this in three parts: (1) industry practices, (2) 
CMOs’ roles and responsibilities, and (3) internal systems and duplicated efforts.
(1) Industry practices
The legacy catalogues assembled in the analogue era involved little systemic data 
collection and this has meant much of the data may have been lost during the transition to 
digital. In addition, existing business practices such as Non-Disclosure-Agreements (NDAs) 
and lump-sum advances were widespread and accurate data was not deemed a priority. 
Some of the existing infrastructure still relies upon manual processes and transactions, so 
reconciling the legacy data requires significant financial and human resources to manage 
time-consuming manual processes. The unintended consequences of these practices are 
increased opacity in the data flow as well as increases in inaccurate data leading to higher 
levels of unattributed, so-called ‘black box’ income, that cannot be distributed to those 
entitled to receive remuneration. 
(2) CMOs’ roles and responsibilities
Many industry stakeholders, although acknowledging UK CMOs’ high standards of 
operation compared to CMOs in other territories, expressed concerns about the high level 
of bureaucracy and in their view, archaic governance structures which characterise the 
sector overall. 
On the publishing side, the systemic complexity and the increasing fragmentation of 
datasets, as well as the flaws in legacy data, leads to inefficient data processing and 
difficulties in identifying the correct musical works to be linked to sound recordings. With 
no alternative measures available from the CMOs, many businesses are building their own 
solutions or adopting expensive intervention measures. It was noted that the publishing 
sector has a different sense of urgency and this seems to be reflected in the sector’s 
slower response to the challenges of ever-growing data volumes. Slow data processing 
and slow payment continue partly because of the need for rigorous processing. Whilst 
ensuring data privacy and security, it adds another layer of challenges in matching to 
the IPI. For ISWC, CISAC has proposed an initiative to increase the speed of allocation. 
However, this has not been implemented as yet. 
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On the recording side, the linking of IPNs to ISRCs is necessary to facilitate the 
identification of performers and attribution in respect of their recorded performances. 
Labels themselves administer these data systems in isolation for interactive streaming 
without the CMO procedures which underpin and maintain ‘collectively authoritative data’ 
with concerns raised around trust and transparency. Specifically, in relation to the absence 
of the CMO’s role, some argued that the legal definition of streaming was predisposed 
to protect labels’ interests rather than those of the artists. Some suggested it would be 
beneficial if collective licensing was applied to interactive streaming. The absence of a 
centralised database for ISRCs suggests that there is often more than one version of the 
truth, which further complicates linking with other identifiers. 
Most concerns about CMOs’ roles focused on their protection of their data. CMOs have 
invested enormous amounts of effort and capital to build their own data systems and 
would understandably conceive these as valuable assets. Unsurprisingly, with music 
content so widely distributed online, new technologies have emerged to also disrupt this 
model, including alternative ways to access the necessary data such as MusicBrainz 
and Gracenote. Some interviewees suggested that CMOs’ protective mind-set over their 
‘proprietary’ data may, in time, make the CMOs’ role less relevant going forward as they 
could be bypassed. 
(3) Internal systems and duplicated effort
Most companies acknowledged the need to improve their data management and have 
taken measures to address this. Our findings show that many companies are building 
internal systems to suit their own specific needs. However, many interviewees suggested 
that there were growing amounts of duplication and effort in dealing with common issues, 
but that industry-wide collaboration could address inefficiencies and therefore save money, 
time and labour. Despite the apparent benefits of collaboration, free market competition 
models have been the sine qua non in dealing with data issues.
Fourthly, we identified a number of major barriers to improving efficiency and transparency 
in music data management which need to be addressed: (1) the lack of awareness about 
the importance of data, (2) the politics arising from asymmetrical power relations, (3) the 
lack of collaboration and (4) the lack of governance.  
(1) Lack of awareness about the importance of data
Historically, the importance of getting the data right at the point of creation has not been 
deemed a major priority. The lack of systematic data collection has compounded data 
problems. The emergence of DIY, User-Generated Content (UGC) and an increasing number 
of ways of distributing music adds another layer of problems. Although there are many 
education programmes available, they function only within a limited remit. In addition, there 
is insufficient awareness and understanding of incentives for good practice or of the impact 
of bad practice. Our team proposes a more systematic education programme. 
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(2) Politics and asymmetrical power relations
The GRD initiative highlighted the differing political motivations across the music industry. 
Vested interests and asymmetrical negotiating power impede data efficiency. Improved 
collaboration could help address the difficulties of managing individual interests. This has 
resulted in multiple silos, fragmented datasets and the development of similar solutions 
operating in isolation. With little or no desire to build another centralised database, and 
with significant investment already put into building individual solutions, we recommend 
finding a solution to make existing systems interoperable as a constructive way forward.
(3) Lack of collaboration
The rapid growth in the volume of data exchange, the emergence of diverse digital music 
distribution outlets, and an increasingly sophisticated communication between creator 
and user, has resulted in unprecedented levels of complexity in data management. A lack 
of cooperation between all players however has resulted in an increasing fragmentation 
of datasets, along with increasing administration costs for data management and a 
duplication of data solutions built by individual organisations. We therefore suggest a more 
bespoke model for building collaboration across the industry.
(4) Lack of governance
Many interviewees highlighted a lack of governance as the source of inefficiencies in 
music data management, without specifying exactly what the term referred to. Some 
stakeholders advocate that the market-led approach, which has created hierarchy and 
friction, is not suited to realise the full potential of the value in digital music. However, 
contributors were not clear about how this might be resolved. Although DDEX standards 
help in resolving data issues and deserves continued support, standardisation by itself 
can’t solve all the problems. Unless there is oversight and governance in place, actors will 
always find ways to manoeuvre around the system to promote self-interest, regardless of 
the impact on the greater good. 
Finally, our findings illustrate that creators are often not sufficiently taken into account 
when systems of data management are instigated. Creators, themselves, are often not 
fully aware of the importance of capturing data and registering contributions. Inaccurate 
reporting, data errors and inefficiencies and the resultant unattributed income goes 
unaccounted, unaudited and unreported. An opaque system means it is impossible to 
know how this affects artists’ earnings and therefore it becomes much more difficult to 
incentive good practice at the grass roots.
Divergent views around how the current legal structure of streaming operates, have been 
highlighted by calls from artist representatives for its re-examination, to assess how the 
current model impacts content creators.166
166 #FairInternet4Performers https://www.fair-internet.eu 
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Our observations show that there is a clear divide between organisations representing 
creators and those representing DSPs/record labels on this issue; the former advocating 
the need for change and the latter tending to favour the status quo. 
 
The legal framework relating to streaming is outside the scope of this research. There are 
differing views on this issue, with some interviewees suggesting that a reassessment of the 
legal framework of streaming should be considered.
3.4.3 Recommendations
The following recommendations emerged from the semi-structured interviews with the 
key stakeholders and industry players and must be considered in light of the priorities 
articulated in the UK Industrial Strategy, the Bazalgette Review and the Creative Industries 
Sector Deal.
Figure 20: Recommendations
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3.4.3.1 Education 
Many interviewees indicated a lack of awareness about the importance of data 
management as a core issue. 
To address this we recommend that industry, academia and education providers should 
collaborate to develop, promote and deliver educational opportunities with accredited 
levels of proficiency around data management and that there should be:
1) Accredited Education Programmes for Data Entry Specialists
Despite the increasing importance of identifiers, the industry has not paid enough attention 
to creating specialist qualifications or systematic education for those who are in charge of 
registering industry identifiers. Data entry is often carried out by interns or new employees, 
most of whom have not been given any bespoke education or training. In addition, the lack 
of industry-wide standardisation for data entry requirements gave space to a proliferation 
of different guidelines and rules set by various entities. In complex music data networks 
where, diverse stakeholders have different levels of resources and capital to ensure data 
accuracy, the lack of emphasis in this field has created room for data inaccuracy. 
2) Enhanced Education Programmes for Creators 
Historically, the importance of getting the data right at the point of creation has not been 
deemed a major priority. The lack of systematic data collection has compounded data 
problems. In addition, the emergence of DIY and of diverse ways of distributing music 
make it difficult to control data management. Given the increasing significance of data as 
an asset for artists, this lack of understanding is particularly problematic. Although there 
are many education programs available, they function within a limited remit and therefore 
do not have far-reaching impact across the industry. Essential to the efficient management 
of data should be a focus on the generation of accurate data at the point of creation.
The linking of creative endeavour and professional practice by way of progression 
through industry- focused digital rights education programmes is a fundamental tenet of 
our recommendations.
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3.4.3.2 Interoperability
Interoperability has been flagged up as the key element for improving data management. 
The industry has revolved around separate legal frameworks, publishing rights, performers’ 
rights and sound recording rights. Management entities have evolved in silos with the 
single rights type. In addition, vested interests and power struggles have made it difficult 
to build an integrated system. With little or no desire to build another centralised database, 
many parties have built their own systems. Although standardisation promoted by DDEX 
is having a positive impact in facilitating transactions to work across different systems, 
satisfying requirements across a range of industry stakeholders, it has been suggested 
that for increased interoperability, a range of other important issues need to be addressed. 
Communities and organisations have differing views and perspectives when it comes to 
defining interoperability. Its application across the music ecosystem goes beyond a purely 
technical application. 
1) It is recommended that all content uploaded to a commercial digital platform be 
identified and attributed using internationally recognised, publicly accessible, linked 
identifiers; i.e. there should be no entity without identity. 
Upon upload to a digital platform, the content and contributor both need to be represented 
by an authority-regulated identifier. This is fundamental to the technical operation 
of an interoperable system and underpins automated processes of disambiguation, 
empowering efficiency, reducing cost and enabling enriched experience through search 
and discovery. This unavoidably places a responsibility upon DSPs to become ‘active’ 
conduits of content, ensuring that legislative/regulatory frameworks and agreed systems of 
governance are adhered to.
2) It is recommended that mandatory procedures of ISRC assignment upon upload 
to a DSP should also include an ISWC assignment; i.e. no ISRC should be allocated 
without a linked ISWC.
The linking of unique, persistent identifiers, including ISRC and ISWC is essential to ensure 
all parties involved in the value networks are properly remunerated. When matched with 
the associated metadata, the linked ISRC and ISWC becomes a valuable resource for 
rights remuneration. Whilst diverse initiatives and measures arose to tackle this problem, 
no comprehensive solution is currently readily available. 
At the centre of this issue lies the velocity of ISWCs, which relies on the dynamic 
complexity of rights assignment and split calculations within the publishing sector. To 
resolve this, some have proposed a provisional ISWC that can be linked to the sound 
recording upon release which could be later reconciled via centralised database. However, 
the duplication of ISRC, in addition to the absence of the consolidated database for ISRC, 
could render it difficult to link these identifiers. 
Solutions may be found in pre-existing industry-led processes; for example, where the 
instigation of an ISRC is a mandatory constituent of commercial music content released 
on a digital platform, a process which began with Apple in the early 2000s. Recognising 
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the importance of early content identification as critical in the operation of reporting and 
payment systems, DSPs are now implementing this as a widespread procedure.
3) It is recommended that research into standardised processes and interoperable 
data gateway systems be prioritised for support and investment. The development 
of a registry focused upon the wider attribution of content contributors is also 
recommended as a subject of further research.
Data silos are a pragmatic reality when it comes to digital content167. Diverse competing 
interests operating in an environment where data innovation and disruptive technology 
make for an uncertain market. These interests are being challenged to look beyond the 
parapets of their own walled enclosures and to facilitate an interconnected ecosystem 
that may benefit their rivals as much as themselves. Proprietary silos are structured 
according to commercial requirements and business objectives subject to resources 
and investment, so inevitably, when interoperability is raised for discussion, questions 
of economic imperative need to be considered. The construction of a global database 
with defined rules of operation to which all participants adhere, involves considerable 
commitment and resources. On a practical level, storage, access, ownership and 
structuring of a database needs clear designation of responsibilities and obligations. 
Large organisations with significant budgets for investment have been consolidating 
and structuring their data over time but market entrants and smaller organisations 
can lack the requisite funds to establish the state-of-the-art structures required for 
interconnection and scale. 
An interconnected protocol that connects diverse platforms should be investigated with 
reference to technical innovations that are currently in development in music and related 
sectors and where appropriate piloted.
In considering interoperability, stakeholders have been urged previously to consider four 
key infrastructure requirements to implement control mechanisms for the management of 
digital content: 
• unique persistent identification; 
• global resolution for identifiers; 
• information management standards and 
• Trusted Certification Authority services.168 
4) It is recommended that funding for research be directed towards academic, 
governmental and industry partnerships appropriate for the management of data as 
a proprietary asset, acknowledging the status of data as a public good. 
It is acknowledged that DDEX have already established a forum for technical discussions 
on standardisation and the implementation of these requirements. 
167 Ohlhorst 2015
168 Hill, K., 1999.
84  |  Intellectual Property Office
3.4.3.3 Governance 
From our research, we conclude that ineffective governance is considered to have led 
to serious inefficiencies that undermine confidence in the system. The market-led, self-
regulatory approach, adopted during the analogue era, is perceived to be hampering 
further innovation in the digital era. Market hierarchy, friction and politics arising from 
asymmetrical power relations is not conducive to a digital music management environment 
where interconnected collaboration is key to ensure efficient and transparent data flow. 
1) It is recommended that a networked system of data governance which takes into 
account requirements across the ecosystem be the subject of adequately funded 
research and development; this should promote harmonisation of process, set 
infrastructure standards and implement rules of practice that facilitate collaboration 
amongst all parties in the value chain. It is further recommended that a working group 
be established to look at the issue of data governance across the industry as a priority. 
The music industry has largely relied upon legal-intervention-driven measures and has 
struggled to address the diverse anomalies emerging from complex digital music rights 
management issues. A range of concepts has been developed to define appropriate 
frameworks that can be applied to specific areas of industry and organisations.169 Given 
the particular specifics of the music data management, we believe further research is 
required to consider whether any of the existing frameworks could be applied to the 
music data management and if lessons can be learned from other fields, such as banking, 
telecommunications and internet domain names, which have similar challenges and 
have had some success in addressing them. Tentatively, we suggest that a governance 
framework could oversee the entire ecosystem, promote harmonisation, set the 
infrastructure standards and facilitate collaboration amongst all parties in the value chain.
3.4.3.4 Collaboration 
1) To inform any potential or future governance framework, it is recommended 
that bespoke fora are established to facilitate multi-layered collaboration and 
communication which engage a greater number and a wider range of stakeholders, 
on a more frequent and regular basis than at present. 
Many interviewees recognised that collaboration and improved communication are key 
to efficient data management. The rapid growth in data exchange volume, emergence 
of diverse music distribution outlets and increasingly sophisticated communications 
have resulted in unprecedented levels of complexity in data management. The lack of 
cooperation in data exchange in the industry has resulted in increasing fragmentation 
of datasets. The increasing administration costs for data management and the 
duplication of the same type of solutions built by individual organisations suggest 
that increased collaboration and communication can reduce administration costs and 
increase productivity. The facilitation and promotion of multi-layered collaboration and 
communication, engaging a greater number and a wider range of stakeholders on a 
169 Kuhlmann, S., Stegmaier, P. and Konrad, K., 2019. The tentative governance of emerging science and 
technology—A conceptual introduction. Research policy, 48(5), pp.1091-1097. p. 1092.
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more frequent, regular basis needs a framework which builds on successful models of 
interaction, taking account barriers to interactivity and which can learn the lessons from 
previous failures. 
As a standards organisation DDEX promotes data solutions which emphasise messaging 
and communication strategies based upon accepted and agreed protocols and identifiers. 
This does not solve the issue of duplication of resources across the industry but as an 
instrumental approach that offers flexibility of interoperation, it leaves the responsibility 
for structuring internal silos to the asset holder. Critically, without an incentive/sanction 
framework that promotes mutually beneficial processes, interconnected protocols 
are threatened by fragmentation. Trust and authority are cornerstones that need to be 
established and proactively supported by interested organisations. Effectively this means 
‘buying into’ the idea that technological intervention needs to be considered in terms of 
the public good. 
The policing of an interoperable protocol for data is a social responsibility that requires 
regulatory oversight. 
3.5 Final remarks and future research
At this critical juncture, we have found an unprecedented willingness across the music 
industry to consider how to improve data management, but we also detected a sense of 
frustration. This research set out to map the key issues involved in the way music data has 
been and is currently being managed. The unequivocal support we received throughout 
the interviews and workshops highlights the vast improvements that a transparent and 
efficient music data management system could provide for the digital music economy. 
A strong will per se, however, does not necessarily provide the answers to how the 
problems should be approached. There are competing motivations and vested interests, 
as well as variable levels of resource and capital available for data management amongst 
heterogeneous stakeholders in the music industry. This has so far frustrated numerous 
attempts to resolve data issues; from the ambitious plan to build an industry-wide 
central database (GRD), developing and maintaining standards for the exchange of data, 
competition policy, legal changes, through to technological interventions, the industry’s 
approaches to data management have been beset with difficulties. 
The growing volume of data and an understanding that data management systems need to 
improve, has in our view been hampered by the lack of an industry-wide solution. This has 
in turn driven industry stakeholders to invest in developing individual solutions, resulting 
in increasing fragmentation and siloed systems operating in isolation and significant 
duplication and inefficiencies. Amidst the music industry’s prolonged transition from 
analogue to digital data management, big IT companies are poised to bring a fundamental 
change in digital data management which could potentially challenge the current system. 
The industry is now faced with a critical choice; either to stay with the current status quo of 
bifurcated efforts or to work together, for the benefit of all. 
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In making the decision, it is important to remember that what is at stake is not just the 
data phenomenon, picking a winner or slicing the pie. Music is a vital part of our culture 
and music data management in that sense is about finding ways to cultivate creativity and 
properly remunerate those involved in the creative process. The previous efforts serve 
as a prompt to reflect upon what the industry needs. The explosion in numbers of digital 
streaming businesses signals a shift from market-led competition to a digitally networked 
environment wherein everyone can potentially benefit from collaboration and networking. 
Data has enormous value but only when properly used, managed and understood. The 
big question therefore is how music data can be managed in order to benefit society and 
protect creators’ rights, whilst creating a healthy environment for business (recording, 
publishing and tech industry) to innovate and prosper. 
Every successful project begins by identifying the problems that need to be solved. This 
scoping research took a holistic approach in interrogating a broad range of issues to 
trace the complex and interrelated relationships amongst the music industry’s diverse 
stakeholder community, with limited resources and time available. We therefore traded 
depth for breadth. A deeper exploration of issues covered in this report would provide a 
richer understanding. From the interviews and the workshops held, four key themes stood 
out for further exploration. Tension around the legal definition of streaming was expressed 
and demonstrates in our view the need to clarify where streaming stands in the digital 
music sphere. The industry stakeholders were of one voice for the need to develop a 
bespoke education strategy. A keen interest in wider governance came through loud and 
clear and we believe that future research into how a governance framework for music data 
management might work would be beneficial. 
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4.1 Archaeology of Music 
4.1.1 Music industry and licensing overview
Major publishers
According to Peter Tschmuck170 the 2014 figures produced by Will Page and published in 
Music Business Worldwide showed the global revenues for the music publishing sector 
as $11.34bn but the majority of this income was made up performing right revenues, as 
shown below:
Private Copying Colletions
Mechanical Collections
Directly Licensed Revenues
Non-CISAC Mechanical Collections
Performing Collections
66.6%
11.6%
15%3.1%
3.7%
Figure source 1: Global revenues for music publishing 
(https://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2016/01/31/the-global-music-publishing-market-an-analysis/)
Tschmuck also showed the income trend based on his meta-analysis of the global music 
publishing industry between 1994 and 2014 and the graph below highlights the growth of 
the music publishing industry throughout the early years of the 21st Century, at a time when 
recorded music revenues were declining substantially.
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Figure source 2: Growth of Music Publishing 
(https://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2016/01/31/the-global-music-publishing-market-an-analysis/)
170 https://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2016/01/31/the-global-music-publishing-market-an-analysis/
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The global market is dominated by the major publishers, which comprise Universal Music 
Publishing Group (including BMG Music Publishing since 2008), Sony/ATV Music (including 
EMI Music publishing since 2012) and Warner / Chappell Music. Each belongs to a 
larger conglomerate created by the acquisition and merger of catalogues and publishing 
interests. In the UK, post the acquisition of a 40% share in EMI Music Publishing, Sony/
ATV became the effective UK market leader with, at the time, an estimated more than 30% 
market share followed by Universal Music Publishing (UMPG) at 22% and Warner Chappell 
at 12%. The shares may have varied since then but the pre-eminence of these three firms 
remains. According to Music & Copyright171 the combined global market shares of the 
3 majors in 2017 was around 58.8% with Sony/ATV at 27.3%, Universal at 19.5% and 
Warner Chappell at 12% leaving a healthy and competitive independent sector at 41.2%.
Major record labels
The Association of Independent Music (AIM) defines a ‘major’ as “a multinational company 
which (together with the companies in its group) has more than 5% of the world market(s) 
for the sale of records or music videos.” Since 2012, there have been only three labels that 
can be referred to as “major labels” (Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, 
and Warner Music Group). 
One noticeable difference between the music publishing and recorded music market is the 
greater dominance of the recorded music market by the three majors, whose collective 
global market share for both physical and digital was estimated at 67.8% according to 
Music & Copyright in 2018.172 However, the three major labels have a greater share of 
digital with 71.6% of the market leaving 28.4% to the independents.
Music publishing digital licensing innovations – Special purpose vehicles
The 2005 European Commission (EC) Recommendation’ that “liberated” rights holders to 
remove rights from most local European CMOs and led to the formation of SPVs (Special 
Purpose Vehicles) for the major corporate and independent international publishers. These 
include Sony/ATV’s SOLAR with PRS and GEMA, Universal Music Publishing’s DEAL 
with SACEM, and Warner Chappell’s PEDL which operates with several EU CMOs. More 
recently, BMG set up their ARESA SPV with GEMA, and a group of independent publishers 
(including Bucks Music, Beggars Music and Reservoir Media) moved their IMPEL licensing 
arm from MCPS to SACEM.173
The current digital licensing hub systems in the EU formed to resolve the uncertainties 
produced by the advent of Option 3 post the 2005 EC Recommendation led to the creation 
of ICE (PRS, STIM, GEMA) and Armonia (SACEM, SGAE and SIAE).
There have been further significant changes among the CMOs in the North American 
licensing market with PRO SESAC acquiring the mechanical rights agency Harry Fox 
Agency in 2015, Canadian PRO SOCAN acquiring both Medianet Digital and Audiam 
171 Ovum, 2018. Music & Copyright Newsletter 9 May 2018 p. 5
172 Ibid
173 http://www.musicweek.com/publishing/read/our-vision-is-to-turbo-charge-our-members-digital-income-
impel-names-sarah-williams-ceo/075991
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174in 2016, and US NRO Sound Exchange acquiring the Canadian mechanical rights 
agency CMRRA in 2017.175 Soundexchange launched its own 20 million song database,176 
which, whilst not listing every ISRC ever issued, nonetheless contains the vast majority of 
commercially active recordings.
4.1.2 Copyright
“Works are created by their authors, reproduced and distributed by their disseminators, 
and enjoyed by the audience. These three actors, each with their own concerns, 
negotiate a delicate dance. Most generally, all must be kept content: the author 
productive, the disseminator profitable, and the audience enlightened. Get the balance 
wrong and things fall out of kilter. If authors become too exacting, the audience suffers. 
If the disseminators are greedy or the audience miserly, culture and eventually the public 
domain [is] dessicate[d]”.177
According to WIPO,178 exhaustive lists of works covered by copyright are usually not to 
be found in legislation. Nonetheless, broadly speaking, works commonly protected by 
copyright throughout the world include:
• literary works such as novels, poems, plays, reference works, newspaper articles;
• computer programs, databases;
• films, musical compositions, and choreography;
• artistic works such as paintings, drawings, photographs, and sculpture;
• architecture;
• advertisements, maps, and technical drawings.
Copyright protection extends only to expressions, and not to ideas, procedures, methods 
of operation or mathematical concepts as such. Copyright may or may not be available for 
a number of objects such as titles, slogans, or logos, depending on whether they contain 
sufficient authorship. There are two types of rights under copyright:
i. Economic rights allow the rights owner financial reward from the use of their works 
by others;
ii. Moral rights, which protect the non-economic interests of the author.
174 https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7445889/socan-acquires-audiam
175 https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7793209/soundexchange-buying-cmrra-reflects-evolving-
markets
176 https://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2016/03/soundexchange-launches-free-20-million-song-search-
database.html
177 Baldwin, P., 2014. p. 14-52
178 https://www.wipo.int/copyright/en
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Most copyright laws state that the rights owner has the economic right to authorise or 
prevent certain uses in relation to a work or, in some cases, to receive remuneration for the 
use of their work (such as through collective management). The economic rights owner of 
a work can prohibit or authorise:
• its reproduction in various forms, such as printed publication or sound recording;
• its public performance, such as in a play or musical work;
• its recording, for example, in the form of compact discs or DVDs;
• its broadcasting, by radio, cable or satellite;
• its translation into other languages;
• its adaptation, such as a novel into a film screenplay.
Examples of widely recognised moral rights include the right to claim authorship of a work 
and the right to oppose changes to a work that could harm the creator’s reputation.
Registration
In the majority of countries, and according to the Berne Convention, copyright protection 
is obtained automatically without the need for registration or other formalities.
Most countries nonetheless have a system in place to allow for the voluntary registration 
of works. Such voluntary registration systems can help solve disputes over ownership 
or creation, as well as facilitate financial transactions, sales, and the assignment and/or 
transfer of rights.
“In recent years a number of issues have been raised concerning registration of 
copyright and related rights in the evolving digital environment. With the advent 
of digital technology, the overwhelming flow of content and multiplying scores of 
creators, often completely unidentified, justifies a renewed interest in readily available 
and accurate ownership data and therefore in documentation and recordation under 
different forms. 
The absence of voluntary national registration systems, together with the lack of 
communication or interaction among them, results in a highly asymmetric international 
scenario. Moreover, voluntary registration is very different from one country to another 
including systems where the work is actually deposited (registration) and others where 
only declarations are submitted, without deposit of the work (recordation). Some 
countries have expressed the need of a greater interaction among voluntary registration 
systems.” (WIPO 2019)
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Related/neighbouring rights
The rights granted in national laws to the three types of beneficiaries of related rights as 
follows (although not all rights may be granted under the same law): 
• Performers have the right to prevent fixation (recording), broadcasting and Communication 
To The Public of their live performances without their consent, and the right to prevent 
reproduction of fixations of their performances under certain circumstances. 
• The rights in respect of broadcasting and communication to the public may be in 
the form of Equitable Remuneration rather than a right to prevent. (See above)
• Due to the personal nature of their creations, some national laws also grant 
performers moral rights, which may be exercised to prevent unauthorised use of 
their name and image, or modifications of their performances that present them in 
an unfavourable light. 
• Under the Beijing Treaty, these rights will extend to performers in relation to their 
audiovisual performances. 
• Producers of sound recordings have the right: 
• to authorise or prohibit reproduction, importation and distribution of their sound 
recordings and copies thereof, and the right 
• to Equitable Remuneration for broadcasting and Communication To The Public of 
their sound recordings. 
• Broadcasting organizations have the right to authorise or prohibit rebroadcasting, 
fixation and reproduction of their broadcasts.
(Performers are those who perform a work (including those in the public domain) or folklore 
but does not include ‘extras’ - It is understood that the definition of “performers” includes 
those who perform a literary or artistic work that is created or first fixed in the course of a 
performance – improvisation).
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The Beijing Treaty – Audiovisual Performance [BTAP 2012]179 deals with the intellectual 
property rights of performers in audiovisual performances. It grants performers four kinds 
of economic rights for their performances fixed in audiovisual recordings, such as motion 
pictures [The term of protection must be at least 50 years.]:
i. Reproduction - the right to authorise director or indirect reproduction of the 
performance fixed in an audiovisual fixation in any manner or form.
ii. Distribution - the right to authorise the making available to the public of the original 
and copies of the performance fixed in an audiovisual fixation through sale or other 
transfer of ownership.
iii. Rental - the right to authorise the commercial rental to the public of the original and 
copies of the performance fixed in an audiovisual fixation. There is no provision for 
equitable remuneration for commercial rental.
iv. Making available - the right to authorise the making available to the public, by wire or 
wireless means, of any performance fixed in an audiovisual fixation, in such a way that 
members of the public may access the fixed performance from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. This right covers, in particular, on-demand, interactive 
making available through the Internet.
v. Authorisation of broadcasting and communication to the public of their performances 
fixed in audiovisual fixations.
vi. Equitable remuneration - for the direct or indirect use of performance fixed in 
audiovisual fixations for broadcasting or for communication to the public where 
contracting parties deposit a notification and where a commercial phonogram is 
embodied in an audiovisual product.
“No guidance is providing (in the WPPT) as to the meaning of ER.... (so) therefore 
remain for determination under law.” 180 but “national laws may establish how the 
single equitable remuneration is to be claimed, for example, whether by the performer, 
phonogram producer, or by both, and the terms on which it is to be shared (in the 
absence of agreement between the performer and phonogram producer” 181 “equitable 
remuneration may mean something less than market value’ given the .... parties will not 
be negotiating in a free-market environment”.
[“Phonogram” means the fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other sounds, 
or of a representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a 
cinematographic or other audiovisual work.]
179 https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beijing/summary_beijing.html
180 Ricketson, S. and Ginsburg, J.C., 2005. International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights : The Berrne 
Convention and Beyond. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press. New York. p.1268
181 Ibid
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Article 19 of the Rome Convention (“....once a performer has consented to the 
incorporation of his performance in a visual or audio-visual fixation, article 7 - Minimum 
Protection for Performers, shall have no further application”) does not limit the performers’ 
freedom to negotiate contracts when they authorise the audiovisual fixation of their 
performances, nor their right to benefit from national treatment under the BTAP.
Articles 12(1) and 12(2) authorise contracting countries to decide whether performers’ 
rights are initially owned by the producer and Article 12(3) declares that contracting 
countries may additionally provide audiovisual performers with equitable remuneration 
for the making available to the public, broadcasting and communication to public of their 
audiovisual performance.
Transfer of rights - Contracting Parties may stipulate in their national laws that once a 
performer has consented to the audiovisual fixation of a performance, the exclusive rights 
mentioned above are transferred to the producer of the audiovisual fixation (unless a 
contract between the performer and producer states otherwise). 
Independent of such a transfer of rights, national laws or individual, collective or other 
agreements may provide the performer with the right to receive royalties or equitable 
remuneration for any use of the performance, as provided for under the Treaty.
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4.1.3 Copyright and technology timeline
Date Event
1847 The Paris Concert Café Ambassadeurs is successfully sued by popular music 
composers Ernest Bourget, Victor Parizot and Paul Henrion. The exclusive right of the 
author to approve public performances – although established in France in 1791– did not 
thus become a reality until over 50 years after the law’s enactment.
1849 Following the Ambassadeurs Case the Cour d’Appel de Paris on 26th April orders the 
owner of Ambassadeurs Café to pay ‘compensation’ (effectively ‘royalties’) to composer 
Ernest Bourget for unauthorised use of his music. 
1851 SACEM – the world’s first copyright collecting society for musical works (specifically for 
performing rights) – is established in France (Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs et 
Editeurs de Musique).
1886 - 
1887
The seminal Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is signed 
(in Berne, Switzerland). It intends to give international copyright protection to the creative 
works of the citizens of European member state signatories.
1877 Thomas Alva Edison, succeeds in recovering Mary’s Little Lamb from a strip of tinfoil 
wrapped around a spinning cylinder. He demonstrates his invention in the offices of 
Scientific American, and the phonograph is born.
1887 Emile Berliner is granted a patent on a flat-disc gramophone, making the production of 
multiple copies practical.
1887 The Aeolian Company was founded by New York City piano maker William B. Tremaine 
as the Aeolian Organ & Music Co. to make automatic organs.
1893 Manchester, UK, Amalgamated Musicians Union Formed.
1894 First Musicians Strike in UK at the Liverpool Court Theatre when the orchestra were 
asked to take a pay cut.182
1895 The first true Pianola was completed by Edwin Scott Votey at his home in Detroit. Votey 
later joined the Aeolian Company. 
1896 American Federation of Musicians (AFM) formed 
1897 Marconi establishes a radio station on the Isle of Wight, England.
1898 The Aeolian Company put the pianola on sale in the USA in the autumn of 1898, and in 
Europe a month or two later.
1900 Valdemar Poulsen unveils his invention ‘The Telegraphone’, which recorded magnetically 
on steel wire to the public at the Paris Exposition.
1901 The Victor Talking Machine Company founded by Emile Berliner and Eldridge Johnson. 
Experimental optical recordings are made on motion picture film.
1903 The Aeolian Company has more than 9,000 roll titles in their catalogue, adding 200 titles 
per month.
1904 Edwin Welte in Germany developed a new kind of player piano, known as the Welte-
Mignon, which over the years came to be known as the reproducing piano. Nearly all 
major pianists of the early twentieth century made rolls for the reproducing piano.
1905 US President Theodore Roosevelt: 
“Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused 
and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which, under 
modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon 
the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair protection of the public; 
they are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to 
administer with satisfaction to the public.”183
182 Williamson, J. and Cloonan, M., 2016. Players’ work time: A history of the British Musicians’ Union, 
pp.1893–2013.
183 Retrieved 2011-11-27.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link), The House Report on the Copyright Act of 1909.
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Date Event
1906 Composer - John Philip Sousa to US Congress: 
“These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic development of music in this 
country. When I was a boy ... in front of every house in the summer evenings, you would 
find young people together singing the songs of the day or old songs. Today you hear 
these infernal machines going night and day. We will not have a vocal cord left. The vocal 
cord will be eliminated by a process of evolution, as was the tail of man when he came 
from the ape.”184
1907 Marconi established the first permanent transatlantic wireless service from Clifden, 
Ireland to Glace Bay, Nova Scotia.
1908 White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 - decision by 
the Supreme Court of the United States which ruled that manufacturers of music rolls for 
player pianos did not have to pay royalties to the composers. 
1909 Enrico Caruso is heard in the first live broadcast from the Metropolitan Opera, NYC.
1909 US Copyright Act created (codified in Section 1(e))[4] the first compulsory mechanical 
license to allow anyone to make a mechanical reproduction of a musical composition 
without the consent of the copyright owner provided that the person adhered to the 
provisions of the license. (Congress intended it to govern piano rolls.)
Congress declares: “The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection 
afforded to music has been to give the composer an adequate return for the value of his 
composition ...” The law also prohibits “unauthorized mechanical reproduction of musical 
compositions”.
1910 In the UK Mecolico (the Mechanical Copyright Licences Company) formed to license the 
mechanical right in anticipation of the 1911 Copyright Act.
1911 In 1911, Copyright Act (implemented 1 July 1912) in the UK brought provisions on 
copyright into one Act for the first time – This established Related Rights for Producers & 
Performers on Phonographic Recordings, as well as a Mechanical license. 
1912 Major Edwin F. Armstrong is issued a patent for a regenerative circuit, making radio 
reception practical.
1913 The first ‘talking movie’ demonstrated by Edison using his Kinetophone process, a 
cylinder player mechanically synchronised to a film projector.
1914 In the UK PRS (the Performing Right Society Ltd) formed to administer the ‘Performing 
Right’ (non dramatic performance and broadcasting right) in UK, Eire and British Empire. 
The Society was founded to collect fees for live performance from sheet music, which 
were distributed to its members.
In the US, ASCAP was founded by Victor Herbert, together with composers Louis Hirsch, 
John Raymond Hubbell, Silvio Hein and Gustave Kerker, a lyricist Glen MacDonough, 
publishers George Maxwell (who served as its first president) and Jay Witmark, and a 
copyright attorney Nathan Burkan at the Hotel Claridge in New York City.
1919 The Radio Corporation of America (RCA) is founded. It is owned in part by General Electric.
1948 Audio Engineers Society formed in NYC, USA.
1952 First use of Bar Code product identifier.
1956/57 The Copyright Act, 1956, comes into force on 1st June, 1957. It takes into account 
further amendments to the Berne Convention, and also the Universal Copyright 
Convention, to which the UK is a signatory. Films and broadcasts are now protected in 
their own right. The Performing Right Tribunal, predecessor of the Copyright Tribunal, is 
established.
1959 Toshiba released the first commercial helical-scan video tape recorder. In 1963, Philips 
introduced its EL3400 1” helical scan recorder (aimed at the business and domestic 
user), and Sony marketed the 2” PV-100, its first open-reel VTR intended for business, 
medical, airline, and educational use.
184 Lessig, L., 2008., Remix: making art and commerce thrive in the hybrid economy. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic. Chapter 1.
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1961 The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations is signed. This proves important to the recording industry, 
and assists in the prevention of recorded music piracy.
1962 The standard audio cassette was invented in by the Philips company. They named it the 
“Compact Cassette”.185 The compact cassette technology was originally designed for 
dictation machines, but improvements in fidelity led the Compact Cassette to supplant 
the Stereo 8-track cartridge and reel-to-reel tape recording in most non-professional 
applications.186 Its uses ranged from portable audio to home recording to data storage 
for early microcomputers.
[Philips was competing with Telefunken and Grundig in a race to establish its cassette 
tape as the worldwide standard, and it wanted support from Japanese electronics 
manufacturers.”187 Philips’ Compact Cassette became dominant as a result of Philips’ 
decision (under pressure from Sony) to license the format free of charge].
1964 Sony introduces the first VCR Home Video Recorder.
1967/70 The United Nations Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
is signed (of which the international bureaus set up to administer the Paris and Berne 
Conventions, almost a century earlier, were forerunners). (WIPO, as an international 
copyright umbrella organisation, commences operations in 1970.)
1968 The first cassette player (although mono) designed for use in car dashboards was 
introduced.
1969 Creation of ARPANET, the predecessor of the Internet.
UNIX is developed by a group of AT&T employees at Bell Labs.
1971 The Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorised 
Duplication of Their Phonograms is adopted in Geneva on 29th October (sometimes 
referred to as the Geneva Convention).
1971 Intel releases world’s first microprocessor.
1974 The first use of UPC or Universal product Code BAR CODE UPC scanner.
1975 Bill Gates and Paul Allen found Microsoft.
1977 Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and Robert Wayne found Apple Computing Inc.
1980’s Home Taping is Killing Music – BPI Campaign.
1982 The introduction of MIDI technology (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) begins to 
revolutionise music production.
1982 The introduction of the CD (Compact Disc) constitutes the first mass consumer product 
(or sound carrier) which holds music in digitised form.
1983 ARPANET officially changes to use the Internet Protocol, creating the Internet.
1984 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984),188 also known 
as the “Betamax case”, is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which 
ruled that the making of individual copies of complete television shows for purposes of 
time shifting does not constitute copyright infringement, but is fair use. The Court also 
ruled that the manufacturers of home video recording devices, such as Betamax or other 
VCRs (referred to as VTRs in the case), cannot be liable for infringement. The case was a 
boon to the home video market, as it created a legal safe haven for the technology.
1984/85 Richard Stallman, working at MIT, founds the Free Software Foundation, which is 
believed to be the first anti-copyright organisation of the digital era.
Stallman’s GNU Manifesto sets out case for what became known as ‘Copyleft’.
1985 The first .com domain name, symbolics.com, is registered by the Symbolics corporation. 
185 How Music Technology Evolved Over the Years? – SpeakStick”. speakstick.net. Retrieved 2016-07-14
186 Camras, M. and Martin, D.W., 1989. Magnetic recording handbook.Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
187 Nathan, J., 2001. Sony. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 129.
188 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
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1987 The Fraunhofer Institute in Germany began research code-named EUREKA project 
EU147, Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) – later to become MP3.
1988 The United States finally becomes a signatory to the Berne Convention.
1988/89 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, supersedes the various 
amendments to the Copyright Act, 1956. In addition to economic rights, this Act 
introduces the concept of moral rights for the first time (The Right of Paternity and The 
Right of Integrity). (This present Act continues to be amended, and now incorporates 
various European Directives.)
1990 The US Copyright Act is amended in order to prohibit the commercial lending of 
computer software.
1991 The first GSM Mobile Phone network opened in Europe.
Microsoft introduce Windows Media Player.
Tim Berners-Lee introduces the web browser called WorldWideWeb.
1993 Severe Tire Damage – US Garage Rock Band become first band to perform live over the 
internet.
1994 The WTO (World Trade Organisation) TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property) extends the principles established by the 1886 Berne 
Convention to all countries in the global free trade area. While reinforcing creator’s rights 
(‘author’s life’ terms), it also emphasises the concept of transferable property rights – in 
order to give economic stimulus to the exchange of ‘cultural productions’.
1994 Jeff Bezos founds Amazon as an Online Bookstore.
1994 Emergence of the MP3 compression standard for music.
1995 ESPN SportsZone streamed a live radio broadcast of a baseball game between the 
Seattle Mariners and the New York Yankees to thousands of its subscribers worldwide by 
the company that became RealNetworks.
1994 John Perry Barlow (a former lyric writer for The Grateful Dead, and co- founder of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation) declares, in a widely read manifesto, that intellectual 
property law “cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized 
expression”.
1994 Google begins life as a research project by Larry Page and Sergey Brin when they were 
both PhD students at Stanford University in Stanford, California.
1995/96 The period of copyright is extended, in Europe and then America, to the life of the author 
plus 70 years pma (post mortem auctoris) for most printed works. (Sound recordings 
remain at 50 years.)
1996 In the US, the TRIPS Agreement restores, from 1st January,1996, copyright protection to 
many works of foreign origin which are already in the public domain in the United States.
1996 On 1st December, the UK formally adopts European Union Directive 92/100/EEC which 
concerned rental, lending and neighbouring rights matters. This meant that those 
featured artists and session performers who performed on sound recordings which were 
broadcast or performed in public after 1st December 1996 in the UK now had a legal 
right to receive “equitable remuneration” for this use of the copyright.
1996 WIPO issues its Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
1997 Winamp was released by Nullsoft – it grew quickly, popular with over 3 million 
downloads,189 paralleling the developing trend of MP3 (music) file sharing.
South Korean company SaeHan Information Systems develop first MP3 player - MPMan 
F10.
189 Bronson, Po., 1998. Rebootlegger. Wired. http://archive.wired.com /wired/archive/6.07/newmedia.html. 
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1998 PayPal established in December as Confinity,190 a company that developed security 
software for handheld devices founded by Max Levchin, Peter Thiel, Luke Nosek, 
and Ken Howery. PayPal was developed and launched as a money transfer service at 
Confinity in 1999, funded by John Malloy from BlueRun Ventures.
X.com, an online bank founded by Elon Musk (November 1999) later merged with 
Confinity which was renamed as PayPal.191
1998 In the US, the Copyright Term Extension Act is enacted on 27th October (also known as 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, and pejoratively as the Mickey Mouse 
Protection Act). This Act extends the period of copyright in the United States by 20 years 
(from pma +50 years to pma +70 years). The Act does not revive copyrights that have 
already expired.
The Recording Industry Association of America, (RIAA) file an application for a Temporary 
Restraining Order to prevent the sale of the Rio MP3 player in the Central claiming the 
player violated the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act – RIAA were denied, on appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the Rio’s space shifting was fair use and not a copyright 
infringement.
1998 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is enacted in the United States. It is soon 
criticised as being already out of date in respect of new Internet and other technological 
developments. Around this time a general concern emerges in the music industry that 
the potential removal of long-existing copyright ‘intermediary’ structures will reduce or 
otherwise permanently alter the infrastructure and the bargaining power, or relationship, 
between creators and consumers.
1998 SoundJam MP - an early MP3 player was released and was available until June 2001. 
Apple, Inc. purchased SoundJam MP in 2000 and further developed the code to create 
iTunes.
1999 Napster was founded by Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker. Initially envisioned as an 
independent peer-to-peer file sharing service by Shawn Fanning. Its technology allowed 
people to easily share their MP3 files with other participants.
SubPop is the first label to distribute music tracks in the MP3 format.
1999 Apple introduces streaming into its QuickTime Media player Format.
2000 Gnutella (based on GNU) developed by - the first decentralised peer-to-peer network of 
its kind, leading to other, later networks adopting the model.
[The next day, AOL stopped the availability of the program over legal concerns and 
restrained Nullsoft from doing any further work on the project. This did not stop Gnutella; 
after a few days, the protocol had been reverse engineered, and compatible free and open 
source clones began to appear].
2001 The European Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) which harmonises certain 
aspects of copyright across the 15 member states is approved by the European 
Parliament and the European Council (22 May).
2001 Creative Commons founded by Lawrence Lessig, Hal Abelson, and Eric Eldred192 with 
the support of Center for the Public Domain.
Wikipedia, a Wiki free content encyclopaedia, goes online.
The Dot Com Bubble Bursts and thousands of DotComs go bust.
190 Forrest, C., 2014. How the ‘PayPal Mafia’ redefined success in Silicon Valley. TechRepublic. https://www.
techrepublic.com/article/how-the-paypal-mafia-redefined-success-in-silicon-valley/
191 Doeden, M., 2015 SpaceX and Tesla Motors Engineer Elon Musk. Lerner Publications.
192 https://web.archive.org/web/20111007165253/http://creativecommons.org/about/history
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2001 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001)[1] - landmark intellectual 
property case in which the peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing service Napster, could be held 
liable for contributory infringement and vicarious infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyrights. 
This was the first major case to address the application of copyright laws to peer-to-peer 
file-sharing.
2001 Apple Computer releases the iPod.
2002 Effective from 1st January, 2002, the German Bundestag (Parliament) introduces a new 
law to provide for collective bargaining between organisations representing creators and 
exploiters of intellectual property, aimed at encouraging fairer remuneration for creators 
– including the statutory right for creators to ask for payment reviews and audits of 
companies involved in such exploitation.
2002 CD Price Fixing - The US Federal Trade Commission opened an investigation into price 
fixing leading to decreased competition and reduction of discounting among music 
distributors and retailers. A settlement in 2002 included the music publishers and 
distributors; Sony Music, Warner Music, Bertelsmann Music Group, EMI Music, Universal 
Music as well as retailers Musicland, Trans World Entertainment and Tower Records. In 
restitution for price fixing they agreed to pay a $67.4 million fine and distribute $75.7 million 
in CDs to public and non-profit groups but admitted no wrongdoing.
2004 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd193 - United States Supreme Court decision in which 
the Court unanimously held that defendant peer-to-peer file sharing companies Grokster 
and Streamcast (maker of Morpheus) could be sued for inducing copyright infringement 
for acts taken in the course of marketing file sharing software. The plaintiffs were a 
consortium of 28 of the largest entertainment companies (led by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
studios).
2005 The need to improve the functioning of collective management organisations identified in 
Commission Recommendation 2005/737/EC (1). setting out a number of principles, such 
as the freedom of right-holders to choose their collective management organisations, 
equal treatment of categories of right-holders and equitable distribution of royalties. It 
called on collective management organisations to provide users with sufficient information 
on tariffs and repertoire in advance of negotiations between them. It also contained 
recommendations on accountability, right holder representation in the decision-making 
bodies of collective management organisations and dispute resolution.
2005 Three former PayPal employees—Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim—create 
Youtube - Google bought the site in November 2006 for US$1.65 billion; YouTube now 
operates as one of Google’s subsidiaries.
Mark Zuckerberg and Dustin Moskovitz begin running The Facebook Social Networking 
Site full time. 
2006 In the UK (in December), the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property recommends that 
the 50-year copyright protection term on sound recordings and performers’ rights is not 
extended – as many music creators and record companies had wished (having argued for an 
extension of a further 45 years).
Performers Societies AURA & PAMRA merged with PPL. 
2006 “The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom” by 
Harvard Law School Professor Yochai Benkler is published by Yale University Press.
The one billionth song is purchased from Apple iTunes.
2006 Music streaming service Spotify developed by Daniel Ek and Martin Lorentzon
Daniel Marhely developed the music streaming service Blogmusik, in Paris.
2007 Blogmusik sued by SACEM for copyright infringement – after coming to an agreement it 
was relaunched as Deezer.
193 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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2008 IFPI report “Tens of billions of illegal files were swapped in 2007. The ratio of unlicensed 
tracks downloaded to legal tracks sold is about 20 to 1” IFPI also criticised a “lack of 
interoperability between services and devices, lack of investment in marketing of new 
services”.194
2014 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of 
copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for 
online use in the internal market - designed to help make sure royalty payments are 
timely and accurate while significantly improving the transparency and governance of 
European Collective Management Organisations (CMOs). The Directive also creates a 
level playing field for the multi-territorial licensing of online music services.
2015 “Thinking Out Loud” by Ed Sheeran became the first song to pass 500 million streams 
on Spotify.
Apple launch Subscription Streaming Service – Top Artists exclusively release on Apple 
Music to lure customers.
Spotify dispute with Apple - Universal Music Group CEO Lucian Grange told employees 
that UMG is prohibiting its artists from offering music exclusives.
2017 Spotify Settles $43 Million Class Action Copyright Lawsuit.
Wixen Publishers sue Spotify for $1.6 Billion for Copyright Infringement for non-
clearance of rights.
2017 As part of renegotiated licenses with Universal Music Group and Merlin Network, 
Spotify’s financial filings revealed its agreement to pay more than $2 billion in minimum 
payments over the next two years.
2017 Streaming companies Spotify, Rocket Internet & Deezer write to EU Anti Trust 
Commission complaining that Apple and Google are abusing their market position and 
acting as ‘gatekeepers’.
2018 US Music Modernisation Act.
2018 Spotify files for a direct listing on the New York Stock Exchange.
Sony buys EMI Music Publishing for $2.3 Billion creating world’s biggest music publisher 
with a catalogue of more than 4m songs.
194 https://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2008-summary.pdf
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4.1.4 Streaming
“We have hung on to two income streams in the music industry for 100 years: the 
mechanical royalty and the performing royalty, and we have shoehorned everything down 
those two paths.“ But we are now in a situation whereby those names no longer apply, 
because, a stream, what is it? A stream is not a sale, so it is not a mechanical, and it is not 
a performance, because it is a singular, one-to-one experience.”195
Growth 
BPI figures196 for 2019 show that the UK music market is becoming increasingly digital: 
• 69.3% of turnover now derived from streaming and downloads. 91 Bn audio streams 
were served across services such as Spotify, Deezer, Apple Music and Youtube Music 
in 2018, an increase of 33.5% on 2017’s total;
• Kantar’s Worldpanel survey estimated that over one in five users paid to stream music 
in 2018. 25 to 34-year olds were the most engaged, with over half having watched a 
video or streamed music;
• Mobile phone is the most dominant mode of access (71.6%) while Home Assistants 
(Smart Speakers) were used by 25.7%;
• 80% of the UK population own a mobile phone and of those two thirds use them at 
least twice weekly to listen to music;
• 37% of smart speaker owners had started paying to stream since acquiring a smart 
speaker, showing that ownership is a clear driver for subscription uptake with 83% of 
those users listening weekly to streamed music. 
Figure 3: Global revenues 
195 Fletcher, G., 2017. Interview with former PRS Chair Guy Fletcher, Music Week, http://www.musicweek.
com/interviews/read/the-big-interview-prs-for-music-s-guy-fletcher/067154
196 BPI 2019 
Music 2025 - The Music Data Dilemma   |  103
(Source: IFPI 2019 report)
Streaming - Digital Audio
Streaming Download Physical
Revenue Paid Subscription
Ad Supported Revenue
Payment per download Payment per 
Product
Channel File from Host Database 
Buffered or Cached 
Download from Host or P2P 
Exchange
Carrier – CD, Mini 
Disk, SD Card
Streaming - Technical
Streaming involves delivering an audio file in small packets with some buffering but resulting in real-
time playback. 
• delivers digital audio, including music, without requiring a download file from the Internet
• formats vary but are often compressed digital audio files, i.e.: MP3, WMA, AAC, OGG or FLAC
Higher quality WAV or AIFF require more bandwidth or a physical carrier.
Some services offer different levels of quality for different internet connections,197 which requires a 
steady stream of data packets for uninterrupted listening.
• caching the file on a hard drive facilitates offline access
• some paid streaming music services actively allow the option to both stream and download
Streaming - Legal
Spotify, Apple Music, Pandora, Deezer, Youtube, Soundcloud & Bandcamp all offer different 
variations of streaming services which have implications for digital rights.
• no single legal definition can be employed 
• ‘webcasting’ used as equivalent to describe rights framework
• temporary (not permanent) access to a piece of creative content 
Several different types of streams depending use: 
• on-demand
• semi-interactive 
• ‘lean back’ .
This appears to play a central role determining the rights involved, i.e.:
• communication to the public
• making available, or 
• distribution right/sync etc.
197 BBC Webwise http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/guides/about-streaming 
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4.1.5 Creator remuneration
Streaming has given rise to a shift in music consumption from ownership to access, 
requiring an amendment to the way the reproduction right is interpreted. As the oldest 
form of copyright the reproduction right has long been integral to the copyright system. 
Access almost always involves an element of reproduction, albeit transient but it is open 
to question whether reproduction can continue to be the core determinant of whether a 
stream constitutes a distribution to the public. Under ‘Communication To The Public’, there 
are two major rights:
• Broadcasting - the content is delivered only at a given time of the transmission, 
chosen/curated by the service provider - related/neighbouring rights apply and 
performers are entitled to Equitable Remuneration [ER] for the use of their work [i.e. 
50% of the royalties collected by the CMO];
• Making available - the content is delivered at a given time and space individually chosen 
by the user - related/neighbouring rights do not apply and only the contracted featured 
artist receives royalties on the streamed content [i.e. 15-20% in respect of contract].
Importantly, the non-featured artist/session performer is not entitled to any revenue from 
the use of the content on an ‘interactive’ streaming platform. Furthermore, direct deals 
between record labels and DSPs have negated the role of the PPL, a trusted party in the 
UK in respect of reporting and auditing structures of remuneration - In 1995, as per PPL 
members’ request, PPL reassigned all online licensing rights, apart from simulcast rights 
back to the members Interactive streaming licensing, therefore, is not administered by PPL.
Whilst on-demand Digital Service Providers, such as Spotify and Apple Music, are still 
considered interactive, this has been subject to challenge as services have increasingly 
invested in methods which push content to the consumer through curation and algorithm 
determined playlists. 
Three themes have been particularly prominent:
1. whilst the digital music revenue is on the increase, revenue distribution is not 
perceived as fair with record labels being seen as the chief beneficiaries;
2. by preventing key information, such as contract terms and revenue details, from 
being disclosed under NDA’s, organisations have become hampered by a lack of 
transparency. Not being able to effectively audit payment structures has given rise to 
frustration and suspicion of sharp practice;
3. building a fair digital music value chain that properly compensates artists is crucial to 
the realisation of an undistorted, functioning digital music market.
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Legislation Copyright Royalty Payments
TV, Radio Broadcast/ 
Performance
Performing
Neighbouring
Rate set – CMO 
Equitable Remuneration
Digital Radio 
(Programmed)
Communication To 
The Public
Performing
Neighbouring
Rate set - CMO
Equitable Remuneration
Interactive 
Streaming
Making Available Performing
Mechanical
Varying rates linked to type of 
service/number of plays
Download Reproduction Mechanical Volume of sales (Contract)
Physical Reproduction Mechanical Number of pressings
Volume of sales (Contract)
Creative Industries Federation research has observed that the mean income for music 
content creators consistently falls well below the UK national average and that the 
increasing ‘precarity’198 of creative work has led to sense of insecurity which impacts the 
ability of particular groups to effectively participate:
• 95% of UK creative industries businesses are micro businesses;
• 68.6% have a turnover of less than £100,000, significantly higher than the national average; 
• 35% are self-employed, with freelancers making up a significant portion. 
Many practices, (e.g. registration with a collection society), which underpin and support 
recurring revenue from the use of creative IP, are also a form of signalling or an indicator of 
professional participation. Informal working relationships can mean these are observed on 
an ad hoc basis or are often ignored. 
Over 1,000 UK women registered as songwriters/composers last year, yet the ratio of 
male-to-female registrants remains disappointingly flat year-on-year. Only 17% of PRS’s 
writer membership identified as female, signalling slow progress across the music industry 
to address gender disparity.199
198 McRobbie 2016, Gill & Pratt 2008, Kretschmer 2005
199 PRS 2019
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4.1.6 Music data management – standards and codes 
Code Application Governance
International 
Standard 
Musical Work 
Code: ISWC
Identifies a musical work as a unique 
intangible creation. It relates to the result of 
an intangible creation of one or more people, 
regardless of copyright status, distributions 
or agreements that cover this creation.
Confédération Internationale 
des Sociétés d’Auteurs et 
Compositeurs [CISAC]Ratified 
by the ISO in 2001 International 
Standard Work Code – ISO 
15707:2001.
International 
Standard Text 
Code: ISTC
Identifies the discrete results of creative / 
intellectual effort expressed as text,“creative 
works” such as prose, poetry, lyrics, original 
screenplays, audio and stage scripts. From 
a music perspective access to the lyrics of a 
song are often a distinct request from access 
to the song itself.
The International ISTC Agency 
Ltd operates the International 
Registration Authority for 
the International Standard 
Text Code (ISTC) standard 
ISO21047. The International 
ISTC Agency Ltd (“IIA”) was 
registered as a not-for-profit 
company in 2008.
International 
Standard Music 
Number: ISMN
This is the international standard number 
for editions of music scores. It identifies 
and accompanies a sheet music product 
uniquely, from the first phase of planning it at a 
publishing house over its manufacturing and - 
in most cases--printing and through all points 
of the supply chain.
International standard 
music number (ISMN), 
was developed by ISO 
Technical Committee ISO/
TC 46, Information and 
documentation, Subcommittee 
SC 9, Identification and 
description. It is available 
from ISO national member 
institutes.
International 
Standard 
Recording Code: 
ISRC
An identification system for audio and music 
video recordings. It is used by IFPI members 
to assign a unique identifier to every distinct 
sound recording they release. An ISRC 
identifies a particular sound recording, not 
the song itself, Different recordings, edits, 
remixes and remasters of the same song will 
each be assigned their own ISRC, however, 
the same recording should carry the same 
ISRC in all countries/territories where it is 
distributed, with the code referencing the 
territory where it was originally registered.
IFPI Secretariat is the 
International Registration 
Authority for ISRC by ISO and 
functions as the International 
ISRC Agency. The code was 
developed by the recording 
industry in conjunction with the 
ISO technical committee 46, 
subcommittee 9 (TC 46/SC 9), 
which codified the standard as 
ISO 3901 in 1986, and updated 
it in 2001. 
Interested Party 
Identifier: IPI
As an evolution of the CAE system, the IPI 
has sought the global unique identification 
of a ‘rights holder’ acting across multiple 
creation classes (i.e. musical work, literary 
work, work of art etc.). IPI represented 
metadata assigned to different roles (musical 
creator, publisher, arranger, etc), which 
owned any or all rights (performing right, 
reproduction right, radio broadcast right etc.) 
relating to the musical work.
Swiss CMO SUISA developed 
the CAE system and was 
appointed by CISAC to design 
and develop the IPI system, 
which replaced CAE in 2001.
IPI is a proprietary system not 
governed by ISO. 
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Code Application Governance
International 
Performer 
Number: IPN
Used to identify individual performers in 
audio recordings and audio-visual works. The 
authority to identify each performer comes 
from the legal mandate the performer has 
assigned to their collective management 
organizations (CMOs). The end result is that 
each performer will have a unique ID stored 
on the International Performer Database 
(IPD). The IPN can be used in data exchanges 
between CMOs, simplifying and improving 
the matching algorithms for disambiguation.
The Societies’ Council for the 
Collective Management of 
Performers’ Rights [SCAPR] 
is the international body that 
coordinates and regulates 
the IPD and has invested 
in technical systems to aid 
governance of information 
on performers and their 
performances.
International 
Standard Name 
Identifier: ISNI
An International Standards Organisation 
[ISO] identifier capable of tagging millions 
of contributors to creative works, ISNI is 
specified for the identification of the public 
identities of parties as opposed to their 
private identities (as represented by IPI or 
IPN).
The stated goal of the ISNI is to be a “bridge 
identifier”, allowing various industry partners 
to exchange information relating to a party 
without the need to disclose confidential 
information.
“ISNI is being established as an interoperable 
identifier: a core part of its function is to map 
other standard or proprietary identifiers .” 
ISNI is part of the ISO family of 
international standard identifiers 
that includes identifiers of works, 
recordings, products and rights 
holders in all repertoires. Working 
on behalf of ISO, the ISNI 
International Agency is charged 
with managing and promulgating 
the ISNI identifier system 
worldwide.
Library partners (e.g. BL BNF) 
manage the Virtual International 
Authority File [VIAF] which is the 
network which underpins ISNI.
International 
Standard Links 
Identifier: ISLI
ISLI is used for identifying links between 
entities in the field of information and 
documentation. A linked entity can be 
physical, e.g. a print book or an electronic 
resource (text, audio, and video); or 
something abstract, e.g. a physical position 
within a frame of reference or the time of day.
The ISLI system is 
administered by the ISLI 
Registration Authority(ISLI 
RA). And the International 
Information Content Industry 
Association (ICIA), a not-for-
profit organisation, acts as the 
ISLI Registration Authority. 
MusicBrainz 
Identifier: MBID
MBID is a 36 character Universally Unique 
Identifier that is permanently assigned to 
each entity in the Musicbrainz database, [i.e. 
artists, release groups, releases, recordings, 
works, labels, areas, places and URLs.]  
This database is available under Creative 
Commons licenses CC0 and CC3, which 
places the core data effectively in the public 
domain while supplementary data can be 
accessed and shared on a not-for-profit 
attribution basis.
Robert Kaye founded the 
MetaBrainz Foundation, 
as a non-profit corporation 
dedicated to keeping 
MusicBrainz free and open 
source. This was in response to 
the commercial takeover of an 
open source database (CDDB) 
by Gracenote in 2000. 
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4.1.7 Legislative developments 
The twin signature developments in the music industry of 2018 according to Musically200 
were the progress made in securing the adoption of the EU’s Article 13 and the passing 
of the Music modernization Act (MMA). Even more striking for this research was the level 
of unity shown across the various industry sectors to meet a common problem even while 
their internal divisions over issues like transparency, streaming royalty rates and splits 
continued. The mood within the music industry changed palpably in this year and Music 
2025’s focus on improving data integrity and cross-industry collaboration offers we believe 
an opportunity for a third such win. 
Article 17 (Formerly Article 13) EU Directive 
By November 2018 the more than a decade-long war of words between YouTube and the 
music industry reached a fresh crescendo with claims of how much YouTube contributed 
to the industry between October 2017 and September 2018 ($1.8 billion)201 202 ridiculed 
especially by the IFPI who argued the true figure was less than half of that amount.203 204 
This battle centred on the disconnect or ‘value gap’ between the amount YouTube receives 
from advertising sold around music videos and what the platform pays to the music rights 
holders. The value gap according to IFPI is most evident in the difference between the 
value from the 1.3 billion video streaming users (approximately $850 billion) versus the 
$5.6 billion received for the 272 million users of audio subscription services (paid and ad-
supported) which IFPI argue is because they ‘misapply’ the safe harbour rules.
The relationship between the music industry and the entire tech industry over the past 
two decades has been dominated by the ‘safe harbour’ provisions introduced in the 1998 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)17 USC 512(c) which, as its principal architect 
former head of the US patent Office Bruce Lehman admitted in 2007, have not ‘worked out 
too well’ due to its impact on music and entertainment businesses. Leon Trapman states 
that under safe harbour provisions ‘online intermediaries can, under certain circumstances, 
not be held liable for any User Generated content (UGC) that infringes copyright and is 
posted on the platform’.205 
200 MusicAlly (2018) The Report: Article of Faith issue 418 11th October 2018
201 Google (2018) How Google Fights Piracy https://cdn.mbw.44bytes.net/files/2018/11/GO806_Google_
FightsPiracy_eReader_final-1.pdf
202 Ingham T (2018) YouTube: We’ve paid the music business $1.8bn in ad money over the past 12 months 
Music Business Worldwide November 7th 2018 https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/youtube-weve-
paid-the-music-industry-1-8bn-over-the-past-12-months/ Page 1 of 4 
203 Dredge S. (2018) “IFPI and YouTube at loggerheads over $1.8bn-payments figure” MusicAlly November 19th 
2018 https://musically.com/2018/11/19/ifpi-and-youtube-at-loggerheads-over-1-8bn-payments-figure/
204 “Label Group IFPI Says It Can’t Account for Half of YouTube’s Claimed $1.8 Billion In Royalty Payments”. Digital 
Music news November 16th 2018 https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/11/16/ifpi-google-youtube/ 
205 Trapman , L. (2016) American and European safe harbours . Kluwer Copyright Blog December 14th 2016 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2016/12/14/american-european-safe-harbours/ 
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These same DMCA norms were introduced to the EU in the 2000 European Copyright 
Directive (more usually referred to as the E-Commerce Directive).206 In describing the 
similarity of the DMCA and the E-commerce Directive texts Trapman also identifies a 
crucial difference between how safe harbour operates in the USA and EU principally in 
relation to the burden of proof of infringement. In the USA this shifts to the applicant 
rather than the service provider whereas in the EU it is the opposite, meaning the service 
provider must prove it has ‘no actual knowledge or awareness’ of the infringement.207 This 
difference along with the proposed changes in the new Directive illustrate how the EU 
places “emphasis on protection of the rights holders’ 208 whereas the USA seems to favour 
the service providers.
The conflict between the two sides over the past decade has seen music industry claims 
of damage met by counter claims from Google and more recently certain tech linked 
‘proxy’ organisations as well as certain legal academics209. The combative tone became 
even more obvious during the lead up to the EU Parliament’s attempts, following the EC’s 
2016 proposal to introduce a European copyright framework suitable for; “Creating a 
Digital single market: EU copyright rules fit for the digital age”.210 
The prime objective of the proposed Article 13 of the proposed new rules was to focus on:
“fair rules of the game for a better functioning copyright marketplace, which stimulates 
creation of high-quality content” 211 and “to allow content creators and other rights 
holders to negotiate with online services and content distributors how their work is used 
and shared online…(to) give creators, authors and rights holders the possibility to better 
control the use of their work and be fairly remunerated”.212
The EC proposal met fierce resistance from the tech-sponsored lobby which saw 
an unprecedented online, email and social media campaign aimed at the European 
parliamentarians in July 2018 that drew criticism from the MEP’s as well as the music 
industry. The sheer scale of the campaign was soon shown to be unrepresentative of the 
digital public as very small crowds attended public protests leading up to the pivotal vote 
in mid-September 2018. The result of that vote was seen as vindication by many in the 
music industry of their long-held view of certain technology platforms unwillingness to 
accept meaningful responsibility for the content on their networks.
206 Directive 2000/31/EC 
207 Trapman , L. (2016) American and European safe harbours . Kluwer Copyright Blog December 14th 2016 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2016/12/14/american-european-safe-harbours/
208 ibid
209 Vote for a balanced European copyright law/ Statement by EPIP academics | CREATe https://www.create.
ac.uk/blog/2018/09/10/vote-for-a-balanced-european-copyright-law-statement-by-epip-academics/
210 European Commission (2017)Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/modernisation-eu-copyright-rules
211 European Commission (2017) What does the Commission propose in the new Copyright Directive-
Frequently asked questions. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/faq/frequently-asked-questions-
copyright-reform
212 European Commission (2017) How would the new rules tackle the value gap between creators and online 
platforms - Frequently asked questions. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/faq/frequently-asked-
questions-copyright-reform
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Since the 12th September 2018 vote (438 votes in favour, 226 against, and 39 
abstentions)213 YouTube has launched an enormous PR and media online campaign 
targeting creators and content makers (with claims of dramatic falls in income from 
streaming) across the music industry to publicise what Lyor Cohen and Suzanne Wojcicki 
describe as the ‘unintended consequences’ of Article 13. The clear threat articulated by 
Cohen was that YouTube might have to cease operating in the EU as a direct consequence 
of Article 13 as the apparent punitive consequences of abiding by the new provisions are 
unacceptable to the company. The reaction to these claims has not been met with the kind 
of reaction YouTube may have expected as many of the creators whose livelihoods have 
been directly impacted by the existing safe harbour rules have shown strong support for 
reform of the safe harbour provisions. 214
The YouTube campaign was described as ‘carpet bombing’ by the BPI and has further 
increased the tensions between the two camps leading up to the next stage in the 
European legislative process. Closed-door trialogue negotiations between the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament began in October 2018 
and a final vote (and formal adoption) took place in the early months of 2019 and even 
though the new Directive was approved it, including the now renumbered Article 17, will 
not be implemented until Spring 2021.215
213 European Parliament, Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 2018 on the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market, P8_TA-PROV(2018)0337, 12 September 2018 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2018-0337+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
214 BASCA Chair Crispin Hunt quipped “Rules won’t break the Internet they’ll mend it” at the May 2017 Ivor 
Novello Awards
215 Updates to CREATeʼs EU Copyright Reform Timeline | CREATe November 20th 2018
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2018 Music Modernization Act (USA) 
Challenges to the digital music licensing system in the USA followed those in the EU 
with significant disruption in the US market in the period from 2012-2018. It seems no 
coincidence the attempts to remodel the US system took place after profound changes in 
the EU licensing framework had been achieved to the satisfaction of the key publishers. 
This period saw efforts to replicate the new way collective licensing of digital rights 
operated in the EU market to allow for a similar set of SPVs to be created to allow the 
largest publishers, the oligopoly players, similar control over the licensing of their owned 
repertoire for the oligopsony of music services such as Spotify and Pandora. 
In the USA attempts by the major publishers to control the rates set for the digital use 
of their works led to threats by the 4 largest firms to remove entire repertoires from the 
established PROs. (Sony-ATV, BMG, WCM, UMPG). This was accompanied by claims from 
the NMPA that publishers were “losing the battle over copyright’’ and US music publishers 
began to “push for deregulation of songwriter royalties”, blaming “antiquated laws and 
decrees that date back to the First and Second World War at the expense of songwriters” 
(NMPA’s David Israelite) that benefit digital services like Spotify and Pandora. 
The main target for publishers’ complaint were the almost 75 year old consent 
decrees imposed by the DOJ back in 1941 during the BMI/ASCAP wars over rates 
and membership216 The 2015 DOJ review of the consent decrees for Performing Right 
Organisations (PROs) would allow “greater flexibility for rights holders to decide which rights 
to put into ASCAP and BMI” and “put the US on a similar track to where Europe is”. This is 
evidence of clear belief among US publishers that for the US digital market they were “better 
off when there is no government regulation” and that they would be “be better off in markets 
where publishers are more-free to negotiate private with DSPs, like Europe”.217 
The publishers aims to improve their rate setting powers attracted considerable opposition 
from tech sponsored bodies like Public Knowledge who allege the major publishers want 
to “let the collectives continue to gather royalties on their behalf from bars, restaurants, and 
radio stations, while withholding their songs from digital services”.
The US tech industry has relied on the original 1941 antitrust /anti-competition arguments 
for regulation of the PROs, which whilst offering a ‘convenient place for licensors to go 
to’ also brought ‘would be competitors together on prices’. They blame recent market 
consolidation for the situation where any one of the three major publishers can affect the 
market with little or no need for ASCAP or BMI to license their repertoire and any single 
major publisher raising its rates could signal the others to do the same. What is clear from 
this is that current moves to withdraw rights from existing digital licensing structures are 
driven by the belief in the increasing growth and value of music streaming. All of these 
issues in the USA became part of the backdrop to the Music Modernisation Act which 
seems to have finally produced a road map to resolve the frustrations of the rights holders 
and ameliorate certain dysfunctional aspects of the digital supply chain in the US. 
216 Rosen (G) Unfair to Genius (2012) Oxford University Press New York Page 205-06
217 Downtown Music Publishing Justin Kalifowitz.
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The passage of the “Orin G Hatch - Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act” (MMA) 
brought welcome news to the US Music industry, particularly those who had felt neglected 
in the digital era such as songwriters, record producers and engineers and eminent pre-
1972 recordings artists. The Act according to ASCAP includes key provisions to address 
mechanical licensing and PRO court reform to secure better compensation that better 
reflects the value of music. It also addresses payments to recording artists on pre-1972 
recordings as well as producers. 
The MMA was a result of complex negotiations with multiple players - (PROs, publishers, 
digital services and broadcasters) - over the previous two years. This was about a 
licensing system adapting to the digital age and some overdue reform including as to who 
makes decisions about what music users pay music creators. It provides a reform of the 
mechanical licensing system by introducing blanket licensing, removing the worst aspects 
of compulsory licensing by allowing a ‘willing seller- willing buyer’ rate standard to be 
introduced as well as establishing the Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC).
In truth the MMA is a long overdue legislative response to a number of distinctive and 
at times troubling features of the US copyright licensing system, notably in relation to 
digital music distribution where the existing framework for mechanical and performing 
rights musical works has been shown as ill-suited to the demands of the modern era. The 
performing rights area has been subject to a more than 70-year regime of government 
consent decrees and the existing US mechanical rights system has lacked the kind of 
single point licensing structure usually found in most other developed countries. Such 
a single national licensing entity structure offers licensing certainty and can resolve the 
apparent chaos in the digital licensing ecosystem, benefiting both the majority of rights 
holders as well as significant music copyright users. 
This chaos in mechanical licensing has been most evident since Spotify launched in 2011. 
Spotify’s launches across various markets in Europe were enabled by securing effective 
blanket licensing deals through the EU CMO network even with its current fragmented SPV 
dominated structure. It is worth noting also that Spotify’s original home market Sweden 
operates the Nordic model of extended collective licensing that secures absolute licensing 
certainty for the music user.
By contrast the apparent lack of legal certainty in the USA is largely a consequence of a 
20th Century US antitrust regime that has historically undermined s single point collective 
licensing structure, as being monopolistic and anti-competitive. This led to a plethora 
of licensing agencies and options including the market leader Harry Fox Agency (HFA). 
Crucially none of were able to provide an effective ‘universal’ blanket license to any single 
DSP in the way the Swedish CMO STIM and NCB were able to in 2008 at the time Spotify 
first launched. 
Apple Music has the benefit of almost a decade more experience in handling mechanical 
licensing for its downloads offering through iTunes store which suggests that the licensing 
issues face by Spotify could have been resolved in time ; time however was not on 
their side as they soon faced enormous lawsuits for copyright infringement (from David 
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Lowery’s 2015 class action for $43 million to Wixen’s 2017 action for $1.6 billion)218 The 
seeds for the Music Modernisation Act were in fact sown by Maria Pallante, the head of 
the US Copyright Office in 2013 who called for reform of the US Copyright system.219
Evidence of the increased problems in US digital music licensing is available at the website run 
by The Harry Fox Agency (“HFA’). Formerly owned by the NMPA HFA is now part of SESAC Inc 
and is arguably the best-known US mechanical licensing agent. The website 220 highlights the 
complexity involved in managing mechanical rights with rates and schemes covering physical 
goods (CDs, LPs cassettes) downloads (known as Permanent digital downloads).
4.2 Architecture of music data 
4.2.1 Current Blockchain initiatives
What follows is an outline of some initiatives to integrate Blockchain/DLT into the  
music industry:
One Click Licensing
OCL is a micro-licensing framework Totem for User-Generated content (UGC) and more.221 
It is a model of partnerships between rights owners, rights users, app developers, and 
platforms. OCL attempts to provide rights owners with remuneration for every use of 
their media, a sense of control over their creative works, while simultaneously allowing 
citizens to create works of UGC. Their aim is to stop takedowns, improper use, copyright 
infringement and orphan works. It is based on Blockchain technology. 
The Totem framework helps to facilitate almost any type of agreement between disparate 
parties in practically any kind of peer-to-peer transaction, backed by Authority and Trust, 
much like Visa does for facilitating and settling financial transactions. Totem does this 
through a series of APIs inside of applications on devices, so that devices can make 
decisions generally relegated to servers and databases. There is no evidence that it has 
gained any footing in the industry. 
218 Levine, R., 2018. David Lowery on Spotify Lawsuits and the Battle For Creators’ Rights . Billboard , 26th 
January 2018 https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8095336/davidlowery...medium=email&utm_
campaign=Digital%20Update&utm_term=biz_digital
219 IPkat / 1709 Blog, 2013. Head of US Copyright Office wants reform. IPkat / 1709 Blog. http://the1709blog.
blogspot.com/2013/03/head-of-us-copyright-office-wants-reform.html
220 https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html
221 https://what.ocl.is/index.html#compatible-copyright 
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Mycelia
Founded by Imogen Heap, Mycelia222 is a collective of creatives, professionals and lovers of 
music. Their mission is to empower a fair, sustainable and vibrant music industry ecosystem 
involving all online music interaction services and to unlock the huge potential for creators 
and their music related metadata so an entirely new commercial marketplace may flourish. 
They also aim to ensure all involved are paid and acknowledged fully and to see commercial, 
ethical and technical standards are set to exponentially increase innovation for the music 
services of the future. Mycelia uses Ethereum, an open-source, public, blockchain-based 
distributed computing platform featuring smart contract functionality. Like many other 
initiatives in this space, blockchain is proposed due to the underlying hype but there are 
many technical issues in rolling out large scale blockchain platforms.
JAAK
JAAKs goal is build a global blockchain network for intellectual property rights registration, 
management and monetisation, starting with the music industry. This industry-wide 
Music Sandbox,” allows the company to develop products and the KORD network in 
collaboration with the music industry. Participants provide product and rights data to 
JAAK, which are held in a private version of the KORD network. KORD operates as a 
permissionless, decentralised network of intellectual property information, allowing rights 
holders to collaborate on an industry-wide view of rights. 
Users are connected to a shared data network where they have the sole authority to insert, 
update and remove their own information, creating a public record of rights and an audit 
trail. It includes a framework to detect conflicting information in the network, allowing users 
to resolve conflicts and converge on a global view of intellectual property rights. KORD 
is an open data network which runs on the Ethereum blockchain, enabling rights holders 
to record and assign intellectual property rights. The network will represent a global view 
of intellectual property rights. As a decentralised network, KORD includes a framework 
for defining programmatic rules which are used to detect conflicting information in the 
network, allowing users to resolve conflicts and converge on a global, accurate view of 
intellectual property rights. 
The JAAK pilot involved participants contributing music rights information, metadata and 
audio assets into a private and secure sandbox of the KORD network for testing purposes. 
Participant data was loaded into a graph database, so queries could be performed to link 
rights information from multiple sources, with each participant having a namespace in the 
database containing only their data allowing for complete provenance and authority when 
viewing data from multiple sources.223 
222 http://myceliaformusic.org/ 
223 https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/blockchain-firm-jaak-makes-key-hires-ahead-of-first-product-
launch-in-2019/ 
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Musicoin
Musicoin224 is a music streaming platform built on the blockchain that supports the 
creation, distribution and consumption of music in a shared economy. They aim to allow 
listeners to stream songs from independent musicians on their platform absolutely 
free and without ads, while musicians are compensated more fairly than major music 
streaming platforms in the industry. Musicoin attempts to use the blockchain to power a 
decentralised, peer-to-peer, platform. Similar to Bitcoin or Ethereum, their implementation 
of the blockchain allows them to host music available to everyone and transactions that 
are transparent and secure. Their business model to keep the platform free for listeners, 
and at the same time pays is by leveraging the blockchain to remove intermediaries. They 
are implementing a model called Universal Basic Income (UBI) that supports both listeners 
and musicians. UBI is an economic model to ensure each contributor to the platform is 
fairly rewarded in proportion to their contribution. 
In Musicoin’s context, a UBI pool is created to secure musicians’ income from PPP on 
the platform, at a fixed rate that is fair, uninfluenced by market forces and higher than 
that of any other competing streaming platforms. This will boost the influx of content from 
musicians as well as make streaming music free for listeners, thereby ensuring deeper 
penetration of Musicoin into the streaming market. Unlike other streaming platforms, users 
on the Musicoin platform will be able to stream songs for free and without ads. They have 
designed a global currency (MUSIC) to support the global trade surrounding music and 
music-related businesses. The currency is not issued by a single entity, but by a network of 
computers through a process known as mining. This system has been tested and proved 
by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dash and others (Kroll et al., 2013). They 
also have smart contracts so each stream operates on a Per-per-play (PPP) basis. Every 
time a song is streamed, MUSIC is automatically transferred to the musician or all parties 
of a group.
SingularDTV
SingularDTV225 is a blockchain entertainment studio aiming to lay the foundation for a 
decentralised entertainment industry. By building the future of rights management, project 
funding, and peer-to-peer distribution, SingularDTV’s platform aims to empower artists and 
creators with powerful tools to manage projects from development to distribution. It seems 
to be a content portal through which users can crowdfund, own, upload, share, trade, sell, 
and monetise their work online. SingularDTV intends to grow a whole media ecosystem 
that spans crowdfunding, rights management, and peer-to-peer distribution and sales 
for music, film, theatre, even VR. It’s something like YouTube, Kickstarter, and Napster 
rolled into one portal, all built on the Ethereum network. Users can crowdfund a project 
with the Launch Pad widget, create their own tokens via Tokit, and share and sell their 
content peer-to-peer through the Ethervision portal. The goal of SingularDTV is a totally 
decentralised entertainment industry in which content creators retain control and access 
to profits. There are plans to roll out functions for renting studio equipment and to creating 
workers’ unions, but those are not expected until 2019.
224 https://musicoin.org/ 
225 https://singulardtv.com 
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Consensys
Consensys226 is a Brooklyn-based Ethereum development incubator with a high-profile 
conveyor belt of blockchain projects that often interconnect. On Ujo—the centre-piece app 
of Consensys’ interlocking music platforms—artists can distribute music directly to fans. 
But even before releasing music, bands or groups can use Weifund, a crowdfunding app 
upon which users issue value tokens redeemable with band-specific goods and services. 
The Boardroom app can be used to allocate contracts and set up royalty percentages 
amongst members, and Balanc3 specialises in doing taxes for musicians. All of these apps 
are supposed to work seamlessly together to empower musicians to be their own music 
industry. The Grammy-winning producer RAC just released his album EGO on Ujo, the first 
album ever released on the blockchain (although Imogen Heap beat him to first single). 
The ConsenSys ‘hub’ coordinates, incubates, accelerates and spawns “spoke” ventures 
through development, resource sharing, acquisitions, investments and the formation of 
joint ventures. These spokes benefit from foundational components built by ConsenSys 
that enable new services and business models to be built on the blockchain. 
dotBlockchain
The mission of dotBlockchain is to eradicate losses from wayward rightsholder information 
through evolving the file type with which music is transferred. MP3s, WAVs, and AAC 
audio files—the dominant modes of this era—provide ample data compression, but are 
woefully inadequate in terms of metadata. dotBlockchain’s .BC format, however, comes 
loaded with information about rights, licensing details, and terms of use—permanently 
built into the file’s metadata. They aim to eradicate the nitty gritty details of publishing 
rights and licensing are immutably tied to the file itself so that even as tracks are chopped 
up, sampled, and recycled the correct attributions are kept. In 2018, they announced a 
partnership with Cardstack Syndicate Inc., creator of the Cardstack framework. Cardstack 
plan to enhance dotBC’s technology and business plans by formally aligning their efforts 
more closely. Leveraging Cardstack’s technology allows dobBlockchain to integrate a 
technology and services stack that combines the cloud and blockchain layers for clients. 
The strategic partnership follows several successful dotBC collaborations with prominent 
music industry players, including the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers 
of Canada (SOCAN), contextual advertising network MediaNet, digital distribution 
technology company FUGA, and online music store CDBaby. DotBC is also a formal 
partner of technology giant Intel, whose blockchain framework serves as the platform for 
recording dotBC’s recording rights registry. 
226 https://consensys.net 
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Custos
Custos227 is a South African copyright protection outfit which implements a “tracking 
technology” that creates a bitcoin watermark on copyrighted media. If that material is 
found pirated, Custos analyses the file and follows the trail of pirated or unlicensed content 
back to the source to impose a swift retribution. Custos also intends to incentivise the 
users of the peer-to-peer networks they are tracking with a monetary reward for identifying 
the source of pirated material. So, if the content is leaked by the intended recipient, 
typically a reviewer offered a pre-released version of a movie, there is a small bitcoin 
reward that can be collected by the first person to find it. When a media downloader, or 
bounty hunter, claims the bitcoin in a Custos watermark the transaction can be seen on the 
blockchain in around 10 minutes, and Custos will then be able to notify the media provider. 
They claim that as a result, the original source of the content could then be subject to legal 
penalties or lose their access to any future content. In this manner, authorised media users 
should be strongly discouraged from actively sharing files or carelessly leaking them, while 
at the same time, they need not be inconvenienced by cumbersome security measures Just 
how Custos intends to turn file-sharing techno-libertarians into copyright informants is yet 
to be explained. The Custos project is a worthy reminder that the eternally verifiable chain 
of data transmission that makes up the blockchain can be used to inhibit the very same 
liberties that it theoretically affords. The Custos solution received a top-five prize from the 
competition SeedStars World in 2017 as well as funding from rom Innovus, the Technology 
Transfer Office of Stellenbosch University, where the product was conceptualised. The 
company recently completed a second-round seed investment of just under US $265,000, 
part of which came from the New York based Digital Currency Group (DCG).
The Interplanetary File System (IPFS)[1] is an interesting project that could provide much 
of the infrastructure needed for musical content tracking and attribution as it provides a 
permanent, decentralised Web where links do not die and no single entity controls the 
data. Musicians can add any data to it and in return receives a unique identifying hash. 
IPFS is a content-addressed system, in contrast to the Web, which is an IP-addressed 
system. It has potential but still in early stages. 
Blokur
Blokur (http://www.blokur.com) is a start-up building a blockchain-based platform for the 
management and monetisation of creative rights, with a mission to complete the potential 
of the internet for the creator. The UK based start-up recently raised a $1.2 million seed 
round of funding from Digital Currency Group, Ascension Ventures, media entrepreneur 
Remy Minute and InnovateUK. Blokur’s stated goal is to reduce costs and increase 
revenue for music publishers and others through automation and better data, enabled 
by blockchain technology and machine learning. Blokur reconciles different sources of 
rights data to a single blockchain state. They provide an interface for music publishers 
and CMOs to explore their catalogue in the cloud and compare their data with the global 
consensus view. Industry standards such as CWR, DDEX and the OMI API are supported.
227 https://custostech.com/ 
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4.2.2 Use case: Blockchain and the music industry
This use case examines the role that blockchain may play within the music industry to 
track-and-trace an artist’s claim to royalty payments on the blockchain – ostensibly to 
allow for greater transparency in royalty payments and thereby faster resolution of claims 
for end-users, reduced fraud for CMOs, and an overall reduction in the cost of delivering 
these services. It is envisaged that a public permissioned ledger could be used in certain 
use case scenarios. What makes the deployment of a permissioned blockchain most 
applicable in the music industry is that we have a finite number of trusted parties who must 
be included in the blockchain for it to work e.g. for artist payments to actually be verified 
and carried out.
The goal is to remove intermediaries between the artists and royalty collection agencies in 
the form of handling agencies that usually manage the royalty payments and in particular 
to provide a solution to the inconsistencies with data flow/registration and working practice 
from the point of creation through the system of release and distribution. The assets in this 
case are digitally native – that is, they are created from the beginning in a digital format and 
relate to the tracks performed/recorded or delivered in some form that need to be paid for. 
If the performance rights organisations decide to provide the blockchain, they will have full 
control over the asset and are the ones responsible for managing and maintaining the state 
of that asset digitally, as well as the historical record. 
Organisations operating in this area include artists, groups, record labels, performing rights 
societies, often on the basis of earlier paper-based systems. Confusion can exist between 
the artists at the time of creation as to who has done what, who should get what in terms 
of their contribution, and in what form (e.g.one-off or ongoing). In addition, the ability to 
make payments related to creation and use of original artefacts is restricted by existing 
payments channels and practices, unrelated to the work itself. It is unclear as to how a 
blockchain can solve this particular without agreement on the content IDs. 
It is not necessary for millisecond transaction speeds for managing this asset, but instead 
the time frame of minutes, so a blockchain may offer a good result. Since the solution is 
only supposed to support information related to the transactions associated with providing 
music, it is not foreseen that any private data will be directly stored on the blockchain, 
but only transactions. The solution is about managing payments and is, therefore, a good 
match for blockchain. Shared write access is required so that all parties are able to have 
a transparent record of what has occurred and when. This provides irrefutable proof that 
an artist is associated with a work and payment needs to happen. The writers are also 
known to one another in this use case. The distributed network needs to be able to control 
functionality; e.g., for upgrades of the network. The transactions need to be public. As a 
result of this analysis, the most suitable would be to select a permissioned public shared 
ledger. Recall that permissioned, public, shared systems are a form of hybrid system that 
provide for situations where whitelisted access is required but all the transactions should 
be publicly viewable. It applies here where only key players within the music rights industry 
can write to the network, but all transactions can be publicly verified. A viable blockchain 
is Hyperledger Fabric which also have LevelDB which is a key value database allowing 
storage of data in the blockchain. Of all the existing blockchain implementations, the most 
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practical route would be through a permissioned public shared ledger. A permissioned, 
public, shared blockchain is a form of hybrid system that provide for situations where 
whitelisted access is required but all the transactions are publicly viewable. It applies here 
where only key players within the music rights industry can write to the network but all 
transactions can be publicly verified. 
Blockchain looks like a partial solution to ease the strictures of the royalty framework, 
however in practice what would be needed is the bringing together of representatives of 
all the activities in the music value chain, from individual creators up to multinationals, 
covering all stages of music making (composition, performance, production, metadata 
capture, registration, archiving, contracts, distribution, merchandising, accounting and 
collection of royalties, and legal issues). Basically, the entire existing global music business 
model would need to be re-envisaged. 
Another problem here of course that blockchain transactions are immutable. That is, they 
cannot be changed therefore we will encounter problems in the case of misidentified 
artists, contractual changes, dispute resolution outcomes therefore the blockchain 
with its irreversible chain of information commits can lead to problems not inherent in a 
traditional data storage technology. It remains unclear as to whether blockchain can work 
for music publishing due in main to the complexities of modern song writing (especially 
for hit records and catalogues). Certain blockchain platforms are claiming to be able to 
completely eliminate the music publishing intermediaries (including CMOs) but there is a 
myriad of outlier cases such as what happens, if the song within the blockchain infringes 
another song (e.g. “Blurred Lines”), or regarding samples from another person’s song 
or a song is simply a cover. Short of abolishing the entire current complex legislative 
infrastructure around songwriting and music publishing, blockchain simply may not work.
It seems to only be viable for fixed non-dynamic contracts that cannot change. It has some 
potential for record labels on their artist contracts and has other potential uses in touring. 
However here again there would be difficult issues such as managing secondary ticketing. 
Some CMOs (SACEM and PRS) have been trailing the use of blockchain. This will not 
eliminate their trusted intermediary role but hopefully might improve their systems. There 
is also the immutability of the blockchain which can be an issue when we later discover 
that a recording needs amending due to incorrect attributions. Related to the Distributed 
Ledger Technology are the use of smart contracts for enforcing licences. 
A smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce 
the negotiation or performance of a contract. Smart contracts allow the performance 
of credible transactions without third parties. These transactions are trackable and 
irreversible. Proponents of smart contracts claim that many kinds of contractual clauses 
may be made partially or fully self-executing, self-enforcing, or both. The aim of smart 
contracts is to provide security that is superior to traditional contract law and to reduce 
other transaction costs associated with contracting. 
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For instance, if we were to examine if a creative commons approach is viable with smart 
contracts (e.g. Creative Commons licence such as the Attribution-Non-commercial-
ShareAlike 4.0 International version). At the moment one can write such a licence, but 
there is no automatic enforcement. Indeed, in the current world where licences are only 
loosely connected to the digital objects, it is possible to use a copy of a work even if 
the attached licence specifies no copying. It is possible to envisage a world in which a 
smart licence could only permit copying with attribution possibly only permit copying into 
locations declared as non-commercial and eventually do some kind of tracking, though 
whether that could ever enforce “share alike” is an open question.
The identification and protection of individual and joint creativity is an enduring issue, 
currently addressed by a range of organisational forms and legal approaches. Even with 
paper contracts which are divorced from the creative medium, claiming royalties can 
take decades. However, the cases that make the media are far less than the tip of the 
iceberg, and, worse, we never see the cases that are never pursued because of the lack 
of documentation and/or lack of knowledge, nor the collaborations that never take place 
because the potential participants are too worried by the recognition/creative rights jungle 
to collaborate. 
The current systems (e.g. Performing Rights organisations, and record labels) for recording 
IPR in contributions to collectively created works are cumbersome and can lead to IPR 
going unrecorded (thus impoverishing the creators or leading to expensive litigation) and 
to collaborations not being started because of the difficulty of recording the IPR. Existing 
ways of establishing and enforcing rights have in the past been open to abuse, and the 
rise of the digital economy has created many new opportunities for them to be subverted, 
for which there is ample evidence, such as illegal file sharing and streaming services Digital 
music services do not collate or publish all the metadata related to a creative performance, 
making acknowledgement and reward more difficult. 
Current approaches have a further consequence of making it difficult to work easily in 
creative cross media environments where trust in collaborators and different working 
practices may not be easy to achieve. In addition, attribution is difficult to achieve in short 
term multidisciplinary collaborations involving co-production of product and co-creation of 
value, where existing systems are too cumbersome to facilitate sharing, where the project 
is not the product. Potential solutions are being explored, most typically within the music 
industry, where the history of changes in the way that music is accessed is most visible. 
These range from a variety of legalistic approaches, (e.g. DRM, DCMA, EULA) to, at the 
other extreme a software patent filed by Apple to prevent iPhones from recording live 
entertainment. These solutions are limited in application, and in many respects preserve 
what is left of the status quo of copyright and often are relying on existing lengthy and 
expensive legal practices for compensation rather than prevention. This is occurring at a 
time when due to digitisation, a more artist centric world is emerging and there are now 
many more routes to market for artists. 
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4.2.3 Artificial intelligence, deep learning, big data 
An entire start-up ecosystem is emerging around services that give artists automated 
songwriting recommendations or enable the average internet user to generate customised 
instrumental tracks at the click of a button. In 2016, Sony’s Computer Science 
Laboratories (CSL) built an AI called Flow Machines228 that collaborated with songwriter 
Benoît Carré to write a song in the style of The Beatles, titled “Daddy’s Car”. 
Spotify’s Creator Technology Research Lab promoted a new, AI-composed music project 
on the streaming platform called SKYGGE. One of SKYGGE’s hit singles “Hello Shadow,” 
featuring Kiesza appeared on Spotify’s flagship New Music Friday playlist in December 
2017, as well as on localised NMF playlists in the U.K., Norway and Scandinavia. 
Through its in-house Magenta project,229 Google is also developing deep-learning algorithms 
for generating songs, drawings and other artworks. One of its most popular music projects, 
Performance RNN, uses neural networks to give expressive, human-like timing and 
dynamics to otherwise stagnant, machine-generated MIDI files. All of Magenta’s tools are 
open-source, and real artists are already using these tools to write their own songs.230 
Creative AI still faces financial and legal resistance from many, however, Warner Music Group’s 
recent acquisition of Sodatone, a231 startup using algorithms to streamline and improve the 
A&R process, is a prime example of a paradigm which could transform artist development. 
Start-up companies such as Splice232 and Amadeus Code233 are building similarly AI-
facilitated assistants for songwriters and producers. Three of the 21 start-ups in the 
Techstars Music accelerator roster to date Amper,234 Popgun[8] and SecondBrain235 have 
built their core product around AI-generated music. Both Amper and Popgun have closed 
additional funding rounds from the likes of Khosla Ventures, Two Sigma Ventures, Horizons 
Ventures and Foundry Group since graduating from Techstars. 
Tensions around creative automation were evident in July 2017, when media outlets 
and industry execs accused Spotify of placing “fake artists” in its mood playlists. It was 
revealed that Swedish production and background-music company Epidemic Sound had 
developed a robust distribution network for mood music on YouTube and successfully 
translated that network into majority market share on a handful of Spotify playlists like 
Peaceful Piano, and Deep Focus and Ambient Chill. The coming wave of creative AI will 
serve as yet another litmus test for how much the music industry can tolerate and compete 
with a functional, utilitarian music streaming ecosystem.
228 http://www.flow-machines.com/
229 https://magenta.tensorflow.org/ 
230 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aq3370Prbi4 
231 http://sodatone.com/ 
232 https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/16/splice-sounds/ 
233 https://amadeuscode.com/coming-soon 
234 http://ampermusic.com/
235 http://secondbrain.ai/
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Importantly, U.S. law does not allow AI to own a copyright. Section 102 of the U.S. Code 
states that “in no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.” Musical algorithms fit these criteria almost perfectly: at their heart, they are 
merely procedures and processes for outputting musical content. The legal complexity lies 
in figuring out whether human artists using AI tools are truly the “authors” of the end works 
created, or whether they are simply the programmers behind the AI tools. Until lawmakers 
iron out these kinks which, if history is any lesson, will take several years if not decades, 
the industry will see deals orchestrated across the spectrum on a case-by-case basis. For 
instance, YouTube personality and singer Taryn Southern formally credited Amper Music 
as a co-writer in all the tracks for her latest album, I AM AI. On the other end, while many 
artists have use Google Magenta tools to write their own music, most of them have neither 
the desire nor the infrastructure to pay royalties back to Google.
AEG Presents236 is a large provider of live music in the USA producing or supporting over 
40 music festivals and managing and booking more than 80 clubs and theatres. They are 
using big data when working with bookers, artists and managers to learn what people are 
listening to, what they are buying, and which shows they are attending. That information 
helps their team create even more streamlined and personalised event experiences 
for today’s tech savvy music fan. One example of this improvement can be seen in the 
modern proliferation of festival experiences based on music types, customer segments, 
or even geography. Using big data showcases the future of the industry which lies in the 
connection between fans and artists. Streaming music and other technologies help give 
power back to the fans, reversing a decades-long trend of top down music. This symbiotic 
relationship between technology empowering fans and the industry mining data to meet 
fan expectations has helped democratise music access.
Spotify,237 a leader of big data in the music industry, owns over 28 petabytes of data. One 
petabyte is enough to store the DNA of the entire population of the US—and then clone 
them, twice. Spotify are using big data to learn more about who their customers are and 
how people engage with, purchase, and consume music. By mining data like listener 
behaviour, social media mentions, ticket sales, and music sales, Spotify is able to push 
content and curate listening experiences. 
The listening habits of 120 million active Shazam238 users can be viewed in real time, by 
geographic location. The music industry now can learn how many people, when they 
heard a particular song, wanted to know the name of the singer and artist. It gives real-
time data that can shape decisions about how - and to whom - songs are marketed, using 
the preferences of the listeners. Again, Shazam can be seen to be shifting the power 
of deciding hits from the industry to the wisdom of a crowd. The idea of converting a 
recording sound into data has also led to a different way of interpreting this information. 
If we know the “sound” of past hits - the interaction between melody, rhythm, harmony, 
timbre and lyrics some are attempting to see if it possible to predict what the next big 
hit will be. Companies like Music Intelligence Solutions, Inc,239 with its software Uplaya, 
236 https://www.aegpresents.co.uk/ 
237 https://www.spotify.com/uk/ 
238 https://www.shazam.com/charts 
239 https://www.linkedin.com/company/music-intelligence-solutions/ 
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compare a new recording to older recordings in an attempt to predict success. The 
University of Antwerp in Belgium conducted a study on dance songs to create a model 
that had a 70 percent likelihood of predicting a hit.240
Streaming music services are increasingly focused upon how social media is intertwined 
with the listening experience. The Social 50 chart is derived from information gathered 
by the company Next Big Sound,241 which is now owned by Pandora. In 2015, Spotify 
acquired the music analytics firm The Echo Nest,242 while Apple Music acquired Semetric. 
Semetric243 is known for its service Musicmetric, which record labels, artist managers and 
others turn to for data about how music is consumed online. This information has become 
coveted as more listeners turn from CDs and downloads to streaming outlets like Spotify 
and YouTube. Musicmetric, along with rivals like Next Big Sound tracks streaming services 
and social media chatter and sells that information to clients like record companies and 
talent agents. Content distributors now know how people listen to music and which 
sounds they seem to prefer.
Appendix 4.3.1 Key quotes from interviews
The following pages contain themed quotes from semi-structured interviews with key 
music industry stakeholders which have been carefully anonymised. Full transcriptions of 
the interviews from which these quotes are taken are archived confidentially and securely 
with the research team.
The quotes used are presented in alignment with the chapters to which they relate.
3.3 Research findings from interviews 
3.3.1 Critical juncture for change 
3.3.1.1 Unparalleled growth of data 
“There’s a massive amount of blockage...and the network operators and the potential 
that the misunderstanding if you could just get a dollar from you that’s always been the 
path to scale in the music industry... It is unquestionable. You cannot argue that today’s 
music marketplace is anything close to being efficient for anybody.”
240 https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a-machine-successfully-predicted-the-hit-dance-songs-of-2015 
241 https://www.nextbigsound.com/ 
242 http://the.echonest.com/ 
243 https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/semetric#section-overview 
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3.3.1.2 Existential threat 
“It’s like that cartoon where you have the little fish and the big fish behind and they all 
think they’re a big fish. But then there is Google behind all of them. We’ve got to get our 
act together, because we will be eaten up. Because if the problems relate to data. Then 
you’ve got the biggest companies that have ever existed in history of human civilisation 
are data companies. So spot the problem!” 
3.3.1.3 Economic imperatives 
“It’s a massive strategic shift; we wouldn’t sell a million CDs anymore. So we sell a 
hundred million streams instead. We’ve got a bunch of discovery tools and monitoring 
and Soundcloud, Bandcamp. YouTube, Deezer. Radio. And to monitor all of these 
underground bubbling things so we can go in and go. That’s where we believe our size, 
our ability to gather data through music. That requires really good meta-data to get the 
usage, you’ve got to capture it in an engine and slice and dice it and turn it around.” 
3.3.2 Issues with ISRC and ISWC
3.3.2.1 ISRC
“We have many documents published on the website explaining different facets of the 
ISRC system generally and in pretty simple terms...We have a network of 65 national 
ISRC agencies whose job it is to interact with the industry stakeholders across the 
industry in their territories to provide access to ISRC and education about it.” 
“That’s one of the reasons we took ISRC to ISO when we first invented it with Philips 
back in 1988, or so. Establishing a formal set of rules and a detailed picture of the 
granularity at which you can assign it is really important, and we have that. But does 
it mean that everybody will be satisfied? No it doesn’t. Because establishing that 
granularity of identification is something that’s come out of a consensus process and it 
doesn’t solve necessarily everybody’s permutations of different business questions.” 
“We postulate that there is a role for PPL or CMOs like PPL to play in bringing that, what 
I call, collectively authoritative data – I call it collectively authoritative because you could 
argue that the most authoritative stuff comes from the actual owner of the content.” 
1) ISRC misuse
“There is not a magic bullet. So it is lots of incremental steps. So, going back to the 
source and trying to get more information that would be helpful. And it’s something 
that we’re currently working on as to how we might do that. But there were going to be 
limits to that. So the fact that you knew someone was in a recording studio is one thing, 
the fact they might have played something is another thing. But is there actually whether 
that recording is used? What’s the working title of that recording and how do you match 
it up to the final version of the recording that was it? It’s just there are a number of 
complications in this process.”
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“We had a very big number one hit last year where there were three performers that 
did a recording for that recording. The producers never told them that they didn’t use 
them in the actual recording they re-recorded their work because they didn’t think it 
was good enough. So the next thing is we get these three performers going mad with 
us as to why they’re not getting paid on the recording because often you’re not going to 
bother going back to tell them, you’ve already paid them.”  
“The way that ISRC was formed originally was developed through ISO; it was for a 
very different world to where we live right now, its strengths are also its weaknesses, 
because if you were to have a super robust centralised ISRC database where everybody 
had to really rigorously make sure that every single ISRC that was ever issued had some 
sort of liability attached to it by the person that was attempting to take that code out 
of the system and apply it to their business. It would probably cost more to run that 
system than any of the problems that are caused by the current system.”
“There’s a big problem about people not understanding the purpose and context. So if you 
have an identifier you can specify its format but that is absolutely no use unless you have a 
really good set of rules to specify what would cause it to be used on a different level.”
“The ISRC code is a great idea. It started off really well but just the fact that the rules of 
operation weren’t properly policed properly or understood...There’s a big problem about 
people not understanding the purpose and context. So if you have an identifier you can 
specify its format but that is absolutely no use unless you have a really good set of rules 
to specify what would cause it to be used on a different level.”
2) Examples of ISRC Misuse 
“There’s a period of time where people would issue their own ISRC if they were 
licensing a track for a compilation Now, even though that’s not right. So if I license a 
track to [a record label], they put their ISRC code on its compilation album. That’s not 
correct but it doesn’t break the system. It just means there’s more than one ISRC codes 
for a recording.” 
“It depends on how many people’s hands the data flows through both on the way out 
and way back. For a smaller indie label, they’re probably working with the distributor 
or an aggregator of some kind….Who knows how they do it? Maybe they do it on 
spreadsheet, maybe they email it to the distributor or they maybe fill out a form, there’s 
all sorts of ways to do that...So the more people in that chain, the more likely it is that 
something is being corrupted along the way.”
“A smaller company will just say ‘well, I might as well just chuck my thing in the hat and 
see what comes out.’ But whether or not these people are actually that expert is a moot 
point… I’m a small independent label, I have to give my distributor 50 fields over here 
and I have to give PPL 30 fields over here but about 20 of them are common. Why am I 
doing it separately? And how do I know where the overlaps are?” 
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“It’s up to you to self police how you then put a year code onto that and then all the 
subsequent elements of the code to make it work. That makes it very democratic. It’s 
very easy to access. And you know in the olden days maybe when you had to be like a 
dedicated record company. What happened subsequently, particularly with the digital 
explosion is you’ve got players coming in…there was a sort of subversive attempt to try 
and sort of take over a chunk of ISRC codes...There can be efficiencies made in ISRC 
but there are some inaccuracies in codes that are in use.”
3.3.2.2 ISWC 
1) Complex nature of music publishing
“Let’s say..a song is written by five people which is the average of the songs  these 
days with an average of six publishers altogether because sometime they have a sub-
publisher. A lot of the biggest ones are a lot more than that…[a CMO] in general get a 
clean registration about 18 months down the line.”
“It’s crazy… the multiplication of admin- what a waste of money. And secondly how 
could that possibly work out to like 100 percent exactly, because usually what happens 
is there might be another PRO or a publisher that is claiming something that should be 
claimed by the one where the writer is based or whatever. So it usually becomes more 
than 100 per cent.”
“There are obviously issues, for instance, by and large, publishing data I think is worse 
than recording data. Several reasons...It’s a lot older. And it’s miles more complicated. 
And there is a smaller margin. It’s unsurprising that the publishing industry have 
been unable to maintain or unwilling even to maintain as high quality levels of data as 
recording data.”
2) Competing time pressures 
“You cannot get ISWC before a track’s released. It’s not possible. It seems clear at the 
moment that they’re not providing that role in a timely manner...Being able to get the 
publishing metadata or data earlier so that before a piece of music is released so it’s 
identified. If there’s one thing that anyone can do is working on that.” 
“There’s a different sense of urgency there. Their shift to digital was slower than the 
master shift. Clearly the bulk of their revenues were still coming from non-digital sources 
and still are…” 
3) Open standard; closed data 
“ISWC is a closed standard, it’s not accessible. You cannot access a registry, you 
cannot get an ISWC code without a collection society. It very messy, a lot of duplicates, 
more error correction, correction mechanism. Very strict rules to get one; the IPI is 
mandatory so it makes it difficult to operate in ISWC.”
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“Where do we get ISWC from? If we want to put a new release into marketplace we 
can go to publishers and say can we have an ISWC? Most the time, they’ll say no we 
haven’t got it yet. So there’s nothing that we can do.” 
3.3.2.3. Issues with linking ISRC and ISWC
“The problem is that you have numerous ISWCs linked to many, many ISRCs because 
both datasets are a mess.” 
1) ISRC Duplication
“The biggest challenge that they both face is to go – here’s all of my data sets and 
here’s all of yours. When they miss..neither party want their customers to know that 
they’ve missed. And it was missed so badly.” 
“So PPL sort out ISRCs for the labels. And if they are all true, how could they have 
more ISRCs. So they didn’t want that surfaced. But then when they did the crossover, 
they had about three to four million ISRCs that neither of them could identify. They 
were being used as part of the payment mechanism for the musical works rights. So it’s 
coming across... and I think that’s the wrong approach because what I would prefer if 
they came along and said ‘we think we’ve got a bit of a problem here. Because then you 
can fix it.”
2) Delay in ISWC assignment
“With the work identifier ISWC…the rules around that are for very good reasons to 
preserve very high levels of data quality…but it does mean that that identifier isn’t 
available in time to go out on a new recording. So there’s a huge discussion about how 
we can improve that.” 
“In Europe the societies complain that the data they get from the DSP has no writer 
information. So, they’re having to do lots of matching; fuzzy matching stuff, which is a 
pain. And with the volumes that they are dealing with…” 
3) Royalty inconsistencies
“Different DSPs deal with this problem in different ways. Some of them will revert 
to market share after a certain amount of time to be income. Yes that’s exactly the 
unattributed income. Hence why I always say that major publishers have no problem 
with it at all because market share is always going to favour them. But it is an issue for 
the writers because it’s a lack of data. If you don’t have that, then it becomes a very kind 
of random way of paying people and secondly for smaller publishers because when it 
comes to market share that they easily fall behind.” 
“After three years if they don’t have or can’t find the correct rights holder then they will 
be distributed according to the market share.”
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3.3.3 Embedded industry practices
3.3.3.1 Legacy data
“During the late 90s, most of the noughties, the only way to get the business was 
unlicensed, because the collecting societies were so shit at doing deals. You either 
die or you operated unlicensed. The only way to do it was to ask for forgiveness and 
not permission. It’s worked brilliantly. If the tech entrepreneurs hadn’t done that, we 
wouldn’t have and then we wouldn’t have the digital business.” 
“One of our big problems is ...it is in the digital age, because once it got recorded on a 
hard disk with sequence array and Yamaha keyboard or it might be Roland, they all have 
an obsolescence. So when you try and go back to two track masters and nobody has 
the equipment to be able go and plug all the electronics back in, and along with that, is 
lots of the linear information, about who played; which was just kept on the computer or 
that computer just became obsolete, nobody thought it was important.” 
3.3.3.2 Archaic systems and manual processes
“One of the world’s biggest music companies that we work with is their royalty system 
and their rights was created before desktop computers existed. You have to go in 
and write code to access it. So the idea of changing all of that over for people is just 
terrifying and it’s expensive. So it’s not something they really want to do.” 
“Nothing will happen to it unless either, let’s say identifiers were matched which might 
not happen at all. But if it is identified as a match with the old one, it will only be 
updated if it is flagged as having received a certain amount of play of that song, if there 
is a decent amount of money or if the publisher specifically requests that one is updated 
because of the fact that it’s so slow and so manual, just basically that the vast majority 
just are not done basically.” 
“This is difficult, especially on the older recordings; there was no data about who 
performed what, so actually what you find on a lot of those ones was the contributor 
detail would be very vague...The volume thing just can’t be underestimated; there’s just 
so much of this stuff, especially in the old stuff, that is a real area, it’s not like there is 
anywhere you can go to find that data; we work very closely with the Musicians Union 
around all the boxes around the session forms. We are actually working on a project the 
minute to digitise a lot of the older material so that we can access it more easily.” 
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3.3.3.3 NDAs
“Of course the other problem you’ve got with a full audit is that there will be so many 
things that are blacked out because of NDAs, which is where the record company can 
easily say: ‘we’d love to be able to tell you but we’re not allowed to, our hands are tied.’ 
Another problem is that there are NDAs in play between the platforms and the labels and 
the publishers, so that you can never get access to what licence fees are actually being 
paid. So an artist can’t possibly work out if what they’re getting is a reasonable amount.” 
3.3.3.4 Unattributed income
“On the recorded music side, we know it’s possible to point to errors and find glitches 
but we pretty much have that in place and that’s what’s behind the growth curve that 
you you’re seeing on the charts so far. You know just to say record companies don’t 
have blackbox money. They’re able to pay through to their artists.”
“Our understanding is that, when the platforms were licensed originally. There were 
golden handshakes that took place. There were payments made to unlock the catalogue 
that was being licensed. I don’t know of any artist who has seen any money from that.” 
“And equally, let’s say for instance my own situation; the little band I was in, in the 70’s 
earned very little money, but our catalogue has moved from Warner’s across to BMG, 
Warner’s had significant shares in Spotify, they have cashed those shares in; because 
my catalogue has moved across to BMG. I’ve not seen a penny from Warner’s in terms 
of a dividend from the sale of those shares. So, how come?”
“There’s been a shift from the sale of products to a streaming delivery and that’s met 
with a significant displacement in royalties.”
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3.3.4 CMOs’ roles and responsibilities  
3.3.4.1 Roles and responsibilities
“PRS for music offer us a web service it’s quite old quite clunky and quite difficult to 
integrate with because it’s a soap interface which means that you need slightly more 
complex software to read it” 
“While we are onto the politically sensitive stuff here, but if you look at what is the basic 
reason for the inefficiency of the processes is…it is inside PRS and ICE.” 
“When you move in to online streaming of Spotify or Apple Music, that’s done directly 
by record companies outside of what we do. But actually in reality the question still is 
relevant for music data management because we’ve been managing more traditional 
side of the business which has been – PPL’s nearly 85 years old.” 
“Because it licenses public performance broadcaster, it has its own very clear 
commercial remit which is a public performance of broadcast. PPL have done an 
amazing job of enhancing what they do. I mean they’re an incredible organisation, but 
they still have some barriers in terms of where it’s not really their job under the current 
remit to be developing full blown systems for the entire music industry; because they 
are still a collecting society for public performance and broadcast.” 
“When Spotify tells PRS that a recording was played, PRS then compares that to their 
database of musical works and they then make claims if they need to. Back to Spotify…
for the writer/publisher that they represent and what that fact in that list is saying, is that 
at some point these ISRCs have been reported to PRS and they have linked them to this 
musical work. It’s not about the recording, it’s about the data that is reported to PRS.”
3.3.4.2 Data control
“I think the instinctive desire of protecting their repertoire and data will have to go away, 
and to a significant extent has gone away. I think the people now recognise that data 
is not proprietary... collections societies are very zealous about their data. And they are 
still the worst competition.” 
 “It’s just there is an assumption that if I do these things, I will lose control….We don’t 
want to give you this information because if we give it to you we won’t have a job. I 
mean that was underlying that was effectively what was being said….We don’t want you 
to have a data anyway because it is ours and if you give it to you you’ll be able to do our 
job. That’s quite possible. But if you do it properly reinvent the wheel.” 
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3.3.5 Recent industry initiatives
3.3.5.1 GRD
“If you go back to the Global Repertoire Database which I supported, I thought was a 
good initiative, I thought it was risky and I thought it might fail but I thought it was a really 
good try. And it was the best try anybody’s had so far. But it failed…it wasn’t all about 
money. It was about turf, envy, job protection, all sorts of stuff goes on human behaviour.” 
“GRD failed because of vested interest literally because people were certain quite senior 
people saw it as a threat to their job. So they took almost personal reasons they actually 
scuppered it rather than any logical or industry… There will never be a GRD. There will 
never be a central entity.” 
3.3.5.2 DDEX
“I think one of the things which is very important about DDEX is that it is about allowing 
different players in an ecosystem which is driven by experimentation, innovation, 
ferocious competition between different parties to collaborate where they need to 
and swap data in a standardised way so that the key information can flow through the 
different systems...It’s a phenomenally valuable piece of work that makes the industry 
happen which isn’t very widely recognised.” 
“We have an industry standards organisation, DDEX that everybody buys into. We’re 
trying to get away from a proprietary industry led umbrella organisations with massive 
levels distrust. And just turn it into a DDEX because then it’s apolitical. So I think the 
idea of making sure that all of the standards are within a body that is across the industry 
and has a level of respect and independence the way forward.” 
“In those DDEX conversations, the music industry and the labels are trying to get a 
sense of what the outside world needs. But there’s a three or four companies that got 
very loud voices. And for them this is a complex monopoly right. There’s not a lot of 
incentive for them to do anything that opens up the market. They’re quite happy with 
just having three or four players sharing the market between them. That works.” 
3.3.5.3 Internal systems/silos/duplication
“I think that that’s where the money gets spent and who should be paying for things 
industry wise...If one company decides to invest in its own competitive edge and it’s a 
data related competitive edge, it’s a problem for everybody else that one person has an 
advantage when that advantage comes out just a better awareness of the marketplace.” 
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3.3.6 Further barriers to progress
3.3.6.1. Lack of understanding of data
“I know that historically there’s huge gaps in the data. I’ve had a whole thing some years 
ago trying to work out who was the drummer on Delilah by Tom Jones. No one knows 
who was the drummer on Delilah by Tom Jones. There are huge problems with data and 
I’m quite sure that those problems continue to this day because we dealing with...drunken 
musicians running around doing things, so they don’t fill up forms, stuff doesn’t happen.” 
“Before metadata was publicly visible, it was a chore. They were told it’s very important 
it was legally important that they did it but it was still a chore. So their heart was never in 
it. Even now the bits that they care about most are the bits the public see. And the rest 
of it, they don’t care. A lot of them don’t really understand the nature of the objects that 
you’re dealing with.” 
“Many people are not even bothering to stake a claim to a share until they know where 
their sound recording has been a success. And as soon as you get a hit, you have all 
of this army of people saying they want this or that. So how then do you pay the right 
people when they haven’t worked out who’s who. That is a real problem.” 
“One of the problems has been described is that the artist goes into the recording 
studio, and at that point that kind of information is often recorded significantly after the 
event. So, you’re never quite sure exactly who really is playing in that studio, who the 
engineers were etc. So, lots of misinformation can happen between the recording when 
it is actually recorded.”
“There is an education role, it’s quite a simple one, which is, if you don’t give us this 
information you can’t get paid.” 
“It depends on what you want, and what your priorities are. But if you are better 
informed about what you have to give for what you will get, and be more discerning 
about who you do those deals with, then not only will artists have the option of how 
much admin they have to do, and how much they don’t, but also what a good deal 
looks like. And by return we hope that if we have better informed artists then those who 
are offering deals will hopefully need to do so in a better way.” 
“When you get to a specialist music the people who have the most knowledge and 
know about it has the least interest in putting in any system because they know it so 
they don’t then ever have to look it up or anything.”
Music 2025 - The Music Data Dilemma   |  133
“There is a learning curve to that...There are people who are not really serious about 
a career in music, but they want to get some songs up somewhere, and then there’s 
developing emerging markets where it’s probably hard to get a computer with 
spreadsheets on it. ...There’s this huge sort of innovation and creativity coming out of 
these artists and they need to be supported. But here’s the problem once you start 
letting people who are not the rights owner assign ISRCs to records or people who 
don’t really understand the system very well, then you get problems.” 
“I think songwriters and creators and artists have always been very sort of laissez faire 
with data, which is fundamentally core to their businesses. If they are small businesses, 
all they have is the IP in relation to the music they create. And yet there’s always been 
this line that somebody else’s job the manager will register things for the publisher 
register things and I’m going to be fully creative and just not do anything on this.”
3.3.6.2 Politics and asymmetrical power relations
“Computers can do whatever people tell them to do, but it’s who gets to tell computer 
what to do. That’s what most of this is actually boils down to. Machines can do 
whatever you want them to. But who agrees on who is telling them to do what is the 
political aspect of this and who’s going to pay for the machine to do this particular task 
is the other aspect to it.” 
“The entire industry has no trust. So from creator, to owner, to user, to sales platform, to 
the tech…There is the complete lack of trust because there are too many middlemen. 
You democratise the data then there has to be a level of trust...Within this industry. It 
tends to be led by lawyers. It tends to be led by wanting to protect their own interests.” 
3.3.6.3 Fragmentation and insufficient collaboration 
“I think the problem is that again you’re into silos of data. This is an international 
industry where consumption is happening across borders. There are international 
identifiers. And yet for me the problem is not all of this is joining up.”
“The industry revolves around rights that exist in particular silos; so there are publishing 
rights, there are performer rights, there are sound recording rights. The rights exist as 
separate entities and they must remain separate entities from a legal point of view. But 
what’s happened historically is that management entities have grown up in silos with the 
rights. So the interoperability piece is quite tricky, because you’ve got entire industries 
based around single rights types.” 
“You can find that move in the opposite direction and then that’s driving things up 
unnecessarily. It’s very difficult to go to the publishers and say please follow the 
following standards.” 
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3.3.6.4 Lack of governance
“The cause is the lack of understanding of the new models of distribution, and therefore 
poor governance in those who manage rights. The majority of the friction in the marketplace 
is to do with a misunderstanding and bad decision making...the music industry is still this 
big tiny opposed the potential... I think that’s more to do with a lack of governance a lack of 
understanding...The industry did very little to progress those conversations with potential 
new entrants...there was no governance from a record...it was about cost management, it 
was about downsizing ahead of the decline in the music industry.”
“It’s a complex monopoly combined with a lack of governance. At the top levels of 
those businesses...they’re still clinging onto what they’ve got, they’re worried about 
undervaluing their rights, they’re worried about losing control. They don’t recognise 
that if they create a marketplace actually well, then the value of music in an expansive 
marketplace, the value of music is only going to go one way which is up.” 
“The link between the work and the sound recording...They are completely disconnected. 
It’s the governance rules. So, even if they tell us this is the truth, if somebody else tells me 
no, it is not true. What do I do? Who is the ultimate decision maker?”
3.3.7 Creators in music data value networks
3.3.7.1 Music data and creators’ earnings
“First if you’re an artist or a songwriter and you’re trying to make ends meet, you need to 
know what works and what doesn’t work...If someone consumes the music something 
that I’ve produced, I need to know about it, the second that happens. That’s where you 
focus the effort and the initiatives, so you can map the market in terms of who might 
distribute music licenses and how that gets supplied from the existing entities.” 
“A big publisher for the record company has a [large number of] catalogue[s]. So the 
money that they get has increased. The deal that would have been done on that site 
between the songwriter and the publisher or the label and the artist will have been very 
much in favour of the corporation. So they get extra money that wasn’t there before….
[whereas] songwriters that are active now don’t have that tunnel that the long term long-
tail have.”
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3.3.7.2 Data as an asset
“Data has always been the promise and the Achilles’ heel of this industry. And the more 
data that is created, the more prospect for ownership there is. And we’ve never had 
a problem with technology. We’ve always had a problem with ownership and politics, 
part of which I think comes down to the fact that off tradition and also that the law and 
cultures change much more slowly than creativity and technology. If there is a value in 
user base and network ability, that should translate into a financial fact which is behind 
artists’ right now, but equally is a huge opportunity for music if we can get that right.” 
“The artist is the center of a larger business as well as being a business, in their own 
right. And part of the reason we support that is perhaps the business has looked at the 
other way up and seen it as the industry which works with artists, as opposed to looking 
at the engine of the industry.” 
3.3.7.3 Creators’ earnings and attribution
“It actually comes back to attribution. If you can’t recognise the numbers that George 
Harrison in The Beatles is the same George Harrison The Traveling Wilburys or whatever 
it is…then how are you going to show to consumers. This is George Harrison doing 
something different from what you’re used to and maybe you’d like this.”
3.3.7.4 Debates on the legal definition of streaming
“We have a right to license that exclusively performers right to deal with their right in the 
manner in which they wish, which tends to be by way transfer in return for a contractual 
agreement for royalties when the right is exploited which is through streaming platforms. 
Now we need to be very very careful. I think as an industry that we do not fall into the 
trap that is being set by broadcasters and by certain internet services, whereby a stream 
is treated as a broadcast, a linear communication or a public performance, because the 
fact is that that would suit very well certain players and users of the recordings, of the 
rights to pay less.” 
“Streaming is a form of communication to the public and should be treated like radio 
which we’ve always felt is a very strong argument, and it is becoming stronger every day 
because people are now using these smart speakers in their home that link to Spotify 
and all they are doing is saying ‘play me stuff by Elton John and maybe play me a song 
or give me a summer playlist...This is no different to listening to one of a proliferation 
of radio stations that you could tune into; there’s no difference at all. People are not 
selecting tracks on streaming services in the way they used to, they are being fed. So 
there’s the smart speakers use playlists all the time... Now all that is being pushed to 
you. You’re not pulling that stuff out; it’s being pushed to you. So the argument, that 
should come under equitable remuneration becomes even stronger.”
136  |  Intellectual Property Office
“I think the problem there is the separation of interactivity with streaming from non-
interactive streaming. I don’t think really there’s that much difference between the two 
the way in which streaming is developing. People are getting more and more used to 
leaning back than leaning forward streaming.”
“Unfortunately the way things are developing is evolving as if all streaming is interactive. 
I think that’s a significant problem because I think there’s quite a lot of evidence…[which 
is] people were offered too much choice. When you’re offered too much choice, you 
tend not to choose anything. And therefore you know people find things for you. And 
now music is being offered in such a huge volume, it’s much much easier for people 
to lean back in and be provided with something, rather than them to lean forward even 
though the capability is there for interactivity, the reality is that people are using it much 
less interactively.”
“Actually what was interesting here is that…the decision was to give performers a 
stronger right in making available on demand an exclusive right. The irony of this though 
is that actually the remuneration rights ended up possibly being a bit more valuable for 
performers because on informants and broadcast revenue has grown enormously in 
terms of our efforts to do that. So 15 years ago we collected about 60 million pounds a 
year just 218 last year.” 
“I just think it’s funny that actually the intention was to give performers a stronger 
exclusive rights where I think a lot of performers now are reflecting on actually in 
reality…‘I’ve given away on terms. Am I really benefiting from the upside in streaming 
and what’s going on’”.
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Appendix 4.3.2 List of interviewees
No Organisation Type
1 PRS for Music CMO
2 PPL CMO
3 County Analytics Tech
4 Universal Music Publishing Group Major Publisher
5 Blokur Blockchain
6 JAAK Blockchain
7 Mycelia Blockchain
8 British Library Tech
9 PRS for Music CMO
10 Queen Mary University Tech
11 British Lebrary/Editeur Tech
12 Universal Music Group Major Label and Publisher
13 Apple Music DSP
14 Hearofm Blockchain
15 BBC Broadcaster
16 Digital Catapult Trade Body
17 Sensore Tech
18 Clintons Solicitors Law Firm
19 MCPS/MPA Group CMO/Trade Body
20 MMF Trade Body
21 YouTube DSP
22 UK Music Trade Body
23 Beggars Music Indie Publisher
24 AIM Trade Body
25 Cooking Vinyl Indie Label
26 Digital Data Exchange Tech Trade Body
27 7 Digital DSP
28 BPI Trade Body
29 FAC Trade Body
30 PPL CMO
31 ICE CMO
32 BMG Rights Management Major Publisher
33 Beggars Group Indie Label
34 PRS for Music CMO
35 7 Digital DSP
36 BASCA/Ivors Academy Trade Body
37 PRS/Peer Music CMO / Indie Publisher
38 IFPI Trade Body
39 Independent Music Researcher Trade Body
40 The Orchard Intermediary
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No Organisation Type
41 MPG Trade Body
42 PRS Foundation CMO
43 Warner Chappell Major Publisher
44 WIN Trade Body
45 Musicians Union Trade Body
46 SCAPR CMO
47 CISAC CMO
48 Music Biz Trade Body
49 Warner Music Group Major Label and Publisher
50 Ivors Academy Trade Body
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Appendix 4.4 NVivo analysis
The diagram below illustrates the coding schemes used to analyse the content of over 50 
interviews (see interviewee list at 4.3.2). Each interview typically lasted around one hour. 
In the first stage of analysis, we transcribed the interviews as they were being conducted. 
The transcribed data, as well as the interview notes were coded under 100 initial nodes. 
At this stage, the imperative was to code interviews as tightly as possible to ensure we did 
not lose any important insights shared by interviewees. As a result, many of the passages 
were coded to two or more codes.
Towards completion of the interviews, key themes were emerging, identified through the 
initial data analysis as well as through numerous team discussions. On 17th October 2018, 
we shared these key themes in a workshop held at PRS for Music where key stakeholders 
further expressed their views on the key findings we presented.
In the second phase, we incorporated these stakeholder views and blended them with 
key points of focus from the detailed review of literature and practice carried out by the 
research team. From this stage of analysis, we extrapolated 7 top-level codes: Critical 
juncture for change, CMOs, Barriers to progress, Industry practices, Industry identifiers, 
Recent industry initiatives and Creators. The initial 100 nodes were merged to 23 sub-
codes and 24 sub-sub-codes, which were then grouped together under appropriate top-
level codes. 
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Glossary of acronyms:
General organisations
ASCAP – American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers
AMRA – American Music Rights Association
AURA – Association of United Recording Artists
BIEM - Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les Droits d’Enregistrement et de 
Reproduction Mécanique (International Office for Mechanical Rights Societies)
BL - British Library
BMI – Broadcast Music Inc.
BNF - Bibliothèque Nationale de France
CISAC - Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs
CMO – Collective Management Organisation
DDEX – Digital Data Exchange
DSP - Digital Service Provider
EC – European Commission
EU – European Union
GEMA -Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs-und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte (German PRO)
GVL - Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (German CMO)
HFA - Harry Fox Agency (US Mechanical Licenses)
ICE – International Copyright Enterprise
IFPI – International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
IPO - UK Intellectual Property Office 
IMRO - Irish Music Rights Organisation (Irish PRO)
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ISO - International Organisation for Standardization
MCPS – Mechanical Copyright Protection Society
NMPA - National Music Publishers Association (US)
PAMRA – Performing Artists Media Rights Association
PPL – Phonographic Performance Limited
PRO – Performance Rights Organisation
PRS – Performing Rights Society
RAAP – Recorded Artists, Actors & Performers (Irish CMO)
SACEM - Société des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs de musique (French PRO)
SCAPR – Society of Collection Agencies for Performers Rights
SESAC - Society of European Stage Authors & Composers244 (US PRO)
STIM - Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå (Swedish PRO)
SUISA - SUISse Auteurs (Swiss PRO)
WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organisation
244 full name no longer used
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Identifiers
CAE - Compositeur /Auteur /Éditeur (Composer/Author/Publisher)
CWR - Common Works Registration
EAN - European Article Number
EDI - Electronic Data Interchange
GRD - Global Repertoire Database
IPD - International Performers Directory
IPI - Interested Party Identifier
IPN - International Performer Number 
ISBN - International Standard Book Number
ISNI - International Standard Name Identifier
ISMN - International Standard Music Number
ISTC - International Standard Text Code
ISRC - International Standard Recording Code
ISWC - International Standard Musical Work Code
MBID - MusicBrainz Identifier
RIN - Recording Information Notification
UPC - Universal Product Code
VIAF - Virtual International Authority File
VRDB - Virtual Recording Database
WID - Works Information Database 
Legislation
DMCA – Digital Millennium Copyright Act
DEA – Digital Economy Act
ER – Equitable Remuneration
GDPR - General Data Protection Regulation
MLC - Music Licensing Company - Mechanical License Collective (under MMA)
MMA – Music Modernization Act
Representative bodies
AIM – Association of Independent Music
BASCA – British Academy of Songwriters, Composers & Authors (Ivors Academy)
BPI – British Phonographic Industry
FAC – Featured Artist Coalition
IMPEL - Independent Music Publishers e-Licensing
IMPALA - Independent Music Producers & Labels Association
MERLIN - Independent Labels Digital Licensing Association
MMF – Music Managers Forum
MPA – Music Publishers Association
MPG – Music Producers Guild
MU – Musicians Union 
UK Music 
WIN – Worldwide Independent Network
Other
MIDEM - Marché International du Disque et de l’Edition Musicale (Annual Music Industry 
Summit - Cannes Fr.)
SXSW - South By Southwest (Music & Tech Summit - Austin Texas, USA)
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